Bulgarian Artillery in WW1

[MCP]

Strenght of Serbian Artillery in Macedonia during the war

Today I have noticed that I had forgot to send the message about the strenght of Serbian artillery after its defeat in 1915. I add it now, even if it not in the correct place. Sorry. :shrug:


Serbian troops evacuted to Corfu between 18 January and 23 February 1916 were organized by a French Military Mission commanded by gen. de Mondesir. Serbian Army was organized into six infantry divisions and one cavalry division based on the French model. France had to provide armament, artillery, equipments and animals. Great Britain gave clothings and transport animal and lorries. When Serbian reached Solun gen. de Mondesir went back to France, but french and British officers remained with them.

Each Infantry Division would have :
one artillery group with three Field Artillery batteries (four 75mm QF guns each);
one artillery group with three Mountain Artillery batteries (four 70mm or 65mm QF guns each);
one artillery group with three Mountain Artillery batteries (four 80mm not QF guns each);
one artillery group with three Field Howitzer batteries (four 120mm QF howitzers each);
one battery with six 58mm light Mine launchers.

On April-May 1916, when the Serbian Army was assembled in Solun area, it was complete in transport and artillery:
9 field artillery groups;
8 mountain artillery groups;
6 field howitzers batteries;
some light Mine launchers.

On September 1918 the Serbian Army had:
113 70mm and 65mm QF mountain guns;
116 75mm QF field guns;
2 105mm QF heavy howitzers (captured);
54 120mm QF 120mm howitzers;
1 150mm QF howitzer (captured);
3 captured guns (caliber not known).

During the offensive in 1916 and 1917 Serbian Army was supported by French heavy guns.

[MCP]

The occupation of Eastern Macedonia

At the beginning of August 1916, when Bulgarian Army became its advance, the Fortress of Kavala was not in good condition. The fortification works had not been finished. Of the five forts covering Kavala, only three were completed, of the ninety guns that had been planned for the fortified positions, there were only two obsolete naval guns, and of the 2,000 gunners foreseen there were only 140. The infantry for the defense of the forts, which should have been five regiments, was entirely missing. The machine guns only then had begun to be placed in their positions. The Fortress Command was tasked largely with the supervision of works under construction rather than the conduct of war. Its force numbered thirty-five officers and 250 enlisted men.

Since the negotiations with the Allies were inconclusive, Greek government decided not to resist the German-Bulgarian invasion and on 15 August ordered Kavala Fortress to withdraw the guns and machine guns from the fortified positions. The 7th Artillery Regiment transported the armaments of the forts of Lisse, Perithori and Tulunbar to Drama.
On 18 August the screening companies of 5th Division in the area of Drama were withdrawn. A few outposts that remained were captured by the Bulgarians. 5th Division assumed a defensive deployment, but on the evening of the same day, Army Corps D received from the Minister of the Army General Konstantinos Kallares the order to avoid any kind of friction with Bulgarian army: if 5th Division was unable to remain in Drama, it had to withdraw to Kavala.
On 19 August in the zone of responsibility of 6th Division, the Bulgarians attacked Greek troops and after a brief negotiation two companies based in Achladochori and Phaia Petra were disarmed by the Bulgarians. However the mobilization equipment and armament of 6th Division was not captured because it had been sent to Old Greece.
On 20 August 2nd Trakiska Infantry Division captured the forts of Lisse and Perithori. The materiel of the forts was scattered by the Bulgarian cavalry while being transported to Drama. Since one Bulgarian column was approaching the forts round Kavala, 7th Division was ordered to defend them. The following day the commander of Army Corps D, Colonel Ioannes Chatzopoulos, received the order to avoid the use of force. In meantine, between 19 and 22 August the advancing Bulgarian troops drove back the Greek forces inside Eleutheroupolis, Siderokastro, Serres, Drama, and Kavala, cutting off all the communications and capturing the whole of eastern Macedonia.
On 23 August Army Corps D ordered 5th Division to leave Drama and to relocate to Kavala, but this movement was postponed since the provisioning of the Division would be easier in Drama. The same day the Bulgarians demanded the to capture "D" (= Delta). While the commander of Army Corps D was waiting for istructions from its government, the Bulgarian captured both forts "D" and "E" (= Epsilon).
On 24 August 10th Belomorska Infantry Division captured the heights around Eleutheroupolis and tightened the encirclement of Kavala with the capture of saddle of Stauroupolis and forts "I" (= Iota), "Z" (= Zeta), and "H" (= Heta). The following day they captured the remaining forts.
On 1 September, being not able to restore contact with Army Corps D and the government, 6th Division, which was encamped in Nea Zichne, minus the 16th Infantry Regiment, departed for Kavala, arriving there on 4 September after passing through Eleutheroupolis and the forts captured by the Bulgarians.

