Bulgarian Artillery in WW1

[MCP]

The growth of the Bulgarian Artillery : 1891 - 1904

In 1891 the Sixth Ordinary National Assembly passed the “Law for the organization of the Armed Forces of the Principality of Bulgaria” preparared by the War Minister, colonel Mihail Savov. It lay the foundations of the Bulgarian Army and provided a remarkable strengthening of the artillery, that should be composed by :
- 6 artillery regiments with 6 four-guns field batteries in peace, and 6 eight-guns batteries in wartime (six guns for the mortars batteries);
- 6 mountains half batteries in peace, that should be expanded to 6 six-guns batteries with the mobilitazition;
- 3 fortress artillery battalions with 3 companies each in peace, and 4 in wartime;
- 6 reserve artillery batteries with 4 sections each, that should be expanded to 4-6 six-guns batteries with the mobilization;
- 6 four-guns mountain batteries, that should be raised at the mobilization;
- 6 four-guns field replacement batteries, that should be raised with the mobilization.
This meant that in wartime the Bulgarian artillery would have all together 78/90 batteries with 504/576 guns (408/480 field, 60 mountain, and 36 mortars), not counting the fortress artillery. All the field batteries of the active army should be armed with 87mm guns, while the 75mm guns should be assigned to the reserve batteries (2nd, 3rd, 5th), along with the old 9 pdr Russian guns (1st and 6th) and the short range 9cm Krupp guns (4th). Later all the reserve batteries would be re-equipped with modern guns. They brought the number of the Infantry Division at whom they were attached, and not of the relative artillery regiments. In order to have also some artillery pieces that could fire at high elevations with the curved trajectory, one battery in every regiment should be armed with 120mm field mortars.

Some changes were introduced by the law passed by the Tenth Ordinary National Assembly in 1897, when the War Minister was colonel Nikola Ivanov. The reserve artillery regiments were disbanded, and gave their gun to the active regiments, that were then composed by 3 active and 1 reseve division, each with 3 six-guns batteries. Only the active batteries, however, were horsed in peace. Finally, after a debate lasted many years, the batteries were reduced to 6 guns, and new units were raised with the surplus guns.
The mortars, now designed howitzer, were attached to the fortress artillery. A 5th company was added to each fortress artillery battalion. The mountain batteries were detached from the artillery regiments and formed 3 independent divisions, with 3 six-guns batteries each, garrisoned respectively at Berkovitza, Samokov and Plovdiv. Later with an Order of 3 June 1899 they were administratively grouped into a mountaining artillery with headquartes at Sofia, while the division kept their previous garrison.

In order to arm the new units, the Bulgarian War Ministry should purchase a great number of artillery piece. In 1891 an order was planned for 192 – 87mm field guns (24 batteries), 30 – 75mm mountain guns (5 batteries), and 36 – 120mm mortars (6 batteries). But it was not made in a single settlement, since the military Budget did not allow a so considerable expediture, expecially because at the same time it was necessary to a modernize also the heavy artillery, required to attack the fortress of Odrin, in the event of a war against Turkey. Therefore such order was divided between different financial years.
In 1891 a contract was signed for 72 – 87mm field guns with 24 ammunition wagons, 18 – 120mm mortars, and 6 – 75mm mountain guns. The same year two other orders were made : to Krupp for 26 – 150mm and 120mm heavy guns, and to Gruson for 30 – 57mm light quickfiring guns in armoured housing. all the guns were delivered between 1892 and 1893.
Later another 12 field guns, 6 mountain guns, and 12 mortars were ordered in Germany. It seems that at least one field battery was armed with 75mm guns, that should be assigned to the 1st battery of the 4th artillery regiment at Sofia, to be attached in wartime to as horse artillery to the Cavalry Division. The last mortar battery, that should have been assigned to the artillery regiment was never bought, and was replaced by another field battery.
The last big order before the introduction of the quick-firing artillery came in February 1897, when 108 – 87mm guns with 10,000 shells were ordered to Krupp, while an order fo 18 mountain guns and 48 heavy artillery pieces had been signed with the French firm Schneider-Canet only a few days before. This was the first time that the Bulgarian artillery purchased French guns, and it happened after a long debate, and under the conflicting pressure of the French and German governments.
In fact the Bulgarian War Ministry was not satisfied with the Krupp mountain artillery adopted in 1886 regarded the Schneider guns superior to the Krupp ones. In addition the French diplomacy threatened to refuse the loan of 30 million franks, vitally important for the Bulgarian economy. Above all the Bulgarian Army was traying to free itself from the dependence on the factories of a single country, thinking that it could be very dangerous if it adopted an hostile politics towards Bulgaria. On the other end, the pro-German party, supported and endowed by the Krupp agent at Sofia, Kaufmann, was still very powerful within the Bulgarian officer’s circles. In February Friedrich Krupp himself wrote to Knyaz Ferdinand emphasizing that an order given to a French firm should be regarded as an attack against his own reputation.
The solution was a sort of compromise. The main order was directed to Krupp, to keep the uniformity of the field artillery batteries. In fact Schneider equipped its guns with a different breech mechanism, and at that time had not an 87mm gun, therefore adopting French weapons the Bulgarian Army should change entirely the features of its artillery matériel. The heavy artillery, regarded as more moveable than the Krupp ones, and the mountain guns were purchased in France, also because Schneider made significant concessions to the Bulgarian Government with regard to the price and terms of payement of the weapons.

