Войната в Сирия

[iasen ianakiev]

http://www.ria.ru/arab_sy/20121004/765841337.html - Взе да мирише на война

[Кухулин]

Алеппо: после атаки смертников

Взривовете явно са били доста сериозни, може би над тон експлозив.

[iasen ianakiev]

http://www.newsru.com/world/04oct2012/turkie.html

[Кухулин]

Между другото, турците са ударили по Сирия с любимите на всички ни фъртъни (T-155 Fırtına). Трябва да е било атрактивно

[iasen ianakiev]

А ето и клипче с Т-155 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJu7DIeJo4A&NR

[Кухулин]

Thousands protest in Turkey over Syria mandate

Антивоенни демонстрации в Истанбул и Анкара след турския обстрел, сблъсъци с полицията. Не му е лесно на Ердоган.





По доста несигурни данни сирийските загуби са 10 убити и до 5 единици техника.

[iasen ianakiev]

http://ru.euronews.com/2012/10/05/sy...ascus-airbase/- ССА са превзели база на ПВО в околностите на Дамаск.

[iasen ianakiev]

http://www.newsru.com/world/05oct2012/syria.html - Нов Сирийски снаряд е паднал в Турция и турците ,пак са отговорили с артилериятя си.

[Dinain]

***Който иска да обсъжда вътрешната политика на Турция, да си отвори тема, ако вече няма такава. Тази тема е за Сирия.***

ПП Съществуваща тема: Перспективи пред Турция като регионална сила

[Кухулин]

Е, мерси

Бунтовниците са превзели още една ПВО-позиция край Дамаск:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tkxHUfUaQqI

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zjHhZl_kGDM

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A99eVuQ-L54

Този път съпротивата явно е била по-слаба - няма трупове, виждат се пленени войници. Усеща се, че правителството губи контрол над покрайнините.

[Dinain]

Между другото, в първото видео на 0:18 ясно се чува точно това:

In the Islamic world, instead of applause, often someone will shout "takbir" and the crowd will respond "Allahu Akbar" in response.

Нещо като "кой е най-голем?" и публиката отвърща "..."

[ndragostinov]

Бих искал да се върнем малко назад във връзка с клането в Хула.
Вчера случайно ми попадна докладът на ООН от разследването и смятам, че съдържанието му ще бъде интересно за мнозина. Малко е дълго за четене, затова ето главните моменти:

2. The commission has since continued its investigation focusing on identifying the perpetrators. Access to the country was not granted despite specific requests to the Syrian Arab Republic via Note Verbale dated 4 June 2012 (annex XI) and in person by the Chairperson during his visit to Damascus 24–25 June 2012. Moreover, the commission had not received a response to a request dated 13 July to interview two specific witnesses whose testimony had appeared in the Government report and who had been interviewed by both Syrian and Russian journalists (annex XI). Although the Syrian Government provided the preliminary report of its own commission of inquiry on 7 June, it has not delivered a final report, nor indicated when such a report might be forthcoming.

(...)