On 3 September 1916 the general situation in eastern Macedonia was as follows:
-- 5th Division in Drama, the 16th Infantry Regiment of 6th Division in Serres and the 20th Infantry Regiment of 7th Division in Eleutheroupolis were encircled by the Bulgarians;
-- 6th Division VI, minus the 16th Regiment, was moving towards Kavala;
-- the forts of Kavala had been captured by 10th Belomorska Infantry Division;
-- the commander of Army Corps D sent repeated telegrams requesting that the equipment be transported to Old Greece;
-- fifteen rebel officers of the Kavala garrison, following an order issued by the Committee of National Defense, went from Thessalonica to Thasos in order to spread the revolt to 6th Division.
Faced with this situation the Ministry of the Army ordered that 5th and 6th Division, along with the non-divisional units of Army Corps D, assemble in Kavala, but this was impossible for those units that continued to be encircled by the Bulgarians.
On 6 September Colonel Hristo Burmov, the commander of 10th Belomorska Infantry Division, and the German lieutenant Schmidt requested of the commander of Army Corps D to be allowed to occupy the heights north of Kavala, in order to defend against a possible landing by the Allies. The Corps commander, having no other choice since the orders of the government called for the avoidance of any kind of friction, was forced to succumb and to evacuate those heights. Thus, the garrison of Kavala was confined to the city, with no possibility of defense. In the meantime the commander of 6th Division was persuaded to move his troops to Solun on Allied ships and to accede to the National Defense movement, in order to avoid their capture by the Bulgarians.
On 9 September, the British landed a Marine detachment in Kavala which destroyed the wireless of the city. Army Corps D was now cut off from the government and Kavala was blockaded by land and by sea. That night Allied transport vessels sailed into the harbor secretly to transport the men of Division VI to Thessalonica, but the commander of the Corps blocked the departure. Only fifteen officers and fifty enlisted men managed to leave by boat to Thasos.
On 10 September 1916 in a meeting with German major von Schweinitz, the commander of the Corps in order to avoid the capture of its troops by Bulgarian forces, asked wether German High Command could guarantee the transportation of the Army Corps, along with its armament, to Germany and its stay there. Major von Schweinitz promised to submit the proposal. An attempt to escape during the night of 9-10 September throught British ships failed because the commander of Army Corps D refused to join the National Defence moviment.
On 11 September the corps commander met again Major von Schweinitz, who delivered to him the reply of Field Marshal von Hindenburg: he accepted the transfer of the Army Corps D to Germany with its armanents. The men of the Greek forces would not be considered prisoners but rather guests of the Germans. During the night of 11-12 September the garrison of Kavala - 400 officers and 6000 enlisted men - moved towards north. All materiel - except 7th Artillery Regiment - was abandoned in Kavala and fell into the hands of Bulgarian Army. Part of the Greek fortress artillery was used by 10th Infantry Division for coast defence.

Remarks:
a good map of Bulgarian advance in Struma valley is attached by Parabellum at http://forum.boinaslava.net/showthread.php?t=5528
However I add a Greek map since it show with more detail the position of Greek and Allied Forces.

