Кризата в Украйна 2013-2014 г.

[Eguo]

Сърби в подкрепя за Русия.

26.03.2014 Болельщики сербской «Црвены Звезды» встретили украинский «Будивельник» российским флагом Фанаты сербской баскетбольной команды «Црвена Звезда» во время матча с украинскими спортсменами из «Будивельника» растянули огромный флаг России и спели «Катюшу»

[Bulgarion]

И друго, при евентуална война, ще пострадат със сигурност газопроводите нали, е, как според вас ще се отрази на ЕС и в частност България.
И има ли Украйна потенциал за ниско-интензивна партизанска война, ако предположим че бързо загуби конвенционалната и Янукович се върне триумфално в Киев
И тъй като горното ми звучи наистина невероятно Тогава целта явно ще е териториална анексия на юго-изтока.

[Bulgarion]

Егуо, това за сърбите е ясно ,че ще е така.
Според мен просто нещата имат много общо с юго-войните като психология и манталитет.Както сега украйнците са фашисти и бандеровци, такива бяха и хърватите - усташи и фашисти, според сръбските медии. Тогава и етническия и религиозния национализъм (шовинизъм дори) бе в подем,което от сръбска страна дори бе миксирано с носталгия по титова Югославия, което в случая е носталгия по СССР.

[Eguo]

Както сега руснацити са комунисти и москали според бандеровски медии. етническия и религиозния национализъм (шовинизъм дори) сега в подем,което от бандеровска страна дори бе миксирано с носталгия по гитлеровски Рейх

И има ли Украйна потенциал за ниско-интензивна партизанска война,

Разбира се, да.

Виц.
Почему в Чехословакии не было партизан?
Ответ - потому, что немецкое командование запрещало .

Бандеровцы не такие... партизанить для них - это удовольствие.

[NATAN]

И пак Аляска....

[Amazon]

Как мислите има ли наистина шанс за това, или е слух за вътрешна (а донякъде и външна) употреба ?
До днес бях сигурен че едва ли ще има нова ескалация и дори война, но сега почвам да се колебая.
Въпроса наистина е какви са ползите и какви са загубите от една подобна интервенция явно е, че Путин би го одобрил, ако сметне че ползите са повече.Вие как мислите

Според мен тази заплаха си свърши работата и скоро ще започнат да се изтеглят от границата с Украйна. Най-късно след изборите. Днес Меркел и Канадският премиер, направо си казаха, че санкции ще има ако Русия започне инвазия в източна Украйна. Търговията явно е приключила. Крим е изтъргуван и салфетките са подпечатани. Реални санкции няма да има, но според мен ЕС и САЩ, ще си запазят картата ако се наложи да я използват до изборите през май.
Така че ако украинците спрат да клатят лодката и не изберат Юлка(тя днес се кандидатира) или Боксьорчето(още не е, явно е по-умен) за президент, си запазват държавата. Засега.

[Bulgarion]

Както сега руснацити са комунисти и москали според бандеровски медии. етническия и религиозния национализъм (шовинизъм дори) сега в подем,което от бандеровска страна дори бе миксирано с носталгия по гитлеровски Рейх

Определено и това го има, само с часта за райха, не мисля че е така

[1951]

ИЗВЪНРЕДНО: "Десен сектор" щурмува украинския парламент

http://offnews.bg/news/%D0%A1%D0%B2%D1%8F%D1%82-_12/%D0%98%D0%97%D0%92%D0%AA%D0%9D%D0%A0%D0%95%D0%94%D0%9D%D0%9E-%D0%94%D0%B5%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%BD-%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%BA%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%80-%D1%89%D1%83%D1%80%D0%BC%D1%83%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D1%83%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%B0%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82_316000.html

[кало]

http://offnews.bg/news/%D0%A1%D0%B2%...82_316000.html

като говорим за повод... плюс евентуална молба от законния президент, плюс подкрепата на едни доброволци... Не знам доколко е реално, но ИМХО танковете и прочее край Белгород и т.н. не са никак случайни. Досега операцията наистина беше учтива и вежлива, без жертви и без стрелба почти (малко във въздуха за страх на решилите да се правят на герои морячета). Ако сега се случи нещо, стрелбата няма да е във въздуха.

ИМХО, обаче - силно се съмнявам да има каквато и да е военна операция.

[1951]

Тук на живо:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y_LFrMcoEm4

Какво точно става не е много ясно, но поне в момента нещата изглеждат относително спокойни.

[кало]

Да, тази вечер - само заплахи, започват да се разотиват.