4. As noted, the Government’s report stated that the Syrian Army had defended itself from an attack by what it deemed “terrorists”, and that a number of soldiers were killed in the clashes. The report acknowledged the deaths of civilians and described the Abdulrazzak family as peaceful and stated that it had refused to rise up against the State or participate in demonstrations – suggesting they were attacked by anti-government groups for their failure to support the rebellion. The motive provided for the Al-Sayed family killings was their familial ties to Abdelmuti Mashlab, a new member of parliament, and existing feuds with some members of the armed groups.
5. More than forty separate interviews were considered by the commission. All interviewees were consistent in their portrayal of the events and their description of the perpetrators as Government forces and Shabbiha. Apart from the two witnesses in the Government report, no other account supported the Government’s version of events. As noted, the commission’s request to interview those two witnesses was not fulfilled. The commission, nevertheless, carefully reviewed their testimony as set out in the Government report and interviews they gave to other sources, and deemed their accounts to be unreliable as they contained a number of inconsistencies. Not making the witnesses available to the commission meant that those inconsistencies could not be further explored. Separately, a high-ranking defector that the commission deemed credible reported that, prior to his defection, he was asked to help manufacture evidence supporting the Government’s version of events.
6. At the same time, accounts of other witnesses interviewed by the commission remained consistent over time, including those collected from children, despite the fact that they were conducted by different interviewers. The commission found it highly unlikely that the dozens of people interviewed in Taldou could be taking part in an extensive fabrication over such an extended period.
7. Consequently, the commission found the version of events received from the Government to be uncorroborated and insufficient when compared to the larger body of evidence collected from other sources. Besides the Government’s report, little evidence was collected suggesting that anyone other than Government forces and Shabbiha committed the killings.
8. The commission’s earlier report determined that both the anti- and pro-Government forces could have accessed the two crime scenes – the first scene being the seven Abdulrazzak family homes on Dam Street (Tariq al-Sad) and the second being the two Al-Sayed family homes on Main Street (Al-Shar’i Al-Raisi), across the street from the National Hospital (see map). The commission has since determined that the checkpoint at Al-Qaws remained in Government hands at the end of the day the incident occurred. The checkpoint demarcated the new front line between the opposition and Government forces. The commission concluded that Al-Sayed house was adjacent to the National Hospital and lying south of Al-Qaws checkpoint and that the crime scene remained in Government-controlled territory the entire time. Indeed, when UNSMIS arrived the next day and negotiated the handover of the bodies from the site (see the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council, S/2012/523, 27 May 2012), Government soldiers were on duty at the checkpoint and in control of the crime scene.
9. In a related finding, the commission ruled out the theory proffered by the Government that the target of the killing was in fact the newly elected Member of Parliament from Taldou, Abdelmuti Mashlab. According to the Government report,

The first targets of this massacre were relatives of the People’s Assembly member Abd Al-Moa’ti Mashlab. What was required was to take revenge, because he challenged them when he submitted his candidacy to the People’s Assembly and managed to be elected as a member. This indeed happened before things went out of control and the massacre extended to slaughter other families.

10. The “other families” are those of Mashlab’s distant relatives, namely the Al-Sayed family. The commission determined that the Mashlab household was in opposition-controlled areas of the town at the time of the attack. Thus it would have been accessible to an anti-Government armed group seeking to mete out such a punishment, yet the house remained untouched. Both Al-Sayed family homes, conversely, were readily accessible to Government forces or local militias, but the same access would have been extremely risky if not impossible for anti-Government groups.
11. At the Abdulrazzak crime scene, where over 60 persons were killed, the commission considered it likely that a large number of perpetrators would have been necessary to carry out the crime. The killings occurred in broad daylight. Testimony received indicated that the perpetrators arrived both by foot and in vehicles, and that some arrived with pickups with machine guns mounted on top, in addition to a number of cars and minivans. The commission found that the movement of vehicles or weapons, as well as the size of the group, would have been detectable by Government forces at the Water Authority position. At the same time, access to the scene for any sizable group of anti-Government armed men would have been practically impossible, especially if they arrived in vehicles as multiple eyewitnesses attested.
12. Opposition members did manage to access the scene and remove the bodies later that evening and apparently did so using vehicles. However, they were apparently shot at by Government forces and had to abandon their efforts until the following morning.
13. The National Hospital had been occupied by the army for several months prior to the incidents. Although it was accessible by foot from both crime scenes, no one — whether injured or fleeing the crime scenes — sought refuge there. As far as the commission could determine, all injured and surviving family members, as well as people from nearby houses, fled to opposition-controlled areas. Moreover, as mentioned in the commission’s previous report, it was anti-Government activists who arrived at the area first, took care of the deceased and assisted in treating the wounded and organized their burial. The commission saw no indication that pro-Government entities attempted to do the same, namely to secure the crime scenes or to recover the wounded and deceased after news of the events broke – at either site.

(...)