[MCP]

The Capture of Rupel fort

On 10 May 1916, the German Militar attache in Athens announced to the Greek government that the German Staff deemed necessary the occupation of the Rupel pass because the Etente forces had crossed the Struma river. The Greek government protested to Berlin immediately but on 22 May the German and the Bulgarian ambassadors in Athens notified that their forces were going to occupy the Rupel pass. They stated that they would respect the integrity of the country, but the continuing offensives of the Entente forces compelled to a quick reaction.
The threatened area was occupied by Army Corps D with 7th Infantry Division in Kavala, 6th Infantry Division in Serres and 5th Infantry Division in Drama. The forts of Rupel, Phaia, Petra, Perithori had been attached to 6th Infantry Division, that was at full-strength. On 24 May the French captured the fort of Kastanousa, north of Kilkis, and two days later the Germano-Bulgarian became their advance towards Rupel.
Solun Fortress Command, quickly informed by Major Ioannes Maouroudes, the commander of the fort, ordered to present a vigorous defence. Therefore the commander of the 6th Infantry Division deployed his troops in order to obstruct the passage to the Bulgarian Army and notified the Entente forces if they wished to intervene. At the same time the Germano-Bulgarian went on advancing and notified to Greek screening troops that they had the order to capture fort Rupel. But when Major Maouroudes gave the gun on order to fireat the head of the ennemy’s column, the Germano-Bulgarian forces halted their movements and withdrew beyond the frontier.
Only tventy-five minutes later, at 15.05, the commander of 6th Infantry Division, Major General Andreas Bairas, received from Athens the order that resistence should not be offered and the screening troops were obliged to withdraw without engaging in battle. He immediately gave the order to cease all resistence and at 19.00 two Bulgarian battalions encircled fort Rupel and demanded its immediate surrender. Major Maouroudes refused, but the commander of the Bulgarian detachment answered that the garrison was obliged to evacuate the fort during the night, otherwise it would be isolated.
At 05.00 on 27 May Major Maouroudes met German Cavalry Captain Thiel, who accepted the surrender of the fort and all the equipment that would remain in it. At the same time the ordnance of the fort was quickly loaded on the vehicles sent by the Command of the 6th Infantry Division and it and the garrison departed for Siderokastro. The materiel that remained in the fort was captured by Bulgarians.

[MCP]

You are doing amazing work here :nworthy:

I think all this info can be put up eventually on a site part of our collection, you would agree I hope?

Of course, yes.
I'm happy that at least I have found somebody interested in my study about Bulgarian army. They are not many in Italy...

[Imperial]

You are doing amazing work here :nworthy:

I think all this info can be put up eventually on a site part of our collection, you would agree I hope?

[MCP]

The Fortification of the Greco-Bulgarian Frontier

After Balkan wars, the Greek Army Staff estimated that Bulgaria had the capability to strike Greece fast and effectively as it had a stronger army that could be mobilized and moved forward to the borders more swiftly on account of the terrain and the good condition of the transportation network. Moreover it was expected that if Greece and Turkey engaged in military conflict, a Bulgarian attack would be imminent. It was as a result of these circumstances that the fortification of the Greco-Bulgarian border was decided upon following an initiative of the director of Directorate A of the Army Staff Service, Lieutenant Colonel Ioannes Metaxas. The construction of the fortifications was assigned to the Thessalonica Fortress Command with a special staff under the command of Colonel (Eng) Eulampios Messalas.

The part of Macedonia east of the Mesta river is divided by the Struma river into two regions: central and eastern Macedonia. Eastern Macedonia was exposed to the Bulgarian attack, therefore the fortification of the frontier was of primary importante. However the finances of Greece however were poor because its army had been doubled in size. The safety of the urban centers of eastern Macedonia (Drama, Serres) was of a vital importance, because if these towns were lost that would mean the loss of the whole Eastern Macedonia. As a consequence, Solun, which was a large military base, would be threatened. The only way to ensure the safety of these towns was to fortify the frontier.

The fortification of just one line was inadeguate because, if it were to break at one point, the entire region of eastern Macedonia would be placed under threat. Therefore a second interior line was necessary to contain an invasion. However it was realized that if the construction crews working on the fortifications were divided among two locations, then it would take them too long to complete the project. For this reason the main passes at the frontiers were fortified and of the interior line Kavala, and the bay of Eleutherae, along with a few isolated interception works on the border. In this way eastern Macedonia was secured and the problem regarding the mobilization and the strategic concentration of the Greek force was resolved. The fortification by interception works were designed to withstand an enemy attack lasting no more than a few days. They were fortified enclosures, of a semi-permanent nature, affording all-round defense. Their garrison artillery interdicted certain avenues of access to the enemy, while their infantry secured local defense. Isolated forts flanked by smaller enclosures denied the investment of the main fort and its envelopment.

