Съобщение

**Dinain** · 01-07-2016, 23:55

**Обикновен лаик** · 02-07-2016, 15:59

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руският белогвардейски генерал Иван Беляев

Беляев, както е споменато, не само отлично познава топографията и етническия състав на района на Чако-Бореал (междуречието на Парагвай и Пилеканойо), но владее и местните езици - той е първият съставител на речници на тамошните индиански езици.

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80 образовани белогвардейски фицери

Между тях - 2 генерала, 8 полковници, 4 подполковници, 13 майори и 23 капитани. Трима от тях са началник-щабове на армии (споменатия ген. Ерн, майор Корсаков и капитан Касянов), един командва дивизия, 12 - полкове, а останалите - батальони, роти и батареи. Картографския отдел на парагвайската армия се възглавява също от руснак - Николай Голдшмид. Общо на страната на Парагвай се бият около 3000 руски офицери и войници. Дори бъдещият диктатор на Парагвай - Алфредо Стреснер, тогава в звание лейтенант, взема участие във войната под командването на руски офицери.

Парагвайците не се показват неблагодарни. Около 10 улици в столицата Асунсион носят руски имена - "Команданте Беляев", "Команданте Саласкин", "Команданте Каноников", "Офисьеро Серебряков". Има и улица "Русия". В западната част на страната има даже град Фортин-Серебряков. Там е и паметника на ген. Беляев.

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мисията от осемнадесет германски военни съветници

Изглежда, че в период от няколко десетилетия в боливийската армия традиционно служат немски офицери. Между 1928-30 година там служи, например, Ернст Рьом - точно затова добре говори испански.

**Kramer** · 02-07-2016, 18:14

Парагвай се опитва през 19в. да намери място под слънцето, водейки протекционистка политика, поради това е "изяден" от най-големите хищници в Ю. Америка Аржентина и Бразилия, в добавка и Уругвай. Страната губи до 70% от населението си във войната. Съдбата му напомня до някъде тая на България през Междусъюзническата война, само дето за арбитър при окончателното определяне на границите не е Николай II, а новоизбраният американския президент Хейс, който ги спасява от унищожение.

През 1932-35г., т.е. 60 години по-късно успяват да възстановят армия, но не и икономика.

**General Lukov** · 03-07-2016, 08:35

Изобщо няма база за сравнение на човешките загуби на България през Междусъюзническата война и тоталната деструкция на Парагвай във войната срещу Тройния алианс. За няколко години 90% от пълнолетното мъжко население е избито, нещо което България никога не е преживявала.

**Kramer** · 03-07-2016, 12:23

Имам предвид съседи-разбойници.

**Dinain** · 03-07-2016, 14:34

За няколко години 90% от пълнолетното мъжко население е избито, нещо което България никога не е преживявала.

Доколкото чета, няма никакви доказателства за този фантастичен процент (а и звучи направо физически невъзможно да се постигне с тогавашните технологии), а оценките за парагвайските загуби в тази война варират изключително много - от 21 хиляди до 1.2 млн.(!), като самите данни за предвоенното население варират изключително много (население между 0.4 и 1.3 млн.). С една дума, ако дори не знаят колко са били преди войната, историците могат да си измислят всякакви цифри.

Paraguayan War - Wikipedia

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paraguayan_War#Casualties_of_the_war

Най-реалистично ми звучи цитираното изследване "The Paraguayan Rosetta Stone: New Evidence on the Demographics of the Paraguayan War, 1864–1870", където се посочва съотношение на мъже към жени след войната от 1:4. Което пак е катастрофално, но в СССР след ВСВ в някои области съм чел, че е стигало и до 1:12 или 1:13.

И най-вече - силно ме съмнява индианското племенно население някой да го е броил въобще и то да влиза в тези сметки, които може би се отнасят повече за испаноезичното, бяло население. Както е посочено в заглавната статия, индианци за женене не са липсвали след войната.

**Guy de Mont Ferrand** · 06-07-2016, 22:16

Да, това "90 % от мъжкото население" е направо чудовищно, макар и почти цяла Южна Америка да е срещу малкия Парагвай. По-вероятно в някои райони загубите са били "до 90 %". Винаги ме е било яд за тая война като фен на гуараните, но затова пък съм фен на тази, за която се говори в темата. Малко тъжно ми изглежда обаче, че двете може би "най-индиански" страни на континента в поредица войни губят от всички...освен във войната помежду си

И Боливия, и Парагвай са отрязани от достъп до морето, справедливо предвиден от...Боливар? Парагвай печели какво? - безмислената пустош Гран Чако - и що народ се изтребват за това! Някой може би рекъл, че индианците са born to loose

**Duque de Caixas** · 07-07-2016, 00:25

В общи линии Парагуай печели независимостта си, защото Боливия е искала цялата парагуайска част на Гран Чако. Отвори картата и ще видиш, че така Парагуай би загубил нови към 40% от територията си, а единственият (сравнително) по-развит град Асунсион би станал пограничен. Боливия пък се бори за пълен контрол върху парагуайския Гран Чако, защото това е единственият начин през речната система да си продава петрола от провинция Тариха директно в Буенос Айрес. Колко богат е Буенос Айрес? Не говорим за Аржентина с хроничните икономически кризи от втората половина на ХХ-ти век. Говорим за Аржентина от първата половина на века - една от най-богатите държави.

**Guy de Mont Ferrand** · 07-07-2016, 10:53

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В общи линии Парагуай печели независимостта си, защото Боливия е искала цялата парагуайска част на Гран Чако. Отвори картата и ще видиш, че така Парагуай би загубил нови към 40% от територията си, а единственият (сравнително) по-развит град Асунсион би станал пограничен. Боливия пък се бори за пълен контрол върху парагуайския Гран Чако, защото това е единственият начин през речната система да си продава петрола от провинция Тариха директно в Буенос Айрес. Колко богат е Буенос Айрес? Не говорим за Аржентина с хроничните икономически кризи от втората половина на ХХ-ти век. Говорим за Аржентина от първата половина на века - една от най-богатите държави.

Разбирам, но това на практика е война между "малките и слабите", не между големите. Чили как лапва тихоокеанския излаз на боливийците, територията на Парагвай при Стреснер след войната е орязана с 50 + %. Дори необичайният произход на Парагвай от територията, дадена на братята-йезуити, ме кара да им съчувствам, а Боливия, където индианците са мнозинство, е почти като последния наследник на Империята на инките.

**Duque de Caixas** · 07-07-2016, 14:58

Това как лошото Чили си открадва боливийското крайбрежие, шот' мо'е си го позволи е друга глупост, която прочетох в статията за Тихоокеанската война в българската уикипедия, само защото е преведена от руската уикипедия, с всичките произтичащи оттам глупости. Има голямо неразбиране в Европа относно южноамериканската политика, което е разбираемо, защото това е отдалечен район. Не е като, да кажем, Близкия Изток. И в руската литература продължават по инерцията на съветската историография да търсят под вола теле, да обясняват всичко, случващо се на юг от Рио Гранде или с пряка намеса на Голямата лоша Америка, или с потисничеството на експлоататорските политически елити в страните. В случая е второто. Не казвам, че съм големият разбирач, но малкото, което съм прочел до сега по темата до голяма степен противоречи на такава гледна точка.

