плана "Грюн"

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[Док Холидей]

Account for the German Victory in France in 1940

Essay written by Ben Burgess

After an amazing series of victories in the North and East, the morning of May 10th saw the beginning of what was to become one of the most incredibly successful campaigns in military history. At 0532 hours Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division began to cross the frontier of Southern Belgium, almost simultaneous followed by other divisions making their way into Luxembourg with the ultimate objective of the Channel coast. Using Bocks Army Group B “like a matador’s cloak”[i] the Germans hoped to distract the bulk of the allied forces while Rundstedt’s Army Group A made the main thrust through the Ardennes to the north of the Maginot Line. Using seven of ten Panzer divisions the German Army, spearheaded by Guderian’s three armoured divisions, aimed to break through in the area between the Meuse and Sedan. Success followed and in a matter of weeks the French had surrendered, Petain had been given limited control over parts of France and its empire and the British had been forced to retreat across the channel in what was fast becoming known as ‘the miracle of Dunkirk.’ Why then was the German victory so swift and its outcome so decisive? The mechanization of German forces and the recognition of its importance by military figures such as Guderian and Manstein obviously played a major part but there are also other factors. Many historians have argued simply for sheer luck or incompetent French training. It could also be due to the failure of the allies to recognize the need for armoured mobility and the presumption that this war, much like the First World War before it, would be defensive and slow moving after the initial battles. Alternatively it could simply be down to a sheer superiority of German tactics. What is clear is that in order to account for the German success in France in 1940 all these factors need to be analyzed, only then can an accurate conclusion be drawn.

In his article ‘Breakthrough at Sedan’ the historian Alistair Horne suggests that the Germany victory in France in 1940 was primarily down to luck. This he argues was due to the capture of Fall Gelb or Plan Yellow by the allies on January 10th 1940. Essentially an unoriginal plan, Fall Gelb had only undergone minor changes since the original Schlieffen Plan was put into action in 1914. Due to its unoriginality and the suspicion that the allies would most probably suspect a plan of this type Manstein took it upon himself to draw up another. Sichelschniff or “sweep of the scythe” was the result. The allied capture of Plan Yellow, therefore, meant that although originally frowned upon by many of the General Staff, the Sichelschniff plan was put into action.

The plan advocated an advance into Belgium to distract the British Expeditionary Force and Belgian army whilst simultaneous attacking France from the south with the bulk of the German force. Recognizing the importance of mobility and armoured troops it called for the attack to be spearheaded by Panzer divisions, something frowned upon even within the German general staff at that time. The distrust of these new divisions and disagreements as to how they should be used were visible even on the eve of the attack. Talking about German expectations before the campaign Heinz Guderian noted in his memoirs that ‘at that time nobody actually believed in a successful outcome, apart from Hitler, Manstein and myself.’[ii]

The forced introduction of this plan, however, was to prove a great stroke of luck on behalf of the Germans. Regardless of the capture of the original Plan Yellow the allies had known of German intentions for months. Through various sources ‘including the spy known as A-54 within German Military Intelligence’[iii] the allies had been able to establish a clear picture of the original German invasion strategy. This, however, served only to make the allies concentrate the bulk of their armies in Belgium and Northern France where the captured plans had told them the invasion would eventually take place. This then provided a huge aid to the German invasion and meant that once Bocks Army Group B came bearing what Liddell Hart has described as its ‘matadors cloak’[iv] on May 10th the allied forces were all too ready to take the bait. Luck then can be seen to have played a major part in the German breakthrough at Sedan and successful entry into France. In his essay ‘The Inconceivable Campaign’ the historian Kenneth Macksey says of the error which lead to a forced change of plan that ‘it was as if the error were determined by a fate working on Germanys side’[v] and that ‘the lost scheme…amounted only to an unoriginal, enlarged version of the…wheel through the low countries…fully anticipated by the allies.’[vi] This stroke of luck then could be argued to have saved the German campaign entirely. Had Plan Yellow not been replaced by Manstein’s more original Sichelschniff then the Germans would have unknowingly mobilized using a plan which the allies most probably expected and knew about in some detail. Rather than the astounding victory which they achieved the German campaign may have ended in Belgium or, had they fought their way through the expectant allied troops, with another battle similar to the Marne twenty six years earlier. It was through luck then that a plan doomed to failure was replaced by an unpopular yet more original one. Although, however responsible luck was for the successful German entry into France it was a mixture of other, more complicated factors which contributed towards their victories once a breakthrough had been made. For this superior strategy and tactics were needed to overcome French forces and the doctrine of mobile armoured warfare promoted by Manstein and Guderian which had been used to a small extent in the Polish campaign would finally be put to the test.