The following forts were constructed on the Greco-Bulgarian border:
Rupel, 11 kilometers north of Siderokastro for the defense of the Siderokastro pass and to safeguard the Greek valley of the Struma river and Serres;
Phaia Petra, 28 kilometers north of Serres for the defense of the mountain passes that lead from the Bulgarian valley of the Struma and Ali Butush towards Serres and Siderokastro;
Perithori, 25 kilometers east of Phaia Petra for the defense of the approaches from the plateau of Kato Neurokopi to Serres;
Lisse, a twin of the Perithori Fort, for the defense of routes frorr the plateau of Kato Neurokopi to Drama;
Tulumbar, 16 kilometers northeast of Drama, for the defense of the routes which converge from Rhodope mountain to the bridge of Papades village
Paranesti, near the railway bridge over the Mesta river, for the defense of the Korpyla defile.
Paradeisos, 20 kilometers north of the mouth of the Mesta river for defense from the direction of Xanthe.

Owing to a lack of means, the forts were not flanked by smaller permanent constructions but with field fortifications that were built by the units stationed there. The fortifications of Kavala included fortified enclosures of the same type as the interception forts, and provided the capability of cross fire. The enclosures were complemented by smaller ones. Thus the entire line was strongly fortified, covering Kavala and the bay of Eleutherae The area from the fort of Paradeisos to the mouth of the Mesta river was considered an obstacle for the enemy and so it was not fortified. The ridge of Kerkine mountain also remained unfortified. The fort of Dova Tepe (Kastanousa) east of Dojran lake was constructed for the defense of the passes anc the protection of the railway line. The defensive position of Dysoron (Krushe) mountain east of the fort of Kastanousa was not fortified because the conditions for the assembly of the Hellenic Army in the area between the Mesta and Struma rivers were more advantageous compared to those of the Bulgarians.

The forts were intended to accomplish their mission mainly through the use of their artillery. Therefore it was essential to maintain the effectiveness of their fire and the security of the personnel and the materiel for as long as possible. Since there was neither steel armor available nor the capability to employ reinforced concrete in the construction of the forts, protection was achieved through the use of earthworks and shelters. The artillery was protected by in-depth coverage, which resulted in the increase in the size of the fort. Thus the fort at Rupel and the forts north of Kavala reached a perimeter of approximately two kilometers. It was not possible to effectively guard such a large expanse of area with just one Infantry battalion that had been allocated to each fort. Therefore the infantry occupied a simple line composed of trenches with no depth. The combat trenches were linked to each other by communication trenches. The shelters that were connected to the trenches provided protection from enemy artillery fire to the troops depending on the situation. Special attention was paid to the organization of the infantry and artillery observation posts, ammunition and food warehouses and dressing stations. Each fort was surrounded by continuous barbed wire.
The Hellenic Army had acquired many machine guns from booty, which were distributed to the forts. The forts of Rupel and Kavala had more than fifty madrine guns each. These were placed in the same trenches with the infantry. The result was that only a very few could cover effectively the terrain in front of the forts with enfilade fire.

The artillery offered only frontal coverage to the fort, while the sides and rear of the fort were left uncovered. Therefore, if the enemy managed to penetrate the fort on one sfide fit would manage to constrict the fort from all sides. At any rate, the forts were intended to hold out for a few days during which time the army would mobilize and assemble. The army then immediately would flank the forts.


From HELLENIC ARMY GENERAL STAFF - ARMY HISTORY DIRECTORATE, A concise history of the partecipation of the Hellenic Army in the First World war 1914-1918, Athens 1999, pages 32-36

[MCP]

Strenght of Greek Artillery in Macedonia during the war

In 1917 Grrek army was reorganized by a french Military Mission commanded by gen. Braquet (from the end of 1917 gen. Bordeaux). As for artillery the French Staff estimated that Greek Army needed another 54 field and 20 mountain guns in addition to the already existing 160 field and 100 mountain ones. In particular Greek Army had no modern heavy artillery.
It was decided that every Greek Infantry Division would include a field artillery battalion with three batteries, and two mountain artillery battalions with two batteries each. Therefore Greek artillery was reinforced by French guns.