The field guns were the standard Krupp 87mm Mantelkanone adopted already in 1885, with only little changes and updates. The Schneider mountain guns was similar to the Krupp ones, bought after the war against Serbia. The calibre, weight and ballistic performances were almost the same, and they could fire the same ammunition of the Krupp guns. The only difference was that were fitted with a screw breech block with a plastic obturator, instead of the cylindro-prismatic wedge breech mechanism, peculiar to the German guns.
The 120mm field howitzers, at first designed mortars as in the Russian Army, had been intesely tested in the Krupp proving ground at Meppen in 1886-1888 with positive results, popularized by the official report of the firm Krupp Nr. 80 published in 1890. Besides Bulgaria, also the Turkish Government was favourably impressed by this piece and ordered 72 howitzers to arm two artillery regiment, with 6 six-guns batteries each, attached to the II and III Army Corps, both deployed in Europe, at Odrin and Monastir.
These howitzers however were regarded as poorly mobile, both for the excessive weight and the peculiar features of the piece in marching order. This fault clearly appeared during the march that the mortars of the 3rd artillery regiment without ammunition wagons made from Plovdiv to Shumen and back in 1893. The movement of the whole battery, equipped with all the carts and wagon required in wartime, was even more difficult.

At the end of the 19th century the Bulgarian artillery was also provided with optical devices. In 1892 the Russian Army tested at Officers Rifle School at Oranienbaum a great number of rangefinder in order to choose the best device for equip its infantry units. On 5 August 1892 finally the Commission decided to adopt the prismatic pocket rangefinder invented by the French captain Souchier in 1888 (brevet 186052 du 20 octobre 1888), instructor at the École normale de tir at Châlons. That device was judged strong, light, extremely reliable and portable, accurate and easy to use, and above all very cheap. It was assigned to every infantry company, cavalry squadron and Cossak sotnia. On 1 May 1894 it was adopted also by the French infantry battalions.
It could be employed only for infantry, since its accuracy decreased for ranges up to 1000 m. The Russian captain Eroguin, however, invented a simple device to adapt the rangefind to the Army field glass. In that way, the rangefìnder could easily measure ranges from 5 km to 8 km, being utilizable also by the artillery.
The Bulgarian Army followed once more the Russian exemple and adopted the jumelle-télémètre Souchier (далекомер Суше) for its artillery, while no rangefinder was introduced for the infantry units. At the end of the century every battery received a rangefinder and the rules issued in 1902 stressed that firing at medium and long ranges, the distance should always determined by rangefinder.
It is interesting to notice that sometimes the western sources called the rangefinder adopted by the Russian and Bulgarian Army “Suchet” (Handbook of the Bulgarian Army, p. 36, Streffleurs militärische Zeitschrift, 50 (1895), p. 49) or “Souchet” (Rivista di Artiglieria e Genio, IX/4 (1892), pp. 298-303), but this was only a transliteration mistake of the cyrillic Суше.