Нещата там са доста по-различни. До средата на XIX-ти век Чили е една от най-бедните държави (може би най-бедната) в Латинска Америка. Изолирана е от Андите, от два океана и още няма пристанищната инфраструктура и търговския флот да ги превърне от негатив в позитив. Към средата на века нещата постепенно започват да се променят, но държавата все още не може да се изправи директно срещу съседите си, които имат много по-големи финансови приходи от лесно добивани ресурси - сребро, тор гуано... Лека полека чилийската икономика се развива, чилийски минни дружества печелят концесии в Перу и Боливия, плащат си, обаче диктаторите в тези държави си прибират парите и отменят концесиите. Нали, какво толкова може да им направи Чили? Чилийците решават да теглят чертата, че ако подвият опашка, ще загубят международен авторитет за много дълго време, да не говорим, че чуждестранните инвестиции ще секнат, ако държавата не защити интересите на частните си предприемачи. Перу и Боливия толкова лесно тръгват на война именно защото шансовете на Чили не са били никак големи и от камбанарията на Лима и Ла Пас войната е изглеждала като разходка до Сантяго (както междувпрочем и боливийската гледна точка отнсно война за Гран Чако - триумфален марш до Асунсион за приемане на парагуайската капитулация).

Чили към онзи момент няма интерес от война. От една страна, възгледите за успех не са били никак големи, от друга икономическите приоритети са били други - минната промишленост е прохождала, но страната все още е била предимно аграрна и приоритет е бил култивирането на земите на арауканите на юг от Централната долина за земеделие и скотовъдство, а и във вътрешнополитическо отношение нещата са били доста нестабилни, което е характерно за цялата втора част на XIX-ти век. Чили е притиснато в борбата между две политически фракции - централистката се бори за силно президентско управление, а либералната - за парламентарно управление, за да се стигне през 1891г. до гражданска война между президент и парламент.

Но войната на Чили срещу съюза на Перу и Боливия взема обрат, чилийската армия излиза победител и вече от позицията на силния Чили анексира районите на Арика и Антофагаста. От една страна за да затвърди силната си позиция в международен план, от друга, защото няма гаранции, че минните ѝ компании няма пак да бъдат прецакани в бъдеще от перуанското и/ или боливийското правителства, които и да са те.

**Duque de Caixas** · 07-07-2016, 19:53

Иначе обратно на темата за Войната за Гран Чако, едно от най- добрите неща, които съм чел - конкретно, обективно и синтезирано, е това. Сайтът е англоезичен, списван от латиноамериканци. За съжаление се загуби за дълго време, после го подновиха, но огромна част ценна литература се загуби. Намира се с Wayback Machine зa 2004г. Позволявам си да постна цялата статия тук, за всеки случай, за да се съхрани, за което се извинявам, но мисля, че мног хора ще я намерят за интересна:

AIRPOWER IN THE CHACO WAR
by James S. Corum

Introduction

The Chaco War, was the largest and bloodiest war fought in the Western Hemisphere in the twentieth century. For three years, 1932 to 1935, Bolivia and Paraguay fought a savage war with enormous casualties (60,000 Bolivian dead and 30,000 Paraguayan dead) over the Chaco, an arid wasteland in the heart of South America. Neither nation was a producer of armaments or aircraft so both of these small, nations strained their economies to the fullest measure to raise large armies and to equip their armies with the best weapons they could buy on the world market. The armed forces of both nations had been trained by European officers and understood the important role that airpower had played in the World War, so Bolivia and Paraguay endeavored to provide themselves with the most modern air forces they could afford.

This article will deal with the use of airpower by Bolivia and Paraguay during the Chaco War. The air forces played an important role in all stages of the war in a variety of roles to include close air support, reconnaissance and casualty evacuation. The Chaco War provides a very useful case study in how small nations can use and misuse airpower in a major conventional war. As both nations faced arms embargoes that forbade the sale of military aircraft and war materials during the war, it is also a useful case study of how small nations can find ways to evade international restrictions placed upon them in order to keep their armies equipped and their air forces flying.

The Origins of the War

The Chaco is a desert-like region of 150,000 square miles that, as late as the 1930s, had remained largely uninhabited and unexplored. It is bordered by the Pilcomayo River and Argentina on the south, and by the Rio Paraguay and the fertile region of central Paraguay in the East. In the West the Chaco is bordered by the Andean lowlands of Bolivia and in the North by jungle regions of Brazil and Bolivia. The region is covered with thick brush and quebracho trees, has few exploitable resources and the farming potential is poor. Most of the year it is hot and dry and home to an impressive variety of poisonous snakes and disease-bearing insects. Water is extremely scarce in the Chaco and the few wells and lakes in the region assumed central strategic importance in the campaigns of the war. In the winter there is a short rainy season in which the few roads, dusty tracks for most of the year, would turn into impassable quagmires. It is one of the more inhospitable regions in the world to fight a major war.

The origins of the war lie with Bolivia's loss of its coastline and access to the Pacific Ocean during the wars with Chile in the 1880s. After the loss of territory to Chile, Bolivia sought an outlet to the ocean. The Rio Paraguay, which borders the Chaco on the East, is a deep river accessible to ocean-going vessels. Bolivia desired an ocean port on the Rio Paraguay and to get full access to the Rio Paraguay, Bolivia needed to occupy the Chaco. The only problem is that the Paraguayans were there first. What little occupation and exploitation of the Chaco that had been accomplished by the 1920s had been done by Paraguay. A few farming settlements populated by German Mennonite immigrants had been created under Paraguayan authority in the Chaco. In addition, the Paraguayans ran some operations logging quebracho trees, rich in tannin for curing hides, and had built some narrow gauge rail lines into the Chaco to ship the logs to the Rio Paraguay.

In the early part of the century Bolivia resuscitated some ancient land claims dating from the Spanish colonial era placing the Chaco under the sovereignty of the Viceroyalty of Peru and inherited by Bolivia. Paraguay could make claims to the Chaco based on charters from the 16th century when Paraguay was part of the Viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. Negotiations carried on for years with Paraguay offering Bolivia a free port on the Rio Paraguay but refusing to cede its claim or actual occupation of most of the Chaco. Bolivia would settle for nothing less than full ownership of the whole region. For Bolivia, it was a matter of national pride and economic necessity to seize the Chaco. For Paraguay, the situation was different. Paraguay had lost a third of its national territory in the disastrous War of the Triple Alliance (1865-1870) when Paraguay faced the allied forces of Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. After years of hard fighting, the Paraguayans had established a reputation for courage and perseverance -- and also lost eighty per cent of its adult male population killed in the hopeless war. Paraguay had taken two generations to recover from the devastation of the earlier war. For Paraguay, losing another big piece of its territory would reduce it to no more than a third of the territory that it had held at the time of independence from Spain in 1811. If another partition of its territory took place, Paraguay would be so reduced that its sovereignty as a nation would be in question. Thus, resisting Bolivian demands for the Chaco was seen by the Paraguayans as a matter of their national survival.