In autumn 1918 Greek Army had:
128 mountain guns (Schneider-Danglis 75mm QF M. 1906/09 and Schneider-Ducrest 65mm M. 1906 QF)
72 Schneider-Creusot 75mm QF M. 1906 QF field guns
36 De Bange 120mm M. 1878 L heavy guns
36 De Bange 155mm M. 1881/1912 C howitzers



Remarks about the picture
From left to right: gen. Regnault (Commander of the Armee Francaise d’Orient - French Army in Macedonia), gen. Sarrail (High Commander of the Armee d’Orient - the Allied Army in Macedonia), gen. Braquet (the third officier in the second row), admiral Gueydon (Commander of French Fleet in Eastern Mediterranean Sea), Monsieur Jonnart (a french senator, Allied hight commissioner).

[MCP]

Greek guns

In 1912 at the beginning of war against Turkey, Greek Army had only four Infantry Divisions, which were gradually increased to ten during the war. Another Infantry Division was formed in 1913, after the war agains Bulgaria. In 1914 the structure of greek Army was radically changed. Army Corps are introduced and the number of Infartry Divisions rose to fourtheen. Field Artillery was assigned to Army Corps, while Infantry Division received only a pack artillery battalion (two batteries each). However due to lack of mountain artillery, some Infantry Division had only one battery. Beside them there were also: a battalion of Horse Artillery in Athens, a fortress artillery regiment in Solun and a of fortress artillery battalion in Ioannina (Epirus).
At the beginning of World War Greek Army had:
168 field guns (Schneider-Creusot 75mm QF L/32 M. 1906 and ex Turkish Krupp 75mm L/30 QF M. 1904)
98 mountain guns (Schneider-Danglis 75mm L/19 QF M. 1906/09 and ex Turkish Krupp 75mm L/14 QF mod. 1904)
about one hundred heavy and siege guns of various calibers and pattern (105mm, 150mm, 170mm guns, 150mm mortars), mostly old.
Some not quickfiring field and mountain guns of little value were in reserve

On September 1916 Greek Army Corps D based in Eastern Macedonia, with its HQ in Kavala, was forced to surrender. It had three Infantry Divisions (5th, 6th and 7th) and some minor units, among them 7th Field Artillery Regiment. Before the capitulation, on 12th September 1916, the guns and vehicles of the 7th Field Artillery Regiment (with ten artillery batteries) were loaded onto the troop ship Ares, that sailed to Volos. Thus they were not taken over by bulgarian Army. During the voyage the Ares was forced by a French destroyer to sail to Solun. So the guns and vehicles escaped from Bulgarians had to surrender to Greek Army of National Defence, that supported the Etente. The rest of Army Corps D was massed in Drama, where Bulgarians ordered that its guns and machine guns were stored in separate buildings. But these weapons too were not captured by Bulgarian Army. Between 15 September and 27 September Army Corps D (with 16 mountain guns) was transported by rail from Drama to Silesian city of Goerlitz in germany where it was interned.

[MCP]

Strenght of Italian Artillery in Macedonia during the war

During the whole war 35th Infantry Divsion had only eight mountain batteries, each with four Schneider-Ducrest 65mm Mle. 1906 quick-firing mountain guns:
9th mountain artillery group with 22nd and 57th batteries;
16th mountain artillery group with 69th and 70th batteries;
18th mountain artillery group with 75th and 76th batteries;
20th mountain artillery group with 37th and 59th batteries;

Field and heavy artillery was provided by French Army.
In Krusa Balkan Sector there were:
24 Puteaux 75mm Mle. 1897 quick-firing field guns (2nd group/7th Field artillery Regiment and 2nd group/8th Field artillery Regiment);
4 Schneider 105mm Mle. 1913 L quick-firing heavy guns (4th battery);
4 De Bange 155mm Mle. 1881/1912 C howitzers (75th battery).

On August 1918 in Cerna loop Sector there were:
36 Puteaux 75mm Mle. 1897 quick-firing field;
4 Schneider 105mm Mle. 1913 L quick-firing heavy guns;
28 De Bange 120mm Mle. 1878 L heavy guns;
12 De Bange 155mm Mle. 1881/1912 C howitzers.
Just before the beginning of Allied offensive, 35th Infantry Division sent all its heavy artillery (except 12 De Bange 155mm Mle. 1881/1912 C howitzers) to Serbian Army.