In 1903 the Thirteenth Ordinary National Assembly passed a new “Law for the organization of the Armed Forces of the Principality of Bulgaria”, that provided for a radical reform of the Bulgarian Army. On the basis of the Russian “Provisional state for the field direction of the army and the organization of the rear”, the Army Corps was adopted as main battle unit. Therefore the infantry divisions should expand in army corps, and the brigades in divisions. As for the artillery, in peace every infantry division should have an artillery regiment with 6 six-guns batteries, and in wartime it should add a third artillery division with 3 six-guns batteries. With the introduction of the quick-firing gun, instead of a regiment with 54 not quick-firing guns, the infantry divisions should receive two artillery regiments, each with 6 four-guns batteries. In addition the law planned the creation of a mountain artillery brigade with 18 six-guns batteries grouped into six independant divisions, and 3 fortress battalions with 8 companies each.
Unfortunately a great number of the units planned in 1903 remained only on paper. The Army Corps were never established and both in the Balkans wars and in World War I the main battle unit of the Bulgarian Army remained the Infantry Division, that, although composed by only three brigades, had as many infantry battalions as the army corps of most of the great powers (France, Germany, Italy, Great Britain).
Especially the artillery could develop very slowly, both for the restrictions on the budget of the War Ministry, and the need of replacing the existing artillery pieces with new quick-firing guns. Therefore in 1904 only 3 artillery regiment were raised, and, instead of 9 brigades with 18 regiments, the Bulgarian artillery could deploy only 9 regiments, of whom 6 with 9 (6 horsed), and 3 with only 6 batteries, while the mountain artillery had half of the planned artillery divisions (3 instead of 6). Still at the beginning of the War against Turkey every Bugarian Infantry Division could mobilize only one quick-firing artillery regiment, while the second was armed with the outdated not quick-firing Krupp guns.

[MCP]

The growth of the Bulgarian Artillery : 1885 - 1891

In 1885, at the beginning of the war against Serbia, the Bulgarian artillery was mainly composed by old Russian guns reinforced by a handful of short range guns of various patterns taken from the Turks in 1877-78. The only available modern guns were 18 – 87mm and 29 – 75mm long range guns, manufactured by Krupp. They were assigned to the three first batteries of the two existing artillery regiment, while the other three batteries were armed with the old 9 pdr Russian steel and bronze guns M. 1867.
The 9 pdr guns, however, were regarded as unfit for field service. They were too heavy, weighting twice as the 75mm and one time and a half as the 87mm field gun, whereas the topographical conditions of the Bulgarian borders required that artillery was light and mobile. In addition the muzzle velocity of their shells was too small, and consequently the slope and accuracy of their fire were inadequate. If their range was sufficient and their blasting charge was great – twice as the 87mm and even three times as the 75mm gun – their effectiveness was inferior, since the shell exploding produced less fragments, that scattered in a more little area. Being weighty, slow and unable to operate in the probable theaters of operations of the Bulgarian Army, the 9 pdr guns could be effectively employed only as fortress and siege guns, where their powerful fire could be still useful. Actually they were removed from the line units, but were employed as position guns even during World War I.

The replacement of the outdated Russian artillery with modern guns became a priority for the Bulgarian Army. Already at the end of August 1885 a contract with the German firm Krupp had been signed to provide 48 – 75mm and 87mm field guns with 24 000 shells (500 per gun) and the equipment required to form 6 new batteries. Unfortunately they were not received in time to take part in the war. Part of the shells arrived on 10 November, while the others only after the armistice. The first batch of the guns (16 pieces) arrived on February 1886, while the remaining 32 at the end of August. After the war the Bulgarian Army purchased another 6 field and 3 mountain batteries, with 76 Krupp guns in all. They were used to replace the 9 pdr Russian guns and to equip the 3rd artillery regiment. Consequently the Russian guns, both the 9 pdr and the 4 pdr, were assigned to the fortress artillery. After the delivery of the last guns, the Bulgarian artillery were composed by 3 regiments, each with 6 eight-guns batteries. In peace however only 4 guns were horsed. In every regiment 1st, 2nd and 3rd battery were armed with 75mm guns, while 4th, 5th and 6th battery with 87mm guns.