It was brave of Paraguay to so strenuously resist the Bolivian demands. In 1930 Bolivia had a population of three million people to Paraguay's one million and the Bolivian economy, supported by its rich tin and silver mines, was more than three times larger than Paraguay's economy which was based on cattle ranching, palm oil and cotton growing. The war was seen as inevitable by both sides. Throughout the 1920s, both Bolivia and Paraguay built up their armed forces for war.

The Opposing Armies

In the early part of the century Paraguay had made a practice of sending its best officers off to Chile or Argentina for military training. Before World War I, a German military mission had been active training the Paraguayan Army. After World War I, the French provided the major foreign influence with a sizable French military mission arriving in 1926. In the reforms that followed the 1922 revolution, Paraguay made plans to create a regular army of 4,000 men to be expanded to 24,000 in time of mobilization. In the mid-1920s, Paraguay strained its national budget to reequip its forces. Over 10,000 Mauser rifles were bought from Spain. From Denmark, Paraguay bought Madsen light machine guns and from the US, 32 Browning heavy machine guns. Paraguay bought from France eight Schneider Model 1927 105mm mountain howitzers and 24 75mm mountain guns. After a clash with the Bolivians in the Chaco in 1928, Paraguay bought more arms and continued to increase it army. Seven thousand more Mauser rifles were bought as well as 200 additional Madsen machine guns and twenty-four 81mm Stokes-Brand mortars. The syllabus of the officers' academy was overhauled. An NCO academy was created as well as a general staff academy. Paraguay slowly built up her army and navy and air arms and, by 1931, had about 4,000 regular armed forces under arms with the capability to mobilize approximately 16,000 more. The national economy throughout the 1920s was strained to its limits in acquiring weapons and equipment for defense of the Chaco.

One of the largest weapons purchases made by Paraguay, one that would have a major impact on the conduct of the war, was the purchase of two powerful armored gunboats from Italy in 1930. The two large and well-armed gunboats, the "Humaitá" and "Paraguay", were 845 ton craft for service on the Rio Paraguay. Each possessed two 4.7" main guns and were well-equipped with anti-aircraft guns (three 3' AA guns and two 40mm cannon). These boats were able to transport troops and equipment down the Rio Paraguay to the Chaco theater.

Bolivia, with a much larger population than Paraguay and a steady income from her tin and silver mines, was able to buy a considerable amount of modern weaponry in the decade preceding the war. In 1926 Bolivia contracted with Vickers for 36,000 rifles, 250 heavy and 500 light machine guns, 196 pieces of artillery and large amounts of ammunition. The onset of the depression in 1929 reduced the Vickers contract but, by the outbreak of the war in 1932, Bolivia had on hand an impressive armament of 39,000 modern Mauser rifles, 750 machine guns, 64 modern artillery pieces and five British tanks to outfit its regular army of approximately 6,000 men.

The Opposing Commanders

The dominant military figure in Bolivia in the two decades before the outbreak of the Chaco War was a German officer, Hans Kundt. Kundt was born in 1869 in Mecklenburg and was commissioned in 1888. He served on the General Staff and came to Bolivia in 1911 as the chief of the German military training mission to Bolivia. He got along extremely well with the Bolivians and developed a reputation as a superb administrator and troop trainer. Recalled to Germany at the outbreak of World War One. Kundt served on the Eastern Front as a corps chief of staff and as a brigade commander. Kundt retired as a colonel after World War One and was given a major general's rank upon retirement. After World War I Kundt was invited back to his adopted country and was offered the positions of Army chief of staff and war minister with the rank of full general. Kundt took the posts and directed Bolivia's rearmament program in the 1920s and the planning for the occupation of the Chaco. Kundt had some excellent qualities as a dedicated administrator and trainer and had a concern for the well-being of his soldiers that was certainly not characteristic of the south American military tradition. However, Kundt had shown in the World War that he was a mediocre tactician, preferring frontal assaults in most combat situations. Despite his general staff background, he was not much of a strategist. Although the primary military issue of the 1920s Bolivia was the Chaco, Kundt never visited or familiarized himself with the region and his concept of a war with Paraguay was essentially and unopposed, triumphal march of Bolivian arms through the region. Kundt was reluctant to rely on his Bolivian officers --and he had some very good ones -- preferring to micromanage the work of the army. Kundt was removed from his posts as chief of staff and war minister and sent into exile for his role in an attempted coup in 1930.

In contrast to General Kundt was the Paraguayan commander of the Chaco War, Jose Felix Estigarribia. Estigarribia was born in modest circumstances to a farmer and silversmith in Caraguatay, Paraguay in 1888 and went to and attended a college of agronomy. However, after obtaining his diploma, Estigarribia changed his career ambitions and in 1910 joined the army and was appointed a lieutenant of infantry. From 1911-1913 Estigarribia went to the Chilean Military Academy. Chile at the time was regarded as having the best army in South America. He showed great promise as a young officer and by 1917 he was a captain. He played an important role in the 1922 revolution in Paraguay and afterwards he was promoted to major and selected to attend the French Army general staff course at the Ecole Superioeur de Guerre. He completed the three year course in 1927 and in 1928 was appointed as the army chief of staff. He was dismissed after holding the chief of staff's job for less than a year due to disagreements with the government over the strategy of defending the Chaco. However, as war came closer, the government decided that Estigarribia was the man they wanted on the scene and in 1931 appointed him as commander in the Chaco with the mission of organizing a field division for the defense of the region. Estigarribia had a solid reputation in the army as a serious student of modern warfare. Had a large personal military library and he spoke French with great fluency and some English. He was known as a quiet but intense man and was popular with the troops.

The Opposing Air Forces

Bolivia entered the aviation era in 1915 when the first successful flight was made at La Paz. In 1916 Bolivia set about creating an aviation corps and sent three officers to Argentina and three officers to Chile for flight training. In the early 1920s Bolivia acquired several French trainers and tried to set up its own pilot training. After a couple of failed attempts, a proper military flight school was established in La Paz in 1925 under the command of Major Bernardino Bilbao Rioja, one of Bolivia's first six military pilots. A Swiss instructor pilot was engaged and the air corps began to grow into a true air force. By 1925 Bolivia had acquired a variety of European military planes including five Fokker C-Vs, 2 Fiat BR fighters, 2 French Breguet XIX bombers, 10 Bristol F.2B fighters, 9 Martinsyde biplanes and 11 Avro 504s.

The commander of the Bolivian Air Corps during most of this era was Major Bilbao Rioja, a very capable pilot and officer who spend his time studying European and American aviation. At his own expense, he translated and published various technical and air gunnery manuals for his small air force. Bilbao Rioja had considerable influence on the equipment purchases of the fledgling air corps and its organization and doctrine.