[MCP]

Italian guns

After a long debate, in August 1916 Italy sent an expeditionary corps in Macedonia (Corpo di Spedizione Italiano in Oriente - CSIO) composed by only the 35th Infantry Division. Unlike other Italian Infantry Division it had not two Brigades - four regiments, but three - six regiments - exactly like Bulgarian Infantry Divisions. 35th Infantry Division was composed by:
"Sicilia" Brigade with 61st and 62nd IR.
"Cagliari" Brigade with 63rd and 64th IR.
"Ivrea" Brigade with 161st and 162nd IR.
After the armistice another brigade was added:
"Spezia" Brigade with 125th and 126th IR. (built on 15th October 1918 with "fourth battalions" of above regiments).

It hold first Krusa Balkan sector (August - December 1916), then the Cerna Loop Sector (January 1916 - October 1918).
According with Italian Official History of the World War I (L’esercito Italiano nella grande guerra 1915-1918, III/3) no gun of 35th Infantry Division was captured by Bulgarian Army.

[MCP]

ex British guns

Gun model : Vickers-Armstrong 84mm QF Mk I
British designation : Ordnance QF 18-pounder Gun Mk I on carriage field QF 18-pounder gun Mk. I
Calibre : 84mm L/28
Weight : 455 kg
Weight in action : 1280 kg
Tube Lenght : 2.462 m
Shell Weight : 8.4 kg
Shrapnel Weight : 8.4 kg (375 balls)
Muzzle Velocity : 492 m/s
Max. Range : 5960 m
Elevation : + 16° / - 5°
Remarks :
Quick firing field gun introduced in June 1904. It was an amalgam of an Armstrong gun, a Vickers recoil system and a Royal Gun Factory sights and elevating gear. It fired a shell significantly heavier than its contemporaries, the French 75mm or the German 77mm. But the gun was inadact for Macedonia mountainous terrain and British shipped to Salonika Army more usefull pack guns.

NB: since only the 18-pdr field gun was captured by Bulgarians, I don’t consider other British guns used in Macedonia during the war.

[MCP]

Strenght of British Artillery in Macedonia during the war

Between November 1915 and January 1916 British Salonika Army received :
- the divisional Artillery of 22nd, 26th, 27th and 28th Division
- three mountain batteries (2nd, 5th, 7th) with six 2.75-inch pak guns each;
- three 60-pdr. guns batteries (13th, 18th, 20th Heavy Batteries);
- one section of 6-inch guns (43rd Siege Battery);
- nine naval guns: five 6-inch, two 4.7-inch and two 4-inch guns.

In August 1916 British Salonika Army had:
60 18-pdr guns batteries;
16 4.5-inch howitzers batteries;
5 2.75-inch guns mountain batteries;
5 60-pdr. guns batteries (horse drawn);
5 6-inch howitzers batteries (with mechanical wheel transport);
one 6-inch guns section (tractor drawn);
nine naval guns.

On November 1916 British Salonika Army received another mountain battery, two 6-inch howitzers batteries and two 60-pdr. batteries.
On December 1916 60th (London) Territorial Force Division arrived with its nine 18-pdr guns batteries and three 4.5-inch howitzers batteries.

On June 1917 60th (London) Territorial Force Division and one battery and one section of siege artillery (6 inch guns) were sent to Egypt.

On August 1917 two 6-inch guns, two 6-inch howitzer batteries and one 60-pdr. battery were sent to Egypt.

On September 11th (Irish) Division left Macedonia with its divisional artillery (48 18-pdr guns and 12 4.5-inch howitzers).

On January 1918 British Salonika Army received one 8-inch howitzers battery with two pieces.

On 14th Semptember 1918 British Salonika Army had:
192 18-pdr guns (48 batteries);
48 4.5-inch howitzers (12 batteries);
24 2.75-inch guns mountain (6 batteries);
44 60-pdr. guns (11 batteries);
55 6-inch howitzers (9 batteries);
2 8-inch howitzers (1 battery);
2 4.7-inch guns (half battery);
2 6-inch naval guns (half battery).