The decision to adopt German guns can be easily explained. After the Franco-Prussian war, the Imperial German Army was regarded as the most powerful army in the world and Krupp, taking advantage of this favorable situation, became the most important exporter of guns and heavy weapons. At that time almost all the Balkan countries choose Krupp guns for their artillery : Turkey already in 1873, Greece in 1878 and Romania in 1881. Only Serbia preferred the French 80mm guns system De Bange.
Among the powers that adopted Krupp field guns there was also Russia, that in 1877-78 had seen its bronze artillery outraged by the steel Krupp breechloaders employed by the Turks. Already in 1877, at the beginning of the war, it was decided to change the system from bronze to steel and 1500 guns were ordered from Krupp’s factory, while preparations were made to construct the same guns at the Obuchov factory, near Sankt Petersburg. The Bulgarians, that had received their first Krupp guns in 1884 by the Russian Army, decided to follow the exemple of their liberators.

All the long range guns were manufactured by Krupp and were very similar, nevertheless there were some minor differences among them. The old guns, dating back to the Russo-Turkish war, were “built-up guns” (Ringkanone) made of several layers of forged steel. They were composed by the liner, the tube, the jacket and the hoops. The liner was a single piece which extended the length of the bore and was intended to contain the rifling and the powder chamber. It was inclosed by the tube, which was too in one piece, surrounding the liner throughout its length. On the outside of it there was the jacket, made in two pieces and shrunk on the tube. Over the jacket lied six hoops, which, like the jacket, were shrunk on. The trunnions were carried on one of the hoops.
The new guns, bought from 1885 onwards, were known as Mantelkanone. The tube without reinforce, was encircled by a single band or mantle (Mantel, in German) shrunk on and carrying trunnions and fermature. The object of this was to substitute for the thick walls of the old models, thinner metal, susceptible of compression by the mantle, thus increasing its strenght, and obtaining greater resistance with less weight. The shot chamber of the 75mm gun was rifled and conic, while the chamber of the 87mm gun was smooth and cylindric.

Both the models were provided with a round backed wedge, which was pushed in from the side of the breech, and forced firmly home by a screw provided with handles. The face of the wedge was fitted with an easily removable flat plate, which abuted against a Broadwell ring, let into a recess in the end of the bore. A friction primer placed in a vent on the top of the ring ignited the propellant charge. On firing, the gas presseed the ring firmly against the flat plate, and rendered escape impossible as long as the surfaces remained uninjured. When they became worn, the ring and the plate could be exchanged in a few minutes.
There were other minor differences between the two models of gun, introduced according with the lesson learned of the Russo-Turkish War and present also in the Krupp guns adopted by the Russian Army. The breech-block and the sight were improved, while the elevating gear consisted on an arc divided into 16 partitions and was connected with the sighting gear in order to allow to change the sighting angle simply working on the handwheel. The back of the carriage was reinforced and its link with the limber changed. The gun was hooked through a trail eye fixed by two screws and it could be easily removed and replaced when it was damaged. Previously when the trail eye wore and its diameter increased owing to the continuous friction, it could be replaced only in the Arsenal.

The first modern mountain guns were purchased in 1886. Initially they were provided with a carriage similar to those of the 75mm Krupp mountain guns M. 1877 adopted by the Swiss Army. The weight of barrel and shell was almost the same, but the muzzle velocity of the Bulgarian gun was greater (294 m/s against 256 m/s), so it was unable to withstand the force of the recoil to such a degree that sometime it overturned. Therefore in 1892 these carriages were removed, sent back to Essen, and replaced with more strong ones. To be more stable they had longer trails and a low wheelbase.
In order to arrest the recoil both the old and the new carriages used a rope brake. On the recoil, the rope was tied between the brake beam and the hub and the brake beam were thus pressed against the wheels. When the gun moved forward, the rope running from the hub was relaxed and arrest stopped. In such a way the recoil, that in a flat and solid ground was more than paces, could be reduced to only 2-3. But the recoil strength had another negative effect. After the shot, the elevating screw fell down owing to the recoil, and the aimer wasted much time to lift up it again at the same position where the shot had been fired.
As a consequence of all these disadvantages the rapidity of fire of these guns was not very great. They were however employed during the Balkan Wars and even in the early stage of the World War 1, when 24 of them were still on duty. With these gun at the beginning of 1888 every artillery regiment raised one pack artillery section, and at the end of the same year they were expanded into half batteries.