Vickers Type 149 'Vespa". of the Bolivian Air Corps. Photo from the book 'Aircraft of the Chaco War'.In 1927 Bolivia ordered 9 Vickers "Vespa" fighters from Britain, very capable and agile light fighter planes for their time. In 1926-27 Bolivia took delivery of 6 Breguet XIX bombers from France, very sturdy and capable aircraft. In 1929 Bolivia bought four more improved models of the Breguet XIX. By the time of the outbreak of the Chaco War, Bolivia had a very capable air corps by South American standards. In the months leading up to the conflict, the Bolivians deployed an air group of 3 Vickers Vespa fighters, 3 Breguet XIX bombers, 5-6 Vickers Type 143 "Bolivian Scout" fighters and a couple of Fokker Cvs to Villa Montes on the border of the Chaco in the Bolivian lowlands.

The first Paraguayan flight took place in 1915 when a Paraguayan pilot who had gone to flight school in Argentina brought the first aircraft to Paraguay. At the close of the First World War, Paraguay acquired several French trainers and set up a small air corps. Some aircraft took part in the combat actions of the 1922 revolution. The real beginning of a military air corps in Paraguay came with the arrival of a French Air Force mission to Paraguay in 1926. The French maintained five aeronautical and training missions in South America between 1918 and 1924. In 1926 a French air mission of five officers and one NCO mechanic arrived in Asunción to set up an aircrew and groundcrew school for the Paraguayan Air Corps. The French mission stayed from 1926 to 1931 and in that time set the Paraguayan Air Corps on a firm footing and graduated two classes of pilots from the flight school. In that time, the French sold Paraguay 3 Hanriot HD 32 trainers, 2 Morane Saulnier 35 trainers, 6 Potez 25 light bombers/reconnaissance planes and 4 Wibault 73 fighters.

Wibault Type 73 C.1 of the Paraguayan Air Corps. Photo from the book 'Aircraft of the Chaco War'.At that outbreak of the Chaco War, the Paraguayans possessed a small air arm of about 25 pilots and a few dozen mechanics and fitters. Some observers had been trained and the air corps was organized into a small fighter squadron, consisting of the Wibault 73s and a bomber/reconnaissance squadron consisting of the Potez 25s. The Paraguayans also possessed a handful of light utility and transport aircraft as well as the training aircraft based near Asunción at the Nu-Guazu Airfield. The Potez 25 bombers were on the verge of obsolescence in 1932, but in the 1920s this rugged, dependable, maneuverable and versatile aircraft had been one of the most popular aircraft in use with the French armed forces and had proven itself in tough colonial campaigns. The Wibault 73, a high wing monoplane fighter, was also in service with some French fighter squadrons at the time and was reckoned a good fighter aircraft. However, the Lorraine-Diedrich 450 horsepower water-cooled engine that powered the Wibault had a tendency to overheat in the Chaco conditions and the Wibaults gave poor service in the war due to constant engine problems. The commander of the Paraguayan Air Corps was an Argentinean, Major (later lieutenant colonel) Vicente Almonacid, who had flown with the French on the Western Front in the First World War.

For two small and poor countries, both Bolivia and Paraguay had made a major effort to build up effective air forces for the coming war. At the outbreak of the war, the Bolivians possessed a small but capable air force of about forty aircraft, including trainers and transports. Paraguay could put about ten combat aircraft into the field and had about 20 more trainers and transports. Once the war broke out, both nations would frantically attempt to evade restrictions on selling weapons to combatants set by neutral nations and would place a high priority on obtaining aircraft.

The War Begins

In June 1932 a Bolivian Army detachment seized a small Paraguayan outpost on Lake Pinantuten. In July, Paraguayan troops retook the post after a small skirmish and the Bolivian Army in the Chaco countered by attacking and taking the villages of Corrales and Toledo on 27 and 28 July. At the same time, three Bolivian regiments supported by fighter and bomber aircraft were massed for an assault on the Paraguayan fort at Boquerón, which fell at the end of July after heavy fighting. With the Boquerón battle, a series of nearly bloodless skirmishes had escalated into a full scale war.

The conflict in the Chaco quickly escalated during August. At the start of the war, the Bolivians had 4,000 troops organized into the 1st Army corps in the southwestern part of the Chaco. Two thousand men, organized into two divisions, were stationed in the northeast Chaco. By August, a further 6,000 reinforcements were on their way from Bolivia.

The Paraguayans under Estigarribia built up a force of 8,000 men and organized them into an army corps at the settlement of Isla Poí during August 1932. A further 1,500 men were dug in at Nanawa in the southeast Chaco and the 3rd Division, with 3,000 men and 8 Schneider fieldpieces, were in position on the Upper Paraguay River. A further 3,000 reinforcements were dispatched from Asunción. During July and August, the Paraguayans built an airstrip at their forward base at Isla Poí and deployed a small force of combat aircraft, essentially everything that Paraguay had in the way of air power, forward to the battle zone.

The Strategic position

The first major strategic mistake of the Bolivians was the belief that a few thousand Bolivian troops could simply overawe the Paraguayans and occupy the Chaco with little resistance. The Bolivian strategy, if one could call it that, had been worked out under General Kundt in the 1920s and assumed that Paraguay could not or would not fight and called for a triumphal advance of Bolivian arms to the Rio Paraguay. However, the major strategic problem for Bolivia was its long and tenuous supply line to the front in the Chaco. Bolivian troops were mobilized in the heartland of Bolivia and transported by train most of the way to the main Bolivian base, the city of Villa Montes in the Bolivian lowlands. From Villa Montes, the Bolivian soldiers faced a march of 200-300 miles through the choking dust and heat of the Chaco until they reached the front lines. The heat and lack of fodder meant that horses didn't survive long in the Chaco. Indeed, the cavalry units of both armies were soon dismounted. This meant that the basic transport in the Chaco was the motor truck, and these were in short supply in both armies. Since there were only enough trucks for supplies, soldiers had to march for weeks to reach the front line and often arrived exhausted and malnourished.

The Paraguayans were able to move troops from Asunción and the Paraguayan heartland by steamer up the Rio Paraguay to the base at Puerto Casada. From Puerto Casada there was a narrow gauge railroad into the Chaco and Isla Poí, the main Paraguayan base in the Chaco, lay only 18 miles from the end of the train line. Troops and supplies faced a relatively short march to the front. During most of the war, the logistical and transport factors worked to Paraguay's advantage and largely negated the tremendous Bolivian advantage in manpower and material. It also meant that air transport would be very important for the Bolivian forces from the start of the war.

Boquerón Campaign

At the start of September, Estigarribia had concentrated his 1st Corps and sent it to surround and invest the Bolivian garrison of several hundred men at Boquerón. Both air forces began aggressive patrolling and reconnaissance in order to spot enemy troop movements. The Bolivians, with the larger air force, had the clear advantage in the air. On 8 September, two Bolivian Vickers "Vespa" fighters spotted the 2nd Paraguayan infantry regiment on the road towards Boquerón and repeatedly bombed and strafed the column, inflicting heavy casualties among men and horses. Many of the Paraguayan soldiers, most of whom had never seen and airplane, panicked and disappeared into the brush and their officers had to spend the rest of the day rounding up the unit. Despite this setback, the advance continued and the Paraguayans attacked Boquerón on 9 September. When the initial attack was unsuccessful, the Paraguayan forces took positions around the post for a siege. On the morning of the 9th, a whole column of trucks from the Bolivian 13th infantry Regiment ran into a Paraguayan ambush and were shot to pieces.