The commission examined the version of events reported in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 7 June 2012, by Rainer Hermann, and by journalist Marat Musin, on Anna news and Russia Today, 2 June 2012, both of which blamed the killings on anti-Government armed groups. The commission found these reports relied primarily on the same two witnesses as the Government’s report and not on additional investigation or witnesses in Al-Houla. Moreover, these reports asserted that the Abdulrazzak family had converted to Shiism. The commission confirmed that all members of both families were Sunni and that no one in either family had converted

Ето го пълния текст:

http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-50_en.pdf

където ще откриете много приложения, карти и други подробности.

[Henry Sinclair]

Сирийски бунтовници екзекутират 21 алауити, пленени при штурма на казармата "Ханнано" в град Алепо
(Не се препоръчва за деца под 14г.)

[Кухулин]

Вчера случайно ми попадна докладът на ООН от разследването и смятам, че съдържанието му ще бъде интересно за мнозина.

Обсъждаше се тоя доклад. Ако трябва да говорим принципно, никаква стойност не може да има, освен политическа. На всеки е ясно, че само със свидетелски показания, често от втора ръка, няма как да се докаже каквото и да е. В случая имаме и ограничен достъп, липсва критичност, изобщо - слаба работа. Реално доклада не добавя никаква нова фактолигия към вече известната, а в някои случаи дори пропуска елементи и е в противоречие с други. Когато всеки от тези свидетели се изправи пред съда и се подложи на кръстосан разпит, тогава може да се добие реална представа за стойността на показанията му и да се преценят събитията в тяхната светлина. Да си спомним процеса на Шешел в Хага - пълно фиаско точно по тази причина.

Това е положението по принцип, тоест слабости на доклада откъм методология и изпълнение. Самия въпрос обаче е доста интересен - кой точно е изклал тия 100 души. Ясно е едно - на свидетелските показания не можем да се доверим, тъй като са заснети и от едната, и от другата страна. На официалните изявления също не можем да се доверим, освен когато става дума за консенсус по фактите.

Най-логичната линия на разсъждение е да се запитаме - защо са изклани хората? Кой има полза от клането?

От едната страна е баналния факт, че правителството понесе страхотен негатив точно преди мисията на ООН. Това клане му разказа играта от медийна гледна точка. При това схемата съществува и е устойчива - редовно се случваха такива инциденти преди важни международни събития по Сирия. Значи бунтовниците имат много добър мотив, нещата пасват екстра.

От друга страна, какъв мотив има правителството да влезе и да изколи 100 души? Част ли е от обичайната тактика? Не е част. Има ли паралели? Няма. Ползи? Няма ползи. Вреда - огромна.

Да, обаче хора, които са дълбоко запознати със ситуацията, твърдяха, че АКО клането е било в тоя формат, има ВЕРОЯТНОСТ удара да е бил насочен срещу някакви хора на Манаф Тлас. По-късно излезе информация, че по това време генерала изпада в немилост, говори се за някакви контакти с бунтовниците, оттегля подкрепата на целия клан Тлас от Асад, а тя е била страшно важна - дотогава най-силните сунити подкрепят властта. Оттам - наказателна акция и клане.

Аз лично съм на кантар - и двете версии ми се струват еднакво вероятни. Втората е леко конспиративна, но пък напълно в духа на събитията.

[Dinain]

Кухулин, това прочете ли го?

13. The National Hospital had been occupied by the army for several months prior to the incidents. Although it was accessible by foot from both crime scenes, no one — whether injured or fleeing the crime scenes — sought refuge there. As far as the commission could determine, all injured and surviving family members, as well as people from nearby houses, fled to opposition-controlled areas. Moreover, as mentioned in the commission’s previous report, it was anti-Government activists who arrived at the area first, took care of the deceased and assisted in treating the wounded and organized their burial. The commission saw no indication that pro-Government entities attempted to do the same, namely to secure the crime scenes or to recover the wounded and deceased after news of the events broke – at either site.

И по-важно, успя ли да извлечеш нужните логически заключения по дедуктивен път?