In 1886 the units that had taken part in the military conspiracy that had forced Knyaz Aleksandar Battenberg to leave Sofia and to sign his abdication, were disbanded, and new units were raised to replace them. Also the artillery was involved in the turmoil, and on 26 August 1886 1st artillery regiment was disbanded, and a new 4th regiment took its place, in Sofia. During troubled years of the regency the development of the Bulgarian Army suffred a temporary setback, and in 1888, after the arrival of Knyaz Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, the Bulgarian artillery was in a great disadvantage compared to its neighbours, since Serbia had recently ordered 270 field 80mm guns system De Bange, while Romania had 300 Krupp field guns and Turkey, not including the artillery placed in Arabia, Lybia, and in the islands, had 1068 Krupp field guns, 642 of them deployed in Europe. To fill the gap and reach the right ratio between guns and bayonets, which at that time was fixed in about 3 guns every 1,000 bayonets, the Bulgarian Army should double the number of its guns. Therefore in 1889 three new artillery regiments were raised. The problem was how to arm them.
The best thing seemed to adopt only the 87mm gun. In fact Turkey and Romania had the same Krupp guns of Bulgaria and in the same proportion – half of the light and half of the heavy model – so it was desirable to have the most powerful guns in greater proportion. As for the Serbian guns, they were heavier and less moving of both the Bulgarian field guns, but their fire, although inferior to the 87mm, was more effective than the 75mm. Furthermore the light gun was not only less powerfull, but its shell was also so light (4.3 kg) and its blasting charge so small (100 g), that even at the distance of about 1000 m, the the explosion could be hardly observed, since the smoke and the dust raised by the fall of the shells could not be clearly see for their small size.
But to arm six artillery regiments entirely with 87mm guns, Bulgaria had to bought roughly 250 guns, with all their attachments : ammunition wagons, tool carts, field forges, spare carriages, ammunitions, and so on. Such an amount of military hardware could not be purchase in a single settlement with the restricted budget of the Bulgarian War Minister. The only effective solution was to advance by degrees. In 1888 major Konstatin Nikiforov, who had been War Minister in 1885-86, proposed to reduce the number of the guns in the battery from 8 to 6 and to assign 2 batteries armed with 75mm guns to every artillery regiment, while the remaining 4 batteries should be equipped with the more powerfull 87mm guns. In this way with only 72 guns, the Bulgarian Army would have six artillery regiments with 36 guns each. Major Nikiforov thought that such units would be more powerful not only than the Serbian ones, armed only with 80mm guns, but also than the Turkish and Romanian ones, having a higher proportion of 87mm guns (66% against 50%).

The proposal of major Nikiforov nevertheless was not entirely accepted : the contract signed with the German firm Krupp provided for the delivery of 72 - 87mm guns, but the batteries remained with 8 guns, and the new guns were uniformly shared among the existing unitss. At the beginning of 1888 every artillery regiment raised a 7th battery, followed by an 8th battery at the end of the same year.

During the 1889 three new regiments were raised, simply dividing in half the existing ones :
- the 4th regiment (Sofia) raised the 1st regiment at Samokov,
- the 3rd (Plovdiv) raised the 6th regiment at Sliven,
- the 2nd, that was trasferred to Vratza, raised the 5th, that remained at Shumen.
The mountain artillery batteries were attached to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th artillery regiments. Every regiment had only 4 eight-guns batteries, and were assigned to the Infantry Division as follows :
- 1st artillery regiment to 5th Dunavska Division,
- 2nd artillery regiment to 6th Bdinska Division,
- 3rd artillery regiment to 2nd Trakiyska Division,
- 4th artillery regiment to 1st Sofiyska Division,
- 5th artillery regiment to 4th Preslavska Division,
- 6th artillery regiment to 3rd Balkanska Division.

[MCP]

Serbian War tropheis in 1912-13

According with KUTSCHBACH, Die Serben im Balkankrieg 1912-1913 und im Kriege gegen die Bulgaren, Stuttgart 1913, pp. 95-96, during the Balkan War the Serbian Army captured from the Turks:
- 39 855 magazine rifles and carbines,
- 8 machine guns with 33 barrels,
- 126 field guns (Krupp 75mm QF),
- 6 mountain guns (Krupp 75mm QF),
- 30 field howitzers (Krupp 120mm),
- 47 403 cases with infantry ammunitions,
- 16 977 shrapnels and 4852 shells for field guns,
- 919 shrapnels and 1811 shells for field howitzers,
- 216 ordinary shells.