The air patrolling of the Bolivians in this case had failed to give the Bolivian high command a clear picture of Estigarribia's offensive operations. The thick brush of the Chaco worked well to conceal operations and helped the Paraguayans negate some of the effects of the superior Bolivian reconnaissance capability. The Paraguayan artillery was a prime target of the Bolivian air patrols, but the guns were especially hard to spot when camouflaged and carefully dug in. The initial strafing attack of 8 September taught the Paraguayans some valuable lessons about air power and they were quick learners. The Paraguayans learned to use the thick brush of the Chaco to camouflage their movements and to outflank the Bolivians. Trails were cut under the trees and straight lines were avoided. The Paraguayans learned to weave the branches of the trees together over a road to minimize its aerial signature.

With Boquerón under siege, the Bolivians used their whole bomber and fighter force to drop ammunition, food and medical supplies to the defenders. The Paraguayans countered by ringing Boquerón with machine guns and the heavy ground fire forced the Bolivian aircraft to drop their supplies from a high altitude. The drops were inaccurate and most of the supplies landed behind the Paraguayan lines. However, the Bolivian high command had no idea that the aerial resupply of Boquerón had failed and was slow to mount an offensive to relieve the fort. On 27 September the Bolivian high command dropped a message to the starving garrison ordering them to hold on for ten more days while a counterattack was mounted. It came as a severe shock to the Bolivian high command when the garrison at Boquerón surrendered two days later after a desperate and gallant defense.

The Opening Air Operations

Lieutenant Colonel Bilbao Riojo, took command of the Bolivian air force units in the Chaco at the start of the conflict and in July 1932 concentrated his force at the main base at Villa Montes with a forward base at Muñoz. In July of 1932 the Bolivians deployed 3 Vickers "Vespa" fighters, 3 Breguet XIX bombers and 5-6 Vickers Type 143 "Scouts" (fighters) to his forward fields. Given the strategic situation, he visited the theater commander and asserted that the best use of the superior Bolivian air force was to bomb the main Paraguayan base at Puerto Casada on the Rio Paraguay as every man, truck, horse and bullet came through that port on its way into the central Chaco theater of operations. Moreover, in a violent confrontation with the theater commander, Colonel Enrique Peñaranda, Bilbao Rioja insisted that Asunción be bombed in order to break the Paraguayan morale. With the forward Bolivian airfields at Muñoz and Ballivían the Bolivian air corps was within easy range of Puerto Casada and Asunción. Bilbao Riojo's demands were refused as the Bolivian high command thought, quite rightly, that bombing Asunción would set off an international outcry against Bolivia. At that point in the war, the Bolivian high command did not see the need for such drastic action, although the Bolivians would revisit the idea later in the war.

However, a few raids were authorized against the Paraguayan base at Puerto Casada. These raids provoked a strong reaction from the Argentine Government as many Argentines lived in Puerto Casada and ran the railroad into the Chaco (and supported the Paraguayan war effort). Argentina, although officially neutral throughout the war, had a neutrality that can be described as extremely friendly to Paraguay. The Argentines supplied equipment, ammunition and aircraft to Paraguay and provided financial support as well. After the bombing of Puerto Casada in 1933, the Argentines told Bolivia that they would not tolerate casualties among their civilians and dropped some strong hints that they might enter the war on the side of Paraguay if the attacks persisted. Faced with this dilemma, Bolivia sensibly called off the air attacks. From then on in the campaign, the Bolivian Air Corps would be employed chiefly at the front conducting reconnaissance, air patrols and close air support.

From the start, Bilbao Riojo ordered his aircraft to conduct aggressive patrols over the Chaco and the Bolivians lost at least one Vickers Vespa to ground fire at the end of July.

Paraguayan Potez XXV-2. Photo from the book 'Aircraft of the Chaco War'.During the Boquerón battle, both sides carried out numerous attacks in support of the ground troops. Between 9-29 September, the Paraguayan Potez 25s escorted by the Wibault fighters made 12 bombing attacks on the Bolivians in Boquerón. The Paraguayans also used their Potez 25 bombers, which were equipped with radios, as artillery spotters for their Schneider 75 batteries. Artillery Lieutenant Alfredo Stroessner, later dictator of Paraguay from 1954-1990, flew as an observer in the Potez 25 spotting fire for his 75 mm battery.

Although both air forces had been flying reconnaissance missions and close air support throughout the Boquerón campaign, the first air to air clash only occurred in September 28 when a Paraguayan Potez 25 met up with a Bolivian Vickers Vespa. The Paraguayan pilot, Tte. Emilio Rocholl, was wounded but brought his plane back safely. On the last day of September, 1932, the first air to air loss of the war occurred when one of the Paraguayan Wibaults was shot down by a Bolivian Vickers Type.

Reequipping the Forces / The Nanawa Campaign

Bolivian Curtiss-Wright A14R "Osprey". Photo from the book 'Aircraft of the Chaco War'.After the campaign at Boquerón, both sides needed some time to rest and reorganize. The shocked Bolivians recalled General Kundt from exile and offered him the role of commander in chief of Bolivian forces. It was expected that Bolivia's most popular military figure could pull the army together and quickly defeat the Paraguayans. The air forces of both sides were quickly wearing out and new aircraft were needed. Both air forces had lost several precious aircraft to accidents in the rough conditions of the Chaco airfields. The Bolivians ordered 20 Curtiss Wright C14R "Osprey" 2-seater reconnaissance and light bomber biplanes from the United States and the first aircraft arrived in January 1933. The Osprey had one forward and one rear .30 caliber machine gun and could carry up to 260 lbs of bombs in various configurations. It was maneuverable and had a top speed of 163 mph. It was a very capable ground attack aircraft for its day and the Bolivians used it as a fighter bomber throughout the war. It would become the primary aircraft in the Bolivian inventory. Also ordered from Curtiss Wright were several Model 35A "Hawk" II and Model 65A "Sea Hawk" II fighter planes. Four were delivered in 1932, two in 1933 and three in 1934. This single seat fighter was among the best fighters of its day and, with its armament of two-forward-firing machine guns and a bombload of 220 lbs, it was generally used as a fighter bomber. It was the favorite fighter plane of the Bolivian Air Corps. Another major addition to Bolivian air power was the purchase of three Junkers JU 52 trimotor transports from Germany. This very capable transport could operate in the roughest conditions and could carry a load of three tons. The first arrived in October 1932 and the other two in 1933. They would become the backbone of the Bolivian air transport service.

Paraguayan Fiat CR. 20Bis. Photo from the book 'Aircraft of the Chaco War'.Paraguay went to a state of full mobilization during the Boquerón campaign. The top priority for the Air Corps was to acquire more Potez 25 light bombers, as that aircraft had proven to be very capable in operating in the Chaco. Seven more Potez 25s were acquired by Paraguay in late 1932/1933. As for the Wibault fighters, a replacement aircraft was urgently needed. Paraguay had only six Wibaults operational at the start of the war and two had been destroyed in accidents early in the first campaign. The major problem with the Wibaults was the unreliability of its water-cooled Lorraine-Diedrich engine in the Chaco conditions. Five Fiat CR 20bis biplane fighters were ordered from Italy to replace the thoroughly disliked Wibaults. The Fiat fighters were capable aircraft but were generally rated as inferior to the Curtiss "Hawk" fighters of the Bolivians.