The German entry into France in May 1940 marked a new style and approach to warfare. Far from the expectations of the allies the enemy that broke through at Sedan were seen to be using tank divisions independently of infantry without the need for a slow advance due to logistics. This strategy was dramatically different from that of any other army in the world at that time. Aside from the German advocates of the importance of the tank very few other officers (with the possible exception of B.H. Liddell Hart) believed that a weapon seen by many as already a thing of the past could make any difference in future wars. Even amongst the German General Staff the decision to place so much importance in Panzer Divisions was regarded with suspicion. It cannot be ignored however that regardless of any suspicion on behalf of the general staff at the time Germany was the first and only country to recognize the advantages present in mobilized armoured divisions and the superiority which would come through fast, powerful tanks. This revolution in military thinking has been attributed by many historians in large part to the outcome of the First World War over thirty years earlier. The historian Len Deighton suggests that ‘the Germans-like any defeated army-searched their souls to find the reasons for failure…’ whereas the allies ‘preferred to believe their eventual victory…proved that their methods were satisfactory.’[vii] In doing this all German military planning was geared towards fighting and winning the next war whilst avoiding the methods which had failed them previously. The allies, however, saw their victory as a sign of adequate strategy and tactics so while the Germans prepared for Blitzkrieg in 1940 the original ‘First World War formula provided the method by which the French-command attempted to deal with [it when it came].’[viii] This then is exemplary of the vast difference in military thinking on either side at the time. Both expected a different type of warfare, although to their advantage the Germans were quick to realize that where tanks had broken the deadlock in the First World War they would prevent it altogether in the Second.

‘Perhaps it is unique in military history for one man to influence the design of a weapon, see to training the men who use it, help plan an offensive and then lead his force into battle; Heinz Guderian did just that’[ix] For while the campaign in the west followed Manstein’s plan, the forces it utilized had almost exclusively been developed and promoted by Guderian during the 1930’s. Gaining public attention after the publication of his book Achtung! Panzer! in 1937, he was to spearhead the eventual attack on France and make his way to the channel coast. The lessons learned in Poland meant that by the time this happened some of the tank regiments had been re-equipped with new Panzers III and IV and the original Light Divisions themselves had become Panzer divisions six to nine. This mass of mobile heavy-armour passed quickly into France in-between the northern end of the Maginot line and the bulk of the allied forces using the blitzkrieg tactics perfected in previous campaigns. Using airborne troops such as those from the infantry regiment Grosse-Deutschland the advancing army managed to capture essential positions behind the frontier needed for the invasion. These included bridges and fortifications, contributing greatly to the ease of movement of the invading force. Due to the heavy investment in motorization during the 1930’s both the motorized infantry and supply trucks made it easy for the Panzer regiments to move on after capturing a position, leaving the infantry to ‘mop up’ and fortify the taken area. Using this technique, German panzer divisions advanced rapidly into France. Unlike the Schlieffen Plan of 1914 the advancing army also managed to avoid the logistics problem which had caused the attack to grind to a halt before reaching Paris. Motorized supply trucks were able to bring ammunition, food and fuel to front line troops while the Panzers themselves were fitted with petrol engines, allowing them to fill up at French petrol stations if they did happen to outrun their own supply lines. In this way the attack could sustain itself in the short term should it need to, something which would work to great effect in France but eventually prove the destruction of the Nazi war machine in the following ambitious campaign in Russia. It should not be forgotten, however, that while the speed and power of the German advance gave them a great advantage as attackers the allies still remained numerically stronger. At the beginning of the campaign the German army had 2,574 tanks compared to the allies 3,254, on top of which the allies possessed three light mechanized divisions, all equally as powerful as the German Panzer divisions. Why then did the allies not recover from the initial ‘lightening attack’ and counter with their numerically stronger forces before anymore damage could be done? The answer to this lies in the surprise with which the allies viewed the German method of attack and the way in which they conducted their defences afterwards.