According with the same book, p. 127, during the Intrallied War the 1st and 2nd Serbian Army captured from the Bulgars:
- 5 000 magazine rifles and carbines,
- 7 machine guns,
- 11 QF field guns,
- 30 Krupp not QF field guns,
- 7 mountain guns,
- 2 Gruson 57mm QF turret guns,
- 30 ammunition wagons.
As for the artillery, these numbers are different from those published in 1914 in several newspapers and taken from a report of the Bulgarian Inspector of Artillery, maj. gen. Panteley Tzenov. His report stated that the Serbs captured only 20 QF and 12 not QF field guns. Since the Gruson guns were not listed, it is possible that the fortress guns lost at Belogradchik (2 Gruson and 30 Krupp guns according Kutschbach) were not taken into account by gen. Tzenov.

[MCP]

The lesson of the Balkan Wars on artillery : further analysis

Like the major European Armies, the Bulgarian Army deeply studied the lessons of the Balkan Wars in every field and, I think - also about the employment of artillery.
I know that some foreign essays were traslated in Bulgarian, among them the very interesting book of the German HQ Der Balkankrieg 1912/13. “Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften Herausgegeben vom Grossen Generalstabe Kriegsgeschichtliche Abteilung I, Heft 50”. Erster Band: Die Ereigniffe auf dem thrazischen Kriegsschauplatz bis zum Waffenstilland. Berlin : Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn 1914.

Unfortunately I was not able to find anything about it in Western libraries. Can anybody help me? I'm not interested in the history of the Balkan wars, but in theoretic studies about the lesson of the war (expecially about artillery, of course).

Thanks

[MCP]

The lesson of the Balkan Wars on artillery : Lt.col. Nikolov

“Artillery Notes from The Recent Wars in the Balkans", by Lieutenant Colonel Nikoloff of the Bulgarian Army, The Field Artillery Journal 4/3 (July-September 1914), pp. 391-396.

The author is a Bulgarian officier, Lt.Col. Nikolov, that I was not able to identify. If anybody (Dibo maybe ) knows anything about him, I would like to know more about him. His essay contained a proposal of reorganization of the Bulgarian Artillery based upon the experiences of the recent Balkan Wars.
This is the most interesting article, to my opinion.

[MCP]

The lesson of the Balkan Wars on artillery : 2nd lieutenant Morrow

“The Employment of Artillery in the Balkan and in the Present European War." By Second Lieut. Norman P. Morrow, 4th Field Artillery. Lecture delivered at School of Fire Field Artillery, Spring Term, 1915, The Field Artillery Journal 5/2 (April-June 1915), pp. 316-336.

The author was for the first and only time an American officier. The essay is detailed, but the informations came almost entirely from French sources.

[MCP]

The lesson of the Balkan Wars on artillery : captain Alvin

“The Field Artillery in the Balkans".— By Captain Alvin, Translated from the French, The Field Artillery Journal 4/2 (April-June 1914), pp. 312-323.

Another interesting essay from a French officier, that I was not able to identify.

[MCP]

The lesson of the Balkan Wars on artillery : captain Bellenger

"Notes on the Employment of Artillery in the Balkan Campaign". Translated from the French, The Field Artillery Journal 4/1 (January-March 1914), pp. 84-93]
You have to download the whole issue and then look for the article in the Index, since the specific links doesn't work.

The author was captain G. BELLENGER, a French officier of fortress artillery. He published his remarks on the French Revue d'artillerie (November 1913). He was member of the French military mission in Odrin, together with colonel of the Engineers Piarron de Mondesir (who published a much praised book on the siege of the Turkish fortress : Siège et prise d’Andrinople (Novembre 1912 – Mars 1913). Paris : Chapelot 1914) and captain d'Alauzier, an officier of the French Chasseurs à pied.
Capt. Bellenger reflects in his essay the lessons of the French artillery school, as outlined by General Hippolyte Langlois in his L'Artillerie de Campagne en liason avec les autres armes. Paris : L. Baudouin 1892.
Consequently he attached great importance to the light field artillery (75mm), that should have a great rate of fire and be very easy to handle, while he thought that heavy field artillery could play not a great role in the field. He was one of the most influential critics of general Heer essay in France.