The Bolivians reinforced their army in the Chaco and in November were able to block the Paraguayan advance south of Kilometer 7. General Kundt arrived in December and ordered a series of attacks. On 12-13 December 1932, the Bolivian 8th Division drove back the Paraguayans South of Kilometer 7 in a counterattack spearheaded by 6 fighter-bombers. In December, Kundt ordered his forces into a series of costly and futile frontal attacks against the Paraguayan defenses at Nanawa. The Paraguayan defense lines had been well laid out by former White Russian officers, veterans of World War I, who had settled in Paraguay and now served as Paraguayan officers. Although the Bolivians used their air force extensively in the CAS role and had strong artillery support, the frontal assault methods of General Kundt were not much more successful than such attacks in the Great War had been. At one point in the campaign, however, the Paraguayans defenders suffered from a severe shortage of ammunition as the heavy rains had made the roads impassable. Estigarribia mobilized all of his aircraft, bombers, fighters and transports, to fly ammunition into a rough airstrip at Nanawa. The improvised airlift was enough to enable the Paraguayans to hold their positions. In February, Kundt directed another series of attacks upon the Paraguayan positions at Toledo. The Bolivian Air Corps again strafed and bombed the dug-in Paraguayan defenders with little effect and again the Bolivians were repulsed with heavy losses.

Nanawa II / Kundt's Grand Offensive

In July 1933 Kundt massed most of his army to take the Paraguayan positions at Nanawa by frontal assault. With air superiority, strong artillery support and five Vickers tanks in support, he launched his troops at the Paraguayan positions, which had been strengthened since the last battle. The Bolivian Air Corps was given the mission of finding and knocking out the Paraguayan artillery. However, it failed in this mission as it was next to impossible to spot the well-camouflaged Paraguayan gun positions in the thick rush of the region. The Bolivian assault was a bloody failure with over 2,000 Bolivians killed for the loss of only 149 Paraguayan dead and 400 wounded. Nanawa was aptly named the "Verdun of the Chaco".

Campo Via / Paraguay's Greatest Victory

In October and November 1933 Paraguayan air and ground patrols spotted some major gaps in the Bolivian lines at Campo Via. Estigarribia quietly concentrated his forces and on 3 December unleashed a double envelopment maneuver which quickly surrounded the Bolivian 4th and 9th Divisions. The Paraguayan attack was a surprise and the Bolivian defense was badly organized as General Kundt reacted slowly to the developing crisis. His reconnaissance pilots had brought in numerous accurate reports about the strength and locations of the Paraguayan troop movements but Kundt rejected the reports of his airmen as alarmist and inaccurate. Kundt was convinced that the Paraguayan army was not yet ready to conduct operations on a broad front. On 10 December the Bolivians finally counterattacked to try to save some of the forces in the pocket but the air support for the attack was poorly coordinated and many of the Bolivian Air Corps' bombs were rained down upon their own ground units. On 11 December the two Bolivian divisions surrendered. In Bolivia's greatest military disaster, over 2,600 soldiers were killed and approximately 7,500 made prisoner. At one stroke, most of the Bolivian combat forces had been destroyed. Only 1,500 men had escaped from the pocket. Kundt was soon removed as the commander in chief of Bolivia's forces and Col. Peñaranda was promoted to brigadier general and made commander in the Chaco. The Bolivian Army went into a headlong retreat. The Campo Via victory provided the Paraguayans with 8,000 rifles, 536 machine guns, 25 mortars and twenty artillery pieces as well as a large quantity of ammunition. For a small and poor nation like Paraguay, the war booty was a godsend and enabled Estigarribia and his forces to maintain the offensive.

Paraguayan Advance: Battles at Picuiba and El Carmen

As the Paraguayan logistics lines lengthened, their advance slowed and crawled to a halt as the Bolivians managed to piece together a defensive line at Ballivían and the Central Chaco. In May 1934, Colonel Bilbao Rioja, who had taken over a corps command and turned the Air Corps over to Lt. Col. Jorge Jordán, initiated a trap for the advancing Paraguayan 2nd Division and surrounded that unit at Cañada Strongest in the Central Chaco. The Paraguayans managed to fight their way out of the pocket but lost 500 dead and 1,500 prisoners in the process. It was Bolivia's greatest victory of the war and cemented the reputation of Bilbao Rioja as Bolivia's best ground commander as well as a capable air commander. In July 1934 the Paraguayan offensive was turned back at Picuiba and Estigarribia looked for a means to restore maneuver to the battlefield. He found his chance at El Carmen in November 1934 when his surprise flank attacks surrounded the Bolivian Reserve Corps. Two thousand Bolivian troops died and 4,000 prisoners were taken. Only 2,000 fought their way out of the pocket to safety.

One month later at Picuiba, the Bolivians mistook a Paraguayan flanking move for a minor raid as the Paraguayans seized the only wells in the area at Yrendagué. the Bolivian Cavalry Corps, cut off from water, were forced to retreat. It is estimated that of 5,300 in the cavalry corps, 1,600 died of thirst during the retreat.

The Closing Battles

By early 1935 the Bolivian Army had withdrawn from almost all of the Chaco and fallen back on their main base at Villa Montes. Now the logistical situation worked to Bolivia's advantage as the Paraguayans had to rely upon truck transport through the whole length of the Chaco. At this point in the war, both air forces were worn out and had suffered heavy attrition. Estigarribia conserved his few remaining operational aircraft to provide strategic reconnaissance although several bombing raids were flown against Bolivian targets in the first half of 1935.

The Paraguayans maintained the pressure on the Bolivians and crossed the Rio Parapiti, a point well into Bolivia, in April 1935. In a series of savage counterattacks, the Bolivians threw the Paraguayans back across the river. By this point, both nations were exhausted. Bolivia had given up on any idea that it could win the Chaco by force and the Paraguayan forces were stretched to their limit. An armistice was signed on 14 June 1935, ending the war. Subsequent negotiations recognized Paraguay's claim to virtually all of the Chaco.

During the Chaco War, the Bolivians mobilized 210,000 men. Of these approximately 60,000 were killed, 10,000 deserted (to Argentina) and 23,250 were taken prisoner. Paraguay mobilized 150,000 men, lost 31,500 missing and dead and 2,500 prisoners. By any reckoning, it was a bloody war. However, when one notes the small populations of the nations involved -- Bolivia: 3 million, Paraguay: 1 million -- one can get an idea of the true scale of the conflict.