[Рамбо Амадеус]

Дилеми в международните отношения като функция на Украинската криза

Интересна статия, първоначално публикувана в Огон¸к, а след това публикувана на инглизки в Russia Direct, сайт афилииран с Foreign Policy Magazine. Авторът анализира ситуацията през призмата на Баланса на Силите и, съответно, идеологическите заряди отсъстват - нещо, което силно ценя в академичната литература.

Интересното тук е трезвата преценка на ситуацията, която поставя повечето играчи пред сериозни дилеми, тоест, пред нуждата за взимане на взаимно-противоречащи си външно-политически решения и посоки на действие.

Ще си позволя да цитирам някои от по-важните, според мен, дилеми, които са описани в статията. Удебеляването, италикс, подчертаването и нумерацията в текста са от мен. Извинения на хората, които се дразнят от подобен вид форматиране. За пълната статия, кликнете на заглавието.

Russia has positioned itself at the epicenter of global politics
Mar 26, 2014 | Fyodor Lukyanov, Ogonyok magazine

Отношенията между РФ и САЩ

Washington, of course, is not interested in Ukraine itself, but the undesirable precedent of open rebellion against the rules of conduct that have been in place for more than two decades. Never before have they been so breezily and unambiguously rejected as in the case of Crimea. Now the U.S. has to solve a problem with multiple baseline conditions:

1. The first is the need to firmly demonstrate that the U.S. will not permit a revision of the outcome of the Cold War. This is important, since all current international practices are largely built on recognition of the fact that the Americans won the confrontation, and therefore have the right to dictate the world order.

2. Second, the U.S. must retain the possibility of operational cooperation with Moscow, because the latter still has considerable influence where many of Washington’s interests lie. The Middle East, the most intense region of U.S.-Russian sparring in the last two or three years, remains highly explosive, and having Russia as a firm opponent there would not serve the U.S. well.

3. Third, the U.S. cannot ignore the long-term prospect that the dissociation of the West from Russia will accelerate the latter’s relations with China, which is considered to be the main challenger to future U.S. hegemony. Washington still proceeds from the fact that Moscow will not allow itself to become Beijing’s junior partner.

But in the new circumstances, a change is almost inevitable. So it is likely that at some stage in the U.S. discourse on the need to punish Russia for "aggression" an additional element will appear: A reminder that a Russian alliance with China is extremely undesirable for America.

A combination of these three trends will determine the balance of the measures, the severity and scope of the sanctions, and the degree of flexibility in their application. There are more subjective factors at play: the pre-election interests of congressmen (i.e. the midterm election in the fall) and the overall reputation of Obama, who is accused of weakness and indecision and needs to demonstrate his capability. Since economically the U.S. depends little on Russia, we can expect to see some fairly draconian sanctions of a financial and economic nature to show which nation really controls the world economy.

Безсилието на Европа

Europe is in the opposite position. It has already demonstrated to the world its total political failure as an international player, and its economic interdependence with Russia is great. The Old World may be among the main losers from the crisis. Under pressure from the U.S., which is annoyed by the EU’s incapacity, it may have to impose sanctions against Moscow that are mutually disadvantageous and harmful to sections of its own economy, while also picking up the tab for saving Ukraine from collapse.

The EU’s ambitions of self-sufficiency are likely to be buried eventually as it returns under the wing of the U.S., which will consolidate the arrangements on transatlantic trade and investment partnership on its own terms. Especially at risk is Germany, for which the Ukrainian crisis marked not only the country’s debut as a political leader, but also its role as Europe’s frontman. The mere fact that a power of this caliber, used to a shadow role, was forced to act as the mouthpiece of the anti-Russian campaign shows that the EU mechanism works very inefficiently.

РФ и Източна Азия

Another loser is Japan. Over the course of his one-year tenure, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has put a lot of effort into establishing relations with Vladimir Putin, and the ice is clearly broken... but is now draining away. Tokyo was forced to show solidarity with the other members of the G7 and criticize Moscow in the strongest terms, although the Japanese rapprochement with Russia in Asia is far more important than the fate of Ukraine. For them, Russia’s drift towards Beijing is an existential danger. Partly — though to a much lesser extent — Japan’s Ukrainian headache is shared by South Korea, the other staunch U.S. ally in this part of the world.

China clearly has the upper hand. Its position, as always, is a model of balanced pragmatism. Officially, it cannot support Moscow because the legality of the annexation is dubious, but it understands why Russia acted the way it did and is ready to provide extensive informal and economic support. Beijing, of course, does not want to see Moscow lose the battle for Ukraine, since that would strengthen the U.S., its main adversary.