[MCP]

The lesson of the Balkan Wars on artillery : general Herr

In the Balkan Wars for the first time the opposite armies were armed with modern quick-firing guns.
Every Army in Europe sent military observers to the battlefield and in 1913-1915 many essays were written and published on the artillery magazines.
Some of them were translated by the American "Journal of Field Artillery" that is actually on line.
I could find some of them and I hope that they may interest the Forum.

"Some teachings of the war in the Balkans on the tactical and technical employment of artillery".Translated from the Revue d’Artillerie, February, 1913. By Colonel A. H. C. PHILLPOTTS, R. A., "The Journal of the Royal Artillery", 3/4 (October-December 1913), pp. 610-618.
The author was the French general Frédéric Georges HÉRR, who commanded the Verdun strongpoint during the WW1. He could visit the battlefield of Kumanovo an Tchataldja and published his remarks first on the French Revue d'Artillerie and later in a little book: La guerre des Balkans. Quelques enseignements sur l’emploi de l’artillerie. Paris : Berger-Levrault, 1913.

His essay was translated in many languages (English, German, Italian) and was much esteemed and also much criticized, expecially because he studied the employment of the artillery in the Balkans without followin too strictly the lessons of the French school.

[MCP]

Many thanks!
Now I can say that it was very simple, since the only 8cm not QF guns that I know in the Balkans was the Serbian De Bange!
It is incredible that I did not think at it! :1087:

[dibo]

банжово = De Bange

[MCP]

Excuse me, but in the essay about 12th Infantry Division I found a банжово артилер. отделение.
Can anybody tell me what банжово mean? This may help me to identify the kind of gun (8cm not QF) assigned to that unit.
Many thanks

[MCP]

I am quite sure that everybody in this forum already know this link, however it may interest. There are detailed bios of heads of Bulgarian Artillery and a lot of informations about the siege of Odrin at :

http://www.pv-ma.bg/art_pregled/Artilerijski_pregled_1.doc

[MCP]

Bulgarian heads of artillery

Nikolaj Lavrentievic Rešetin (11.04.1883 - 31.12.1884)
Dimitrij Gavrilovic Arseniev (1.01.1885 - 7.09.1885)
Olimpij Spiridonov Panov (09.1885 - 1886)
Petăr Markov Tantilov (1887 - 1893)
Bončo Kalinov Balabanov (22.06.1893 - 12.05.1905)
Nikola Markov Rjazkov (12.05.1905 - 18.09.1909)
Pantelej Tzenov (18.09.1909 - 1913)
Kalin Georgiev Najdenov (1913 - 1915)
Stefan Panajotov Belov (1915 - 1916)
Stefan Stefanov Slavčev (1916 - 1918)
Dimităr Katzarov (12.10.1918 - 1.09.1919)
Vladimir Minčev Vazov (1.09.1919 - 1.01.1920)
Nikola Stojanov Kableškov (1.01.1920 - 20.01.1921)

Remarks :
from 8.07.1878 : Head of the Artillery
from 15.09.1883 : Artillery Inspector
from 8.01.1885 : Head of the Artillery
from 12.04.1886 : Head of the Artillery Brigade
1887 : Artillery Inspector
1889 : Head of the Artillery
from 1.01.1895 : Artillery Inspector
during Balkan Wars and World Wars : Chief of the Artillery in the General Staff of the Field Army

[MCP]

Strenght of quick-firing artillery 1912-1915

1912
75mm field guns - 81 batteries with 324 guns
75mm mountain guns - 23 batteries with 92 guns
120mm field howitzers - 9 batteries with 36 howitzers

1915
75mm field guns - 107 batteries with 428 guns (+ 33%)
75mm mountain guns - 26 batteries with 103 guns (+ 12%)
120mm field howitzers - 9 batteries with 34 howitzers (- 6%)

Planned for 1915
75mm field guns - 122 batteries with 488 guns (- 16%)
75mm mountain guns - 30 batteries with 120 guns (- 16%)
120mm field howitzers - 18 batteries with 72 howitzers (- 53%)