Assessing the Air War

The attrition of aircraft and pilots during the war was high for both sides. The primary killer of aircraft and pilots was operational accidents. Of the 9 Curtiss "Falcons" ordered by Bolivia two were lost in combat and four in accidents during the war. Paraguay lost four aircraft in training accidents with four fatalities during the war. During the war, Bolivia operated between 57 and 62 combat aircraft and 22 trainers and transport aircraft. Paraguay operated 32 combat aircraft and 23 training and transport aircraft. According to the official Paraguayan figures, Paraguay lost eight aircraft in combat during the war (1 Wibault, 4 Potez 25s, 1 CANT, 2 Fiat CR 20s) and Bolivia lost ten (6 Ospreys, 1 Junkers, 1 Hawk, 1 Curtis Falcon). The primary cause of combat losses was ground fire. Air to air combat was fairly rare. However, when the air forces came into contact some fairly aggressive dogfighting occurred, such as an unusual clash early in the war between two Paraguayan Potez 25 bombers and two Bolivian Breguet XIX bombers.

On several occasions, some very successful attacks were made against enemy air bases and supply depots. The most successful Paraguayan attack of the war was conducted against the Bolivian airfield and depot at Ballivían on 8 July 1934. Four Potez 25s escorted by two Fiat fighters dropped 40 bombs on the Bolivian airfield and destroyed at least four Curtiss fighters on the ground and damaged others. The Potez bombers also attacked and destroyed the main fuel dump at Ballivían which caused a severe fuel shortage for an army that was already suffering from a lack of fuel and supplies. The greatest success of the Bolivian Air Corps came at the Battle of Carmen in November 1934 when the Bolivian air units covered the retreat of the Cavalry Corps by constant attacks against the Paraguayan forward units. That any of the Bolivian force escaped at all was largely due to the efforts of the airmen.

Support Aircraft

While the fighter and bomber squadrons of the two air forces acquired most of the glory, the humble unarmed transport and utility aircraft of both sides played very important roles in the war. Both sides used a wide variety of transport and light aircraft to support their forces.

At the start of the war the Bolivian military took over the civilian airline Lloyd Aeréo Boliviano (LAB) which had four sturdy Junkers F 13 light transports (single engine, 6 passenger) and three of the larger Junkers W 34 transports. LAB had just acquired a brand new Ford Trimotor which was used as a transport until it was destroyed in an accident. In December 1932 Bolivia received three Junkers JU 52 trimotor transports from Germany. The rugged construction of the JU 52, its good flying characteristics and its three-ton cargo load made it an ideal aircraft for South American conditions. Bolivia had a fairly impressive air transport capability for a small country and the logistics problems of the Chaco required that it be used to the fullest throughout the war in transporting vital supplies of ammunition, fuel and medicine to the front. During the war, the JU 52s alone carried over 4,400 tons of cargo to the front.

Paraguay also pressed into service a wide variety of transport and utility aircraft. In late 1932, Paraguay bought two Travel Air Model S-6000 six-passenger monoplanes from the US to serve as air ambulances. Paraguay also obtained an Italian twin-engine Breda 44 transport for use as an air ambulance. The Chaco War saw both sides make extensive use of aircraft to transport the sick and wounded from front-line airfields to permanent hospitals in the rear. It is estimated that the JU 52s transported 40,000 wounded and sick Bolivian troops to the rear during the course of the war. The carrying capacity of the Paraguayan Travel Airs and Breda 44 were less, but they usually had a shorter distance to fly to fully staffed hospital ships stationed at the river ports of Concepción and Puerto Casada. Badly wounded troops were also flown to the Central Military Hospital in Asunción. The air ambulances were in constant use and several thousand Paraguayan troops were evacuated by air during the war.

General Estigarribia made extensive use of light liaison planes to travel around the theater and confer with his senior commanders. Estigarribia also used light aircraft to conduct his own reconnaissance over the front. The president of Paraguay, Eusebio Ayala, used aircraft to regularly visit the troops and confer with Estigarribia. This is the first war where aircraft brought the political leadership into closer personal contact with the military leadership during operations in a large and isolated theater of war. Paraguay's premier liaison plane and high speed courier was a US-built consolidated Model 21 C (PT 11). Paraguay also acquired at least one Curtiss "Robin", two DeHavilland DH 60 "Moths" and two Junkers A-50F light aircraft for liaison and light transport duties.

Naval Air Operations

Because all troops and supplies sent by Paraguay into the Chaco were shipped down the Rio Paraguay, air control over the river assumed considerable importance. The Paraguayan Navy had a small air arm (Aviación Naval) equipped with two Macchi M.18 flying boats and one Savoia S59 bis seaplane. The Navy stationed its small force at Bahia Negra in the Northern sector of the Chaco to support the army forces blocking any Bolivian advance down the river. During the war the Paraguayan naval air arm flew 145 missions, including reconnaissance and ground attack operations. The Naval air unit kept the Bolivians on the upper Rio Paraguay under pressure and even conducted the first night bombing in the Americas . On 20 December 1934 the two Macchi M.18s bombed the Bolivian outposts at Vitriones and San Juan with 800 lbs of bombs.

The Bolivians also stationed a small air squadron in the Chaco's northern sector and attacked the Paraguayan river traffic on several occasions. Given the dependence on the river as a communications line, the loss of a gunboat or large steamer to air attack would have been very serious for Paraguay. To counter the Bolivian air threat the Paraguayan Navy used its heavy gunboats, which were well-equipped with anti-aircraft guns, to escort the troop and supply boats and to serve as floating anti-artillery batteries at the vital bases at Concepción and Puerto Casada. The gunboats performed admirably and drove off Bolivian aircraft on several occasions and even claimed one attacking plane. Due to the efforts of the navy, the Bolivians caused minimal damage to Paraguay's logistics traffic.

Breaking the Arms Embargo

While both forces faced a heavy attrition of aircraft the problem of finding replacement planes was made difficult by a League of Nation and US government embargo on arms sales to both combatants. However, while the embargoes were inconvenient, both Bolivia and Paraguay showed considerable ingenuity in evading international controls and importing enough aircraft to keep their air forces flying.

Bolivia relied upon support from Chile. That nation had bought the license to assemble some Curtis aircraft including the Curtiss "Falcon". As the Bolivian "Ospreys" were attritted by combat and accidents, the Bolivians wanted a heavier and faster two-seat fighter and the "Falcon" made an excellent replacement. The Bolivians were able to import several "Falcons" from Chile during the war as Chile quietly ignored the League of Nations embargo. Curtiss "Hawks" and "Sea Hawks", Bolivia's best fighter planes, were also acquired through the Chilean connection.

Bolivia's most ambitious attempt to evade the US and League of Nations embargoes came in 1934 when Bolivia placed an order for four Curtiss "Condor" bombers. These large biplane bombers carried a one-ton bombload, had three turrets each with one .30 caliber machine gun each, and considerable range. Officially, the Bolivians wanted the aircraft as "medical transports", but as the "Condors" were ordered with full military equipment including turrets, machine guns and bomb racks, this seems implausible. The likely explanation for the order is that with things going terribly wrong on the battlefield and the Bolivians wanted a heavy bomber with the range to bomb Asunción from Bolivia -- and the "Condors" fit the bill. When the US refused to allow the aircraft sale, the bombers were acquired by subterfuge by a newly- created airline, the Tampa-New Orleans- Tampico (TNT) Airline. The four "Condors" made it as far as Peru when the US government was alerted and encouraged Peru to impound the aircraft.