And China is willing to use this opportunity to accelerate the Kremlin’s turn eastwards. It is important for Beijing to get Moscow’s infrastructural reorientation towards Asia under way, so it is willing to finance projects that strategically bind Russia to China. In other words, China is calculating that by the 2020s, when the strategic rivalry with the U.S. is likely to take on a new military-political dimension, Russia will have no slack to play with and will have to side with its Asian neighbor. A separate task is to gain Moscow’s support in territorial disputes in Asia and to prevent a rapprochement between Russia and Japan.

Третият свят, развиващите се страни и Близкият Изток

The third world is watching the unfolding events with some surprise, but expects to profit by it. A rerun of the Cold War, when the superpowers paid generously for loyalty, is not in the cards, but the appearance of a rigid opponent of the West in the form of Russia is of interest to many. Most of the world is tired of the lack of alternatives. Russia will not gain recognition of its actions, but can expect to avoid a total blockade in case of further aggravation with the West.

Developing countries are refusing to fall in line and are instead using the discord between the giant powers to strengthen their own positions. A diverting statement was made by Argentine President Cristina Kirchner, who supported the Crimean referendum by equating it to the desire of Buenos Aires to regain jurisdiction of the Falkland Islands. Such extravagant support from distant countries is possible, but it does not impact the fact of the matter.

Iran stands apart. It is counting on a rapid growth of relations with Russia, which are still limited by Moscow’s reluctance to exacerbate ties with the West. The whole Middle Eastern canvas could be transformed if Russia begins to oppose U.S. policy and that of its allies even more than before.

Generally speaking, Moscow has an opportunity to capitalize on the enhanced reputation it gained from its handling of the Syrian conflict and due to its principled stance on the issue. [U]Many Arab countries have been probing to see whether Russia intends to act as a regional counterbalance to America, which has lost part of its authority, but until recently did not find strong support. Now Russia's intentions can change. An indicator of Moscow’s willingness to review its political relations with the U.S. will be the fate of the NATO transit point at Ulyanovsk. So far, despite the frenzy, not a word has been mentioned about it on either side.

РФ и НАТО

The alliance may, incidentally, find a new meaning, lacking since the collapse of the USSR. Eastern Europe’s call for an anti-Russian mobilization could breathe life into the old military bloc, for a period. After all, Article 5 on Collective Defense clearly refers to Russian aggression. However, a recurrence of the Cold War will not change the financial situation of NATO members: No one is willing to spend big on defense. So bellicose statements and symbolic acts could be as far as it goes.

Incidentally, an expansion of NATO is hardly likely. It went so smoothly in the 1990s-2000s precisely because the new countries were in no need of real security guarantees, only psychological ones. They could be accepted without fear of having to defend them. Now the situation is quite different: The potential adoption of Ukraine, Moldova, or Georgia imposes a duty to enter into a military confrontation with Russia on their behalf, which no one needs. Another point is that the intensification of military cooperation with these post-Soviet countries is almost inevitable.

Заключение

How the Crimean campaign will affect the future of the CIS and the integration projects and policies of the former Soviet republics is a major topic on its own. From a global perspective, the Ukrainian drama is perceived paradoxically. By itself, with all due respect to the people of Ukraine and countries that play an active role in its politics, it is not of central importance to the world.

However, Ukraine has become the quintessential global issue, mixing together the contradictions of the basic principles of the UN Charter (self-determination vs. territorial integrity) with the double standards and the lack of balance in the world, the triumph of media images over reality, and legal chaos. Russia finds itself at the center of this 21st century tangle. The central role does not always win the plaudits, and often takes all kinds of flak. But Moscow has sought to return to such a position since the beginning of the 1990s. And now the dream has come true.

[Thorn]

и на руски

http://www.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Krym-na-ves-mir-16515

[Todor Pavlov]

Рамбо, приеми почитанията ми за увлекателното повествование, което споделяш . Удоволствие е да бъдеш четен !
Молбата ми е за руската версия на последното, ако е възможно .
Поздрави !

ПП
Торн го е представил междувременно, за което му благодаря !

[Гост]

Има само едно нещо, което не е съвсем точно - общественото мнение в САЩ е по-скоро против намеса в Украйна- http://news.ibox.bg/news/id_1888518850 Рейтингът на Обама спада, защото се занимава с разни далечни зами, вместо с проблемите в самата страна - а не защото не се държи достатъчно мъжкарски с Путин