Remarks:
18-pdr = 84mm QF field guns
4.5-inch = 114mm QF field howitzers
2.75-inch = 70mm QF mountain guns
60-pdr. = 127mm QF heavy guns
4.7-inch = 120mm guns
6-inch = 152mm heavy field howitzers
6-inch = 152mm naval guns
2 8-inch = 203mm heavy howitzers

[MCP]

British captured guns

In autumn 1915 British 10th (Irish) Division had only three Field Artillery Brigades (LIV, LXVII, LXVIII) with 48 18pdr. field guns and no howitzer or mountain gun. In 1915 during the heavy fighting with Bulgarian Army near Kosturino, Bulgarians captured 8 field guns.
ASIK in 1916-18 Bulgarians had no chance to capture more British guns. I have no evidence of using guns British captured by Bulgarian Army.

[MCP]

ex French guns

Gun model : Puteaux 75mm QF M. 1897
Calibre : 75mm L/36.6
Weight : 460 kg
Weight in action : 1138 kg
Tube Lenght : 2.721 m
Shell Weight : 5.55 kg
Shrapnel Weight : 7.24 kg (290 balls)
It used different kind of shrapnels with 228, 240, or 261balls of different weight.
Muzzle Velocity : 529 m/s
Max. Range : 6820 m
Elevation : + 18° / - 11°
Remarks :
Quick firing field gun. It was the first true quick-firing guns, and French presents usually it as the best field gun of World War I. In fact in 1914 it was outperformed by guns designed in 1910s. In spite of this, French Army did not replaced with a more modern weapons and it remained the principal armament of the French Army also at the beginning of World War II. It was so magnified by French writers that its performances were sometimes exagerated (you can read that its range was even more than 10000 m and it could fire even 28 shells/minute). Serbian, Romanian and Greek Army received a lot of this gun during the war and rearmed many artillery regiment with it.

NB: since only the 75mm field gun was captured by Bulgarians, I don’t consider other French guns used in Macedonia during the war.

[MCP]

Strenght of French Artillery in Macedonia during the war

In spring 1916 French Armee d’Orient had :
36 Schneider-Ducrest 65mm Mle. 1906 quick-firing mountain guns
154 Puteaux 75mm Mle. 1897 quick-firing field guns
48 Schneider 105mm Mle. 1913 L quick-firing heavy guns
56 De Bange 120mm Mle. 1878 L heavy guns
56 De Bange 155mm Mle. 1881/1912 C howitzers
24 Schneider 155mm Mle. 1877/1914 guns
42 trench mortars

In spring 1917 French Armee d’Orient had :
49 Schneider-Ducrest 65mm Mle. 1906 quick-firing mountain guns
160 Puteaux 75mm Mle. 1897 quick-firing field guns
19 Schneider 105mm Mle. 1913 L quick-firing heavy guns
56 De Bange 120mm Mle. 1878 L heavy guns
40 De Bange 155mm Mle. 1881/1912 C howitzers
35 trench mortars

In autumn 1917 French Armee d’Orient had :
99 Schneider-Ducrest 65mm Mle. 1906 quick-firing mountain guns
241 Puteaux 75mm Mle. 1897 quick-firing field guns
11 Schneider 105mm Mle. 1913 L quick-firing heavy guns
60 De Bange 120mm Mle. 1878 L heavy guns
35 De Bange 155mm Mle. 1881/1912 C howitzers
66 trench mortars

In spring 1918 French Armee d’Orient had :
72 Schneider-Ducrest 65mm Mle. 1906 quick-firing mountain guns
231 Puteaux 75mm Mle. 1897 quick-firing field guns
11 Schneider 105mm Mle. 1913 L quick-firing heavy guns
43 De Bange 120mm Mle. 1878 L heavy guns
53 De Bange 155mm Mle. 1881/1912 C howitzers
12 De Bange 240mm Mle. 1884 C howitzers
42 trench mortars

In autumn 1918 French Armee d’Orient had :
100 Schneider-Ducrest 65mm Mle. 1906 quick-firing mountain guns
244 Puteaux 75mm Mle. 1897 quick-firing field guns
11 Schneider 105mm Mle. 1913 L quick-firing heavy guns
60 De Bange 120mm Mle. 1878 L heavy guns
38 De Bange 155mm Mle. 1881/1912 C howitzers
65 trench mortars