Under the League of Nations embargo, France impounded 19 aircraft ordered by Paraguay and the Netherlands stopped the shipment of five Fokker CVs. However, the Paraguayans showed as much ingenuity as the Bolivians in obtaining aircraft. Seven Potez 25s sold by France to Estonia were mysteriously rerouted and shipped to Paraguay. Throughout the war, Uruguay and Argentina connived to support the Paraguayan arms purchases. Uruguay allowed aircraft from Europe to be transshipped through her ports and a variety of trainers, transports and liaison aircraft were obtained by Paraguay through Argentinean sources.

Conclusion

The Chaco War is a good example of how small air forces can have a major impact in a war. The two air forces, which rarely fielded more than 15 operational combat aircraft in the case of the Bolivians and never more than 10 in the case of Paraguay, played important roles in all stages of the conflict.

Both air forces demonstrated tactical competence and considerable ingenuity. The aeromedical evacuation system of both sides was very successful and saved the lives of thousands of soldiers who would have otherwise died in the primitive conditions of the field hospitals. That these small air forces could keep aircraft operational in the miserable conditions of the Chaco testifies to the dedication of their maintenance effort. While the Bolivian Army generally performed poorly in battle, the Cuerpo de Aviación on occasion saved retreating army units from total destruction by relentlessly attacking and delaying the pursuing Paraguayan forces.

The air commanders of both sides performed capably. Lt. Col. Almonacid of Paraguay's Aviación en Campaña and Col. Bilbao Rioja and Lt. Col. Jordán of Bolivia deserve much of the credit for doing a great deal with very few resources. As for the theater commanders, Paraguay had the very good fortune to have in Jose Estigarribia one of the outstanding generals produced in the Americas. With inferior forces he repeatedly outflanked, outmaneuvered and annihilated better-equipped enemy forces. He used his air units very effectively in the reconnaissance and ground attack roles. The Bolivians, on the other hand, were poorly served by their commanders -- especially General Hans Kundt, who was a disaster for Bolivian arms. Not only was this product of the German General Staff an incompetent tactician but he repeatedly disregarded the accurate information that his airmen brought him -- information that could have made the disaster at Campo Via into a Bolivian victory.

James S. Corum
LAAHS USA

LAAHS.com - Airpower in the Chaco War

https://web.archive.org/web/20040805173617/http://www.laahs.com/art02.htm

**Duque de Caixas** · 07-07-2016, 19:55

Има и още една статия конкретно за въздушния аспект на войната:

LAAHS.com - Air Combat During the Chaco War

https://web.archive.org/web/20040805064142/http://www.laahs.com/art13.htm

**pnp5q** · 07-07-2016, 21:55

Duque de Caixas написа Виж мнение

До средата на XIX-ти век Чили е една от най-бедните държави (може би най-бедната) в Латинска Америка. Изолирана е от Андите, от два океана и още няма пристанищната инфраструктура и търговския флот да ги превърне от негатив в позитив. Към средата на века нещата постепенно започват да се променят, но държавата все още не може да се изправи директно срещу съседите си, които имат много по-големи финансови приходи от лесно добивани ресурси - сребро, тор гуано...

Това-а силно ме смути. Но се сетих защо: Потоси - испанското сребро, а след края на империята - чилийската сребърна треска, откриването на неизкопано сребро в Чили! Таман от 1830 до 1850. Имат военен флот от 1818 г. (и три корабостроителници - Консепсион, Валдивия, о-в Чилое) и предвидливо си внасят англичанин да им го организира.
И ей на, в английското уики за Тихоокеанската война някакъв специалист предлага за причини завистта към Чили и ужасните отношения с Перу. За второто е пресолил яко и си струва да видим защо. Междувременно значи Чили вече е успяло: 1) малко да помогне на Перу в неговата война за независимост (1821); 2) и да го обедини след интересното му включване в конфедерация с Боливия, нацепено на Северно и Южно Перу и... под управлението на Боливия. (1836-1839) Това, при положение, че Боливия е създадена на перуанска територия (на бившето вицекралство Перу), много бърка в здравето на северно-перуанския елит, а пък Чили направо позеленява - и така се конкурират миролюбиво с Перу за тихоокеанските търговски пътища, чакат от държавата Перу е`ни пари (за помощта за независимостта), пък те сега хем вече не са тая държава, хем в такава добра комбинация - възстановяват старите търговски пътища на инките! И когато бивш чилийски управник нахлува с партизани обратно в родината си, подкрепен от Протектора на новата Конфедерация, Чили оценява акцията като "нахлуване на Конфедерацията" и тръгва да се отбранява... т.е. чилийци+боливийци+южноперуанци (те намазват от общата търговска мрежа в Конфедерацията, макар и само за три години в мир) срещу... чилийска армия и флот + северно-перуанци!... Резултата - Перу is back, даже успява да си изплати дълговете до Тихоокеанската война (и не бърза да встъпи в нея въпреки съглашенията с Боливия!), а Боливия... продължава да мъти водата... и я домътва до Гран Чако!
Но дотам има още време - през което Испания ле-еко се опитва да стане фактор на аграрно-торовия пазар - и само за две години (1864-1866) научава какъв добър флот си е спретнало Чили - а то успява - заедно с Еквадор и др. 3) да помогне на Перу да си върне ценните птичи острови.
Както виждате, Чили не е зъл съсед на Перу, въпреки конкуренцията - между Валпарайсо и Каляо и т.н. А пък съвсем в никакъв случай не е претрепания мижав комшия, даже - поемайки по моретата отначало под английска "егида", отново с помощта на Англия (и САЩ) успява (според този изследовател - след първите абзаци е ужасно подробен за морските боеве) да си възстанови и обнови! флота в годините между торната война и тихоокеанската - и да влезе в последната като сериозна регионална сила. При това Перу, въпреки пакта си с Боливия от предходната година, отлага да покрепи военните й действия срещу Чили до последно до колкото може. В крайна сметка Чили, след като научава за пакта - и бидейки вече в яка разправия с Боливия за пристанищните такси за минната продукция от Атакама, обявява война и на двете. И понеже Боливия, макар и вече държава с пристанище, така и не изгражда флот - да защити въпросното си атакамско пристанище Антофагаста, Чили го блокира и продължава бодро на север - по море и суша - в Перу! И срещу перуанския флот... Което струва на Перу три провинции - и вече омраза към Чили. А на Боливия - "само" атакамския коридор - и пълна загуба на достъп до океан. Която тя се опитва да "навакса" по-късно по река Парагвай (порт Асунсион-река Парана-Буенос Айрес), докъдето се стига... през региона Гран Чако.
Дано не се е получило твърде разхвърляно, най-подредено, според мен, се чете през призмата на чилийско-перуанските отношения.

P.S. О, докато напиша, вече е пояснен въпроса за речния достъп. Е, това е предисторията.

**ZWQRA** · 22-08-2016, 19:44

Съобщение

Войната за Гран Чако (1932-1935)

Войната за Гран Чако (1932-1935)

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