Looking down on the French coast from his unarmed Flamingo passenger plane after the German breakthrough, British Premier Winston Churchill was heard to say ‘not having had access to official information for so many years, I did not comprehend the revolution effected since the last war by the incursion of a mass of fast-moving heavy armour.’[x] However, regardless of access to this information the same could be said for the majority of the allied leaders at the time. Not only had the development of tanks and the way in which they were used been underemphasized by their armies but the training of troops to deal with these new weapons and stop their advance had also been neglected. Therefore, when the German Blitzkrieg came in May 1940 not only were the bulk of the allied forces positioned to the north of the actual breakthrough but the troops that did stand in the way of the advance were unable to effectively respond. Gripped by the same ‘tank terror’[xi] the Germans had experienced in 1917 and 1918 and further terrorized by the appearance of Stuka dive-bombers many French troops retreated or ‘pretended they had received orders to withdraw.’[xii] The sheer lack of training and familiarity with tanks throughout the French army can be seen most prominently in the rout of many French troops at the appearance of what they did not recognize as their own tanks. Due to this threat the French tanks being brought to the front to counter the German attack were ordered to halt for fear of encouraging further retreats. The tanks which did managed to engage the advancing Panzer divisions fared little better than the infantry. With a much slower top speed and a one man turret which greatly reduced the rate of fire the French armoured divisions were quickly overrun, leaving gaping holes in what was already an under defended area of France. The way in which the French used their armoured divisions also greatly affect their performance. Rather than deploying tanks in independent divisions the French had continued to use them in their First World War role as support for the infantry. Therefore, rather than having groups of concentrated mobile armour the tanks were spread amongst the infantry on the battlefield and therefore quickly targeted and destroyed. The British experience was little better. Many of their divisions were territorial and had very little training when compared to the divisions they were fighting. This then shows the origins of the ‘Dunkirk Mentality’ or ‘Pawns against Panzers’[xiii] belief which was to follow later. Speaking of the BEF’s 3rd Division of which he was then commander, Field-Marshal Bernard Montgomery said in his memoirs that ‘the transport was inadequate and was completed on mobilization by vehicles requisitioned from civilian firms…the countryside of France was strewn with broken-down vehicles.’[xiv] An under equipped British force therefore, under supported by the Royal Air Force against the superior Luftwaffe, found itself fighting on foreign soil to defend the sovereignty of a country which had originally protested because its defenders had crossed its border without requesting an invitation. The poor training of these forces and the lack of equivalent equipment and knowledge of how to correctly deploy it on the modern battlefield ultimately contributed to Frances defeat.

It is apparent, therefore, that the German victory in France was due to a great many factors not least of which was its armoured superiority on the battlefield. Without the military genius of Manstein and Guderian however and the stroke of luck which forced Manstein’s plan forward a stalemate could easily have been reached. The argument that luck played the main role in the German victory therefore is not without its merits. Plan Yellow, like the Schlieffen Plan before it, made use of the temptingly short march to Paris through Belgium. Not only had the Kaiser used this plan over thirty years before but attacks on France had been coming via this route for centuries. Luck then was the main factor in bringing a superior plan into play even if it was not the main factor behind victory. For victory, however, the ability to carry out the plan was needed and this was presented in the use of Panzers and other motorized divisions. The ability to move quickly into France took the allies by surprise and was perhaps the biggest contributing factor to the German success in 1940. Lastly, the allied inability to respond to this fast moving, never-before-seen style of warfare helped the Germans achieve victory at incredible speeds. Although it is apparent that Blitzkrieg alone is not a sure-fire way of achieving victory and as can be seen in Russia later in the war a tenacious enemy, even while under equipped, can turn the tide of the attack However, the sheer terror inspired by these new monsters of the battlefield forced the Allied defenders in France to turn and run, contributing greatly to the ease of the German victory. Those that did manage to escape crossed the channel and waited in England, a place that many of them would continue to wait for another four years.

[Док Холидей]

А ето и бележките към текста

[i] Liddel Hart,B.H., Quoted in History of the Second World War-Breakthrough at Sedan, Alistair Horne

[ii] Guderian,Heinz, Panzer Leader translated from Erinnerungen eines Soldaten

[iii] Macksey, Kenneth – Military Errors of the Second World War, Pg25

[iv] Liddel Hart,B.H., Quoted in History of the Second World War-Breakthrough at Sedan, Alistair Horne

[v] Macksey, Kenneth – Military Errors of the Second World War, Pg25

[vi] Macksey, Kenneth – Military Errors of the Second World War, Pg25

[vii] Deighton, Len – Blitzkrieg, From the rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk, Pg107

[viii] Deighton, Len – Blitzkrieg, From the rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk, Pg108

[ix] Deighton, Len – Blitzkrieg, From the rise of Hitler to the Fall of Dunkirk, Pg140

[x] Winston Churchill quoted by William Manchester in the article The Fall of France “Another Bloody Country Gone West” from the magazine Finest Hour

[xi] Macksey, Kenneth – Military Errors of the Second World War, Pg31

[xii]Macksey, Kenneth – Military Errors of the Second World War, Pg31

[xiii] Warner, Philip – The Battle of France, 1940

[xiv] Montgomery, Bernard – The Memoirs of Field-Marshal Montgomery



Bibliography

Literature



Barber, Noel – The Week France Fell 1976 Macmillan London Limited

Deighton, Len – Blitzkrieg : From the rise of Hitler to the fall of Dunkirk 1979 Fakenham Press Limited

Guderian, Heinz– Panzer Leader 1952 Michael Joseph, Translated from Erinnerungen eines Soldaten

Holmes, Richard (ed.) – The Oxford Companion to Military History 2001 Oxford University Press

Macksey, Kenneth –Military Errors of the Second World War 1987 Cassell

Montgomery, Bernard Law –Memoirs 1968 Collins

Warner, Philip –The Battle of France, 1940 1990 Cassell



Articles & Essays



Horne, Alistair - History of the Second World War-“Breakthrough at Sedan”

Manchester, William - The Fall of France “Another Bloody Country Gone West” from the magazine Finest Hour

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