THE CATALAN FAILURE IN ACCULTURATION IN FRANKISH GREECE AND THE ISLAMIC WORLD DURING THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY

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The economic, political, and religious difficulties which plagued western Europe during the fourteenth century are familiar to most historians as well as to a talented nonacademic writer like Barbara Tuchman.[1] This is so whether these are economic historians examining the failure of Italy's banking system, the end of urban and rural expansion, or the effects of the Black Death; political historians explaining how popular revolts and constant warfare paralyzed governmental effectiveness; or religious historians tracing the sad years of the Avignon papacy and the Great Schism. What is of equal importance, however, is for historians to chart a very similar breakdown in the relationships between Latin Europe and her Byzantine and Muslim neighbors – a failure that was equally pronounced during this crucial century.

This article represents an attempt to examine this failure in three quite distinct areas of the Mediterranean: Frankish Greece, Egypt, and North Africa, which have been chosen because Catalans, who are the concern of this article, were very much involved in each of them. It is to be hoped that such an examination will help to explain in some measure why Catalonia, which was able to expand its influence throughout the wider Mediterranean world of the thirteenth century, faltered during the fourteenth and began a period of actual decline that was to continue for many decades.[2]

Let us begin with Frankish Greece, where Catalans were much involved in two areas: with Athens and Thebes which had come to be controlled since 1311 by the famous Catalan Company, and the island of Rhodes where a large Aragonese contingent was to be found among the Knights Hospitalers who, since 1308, had made it their headquarters and a base from which they could raid nearby Turkish-held shores

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[1] Barbara Tuchman, *A Distant Mirror: The Calamitous Fourteenth Century* (New York 1978).

[2] C. Carrère, *Barcelone, centre économique à l'époque des difficultés, 1380-1462* (Paris 1967), gives an excellent picture of these troubles down to 1450 when she believes a revival in the economy occurred.

of Asia Minor. Catalan interests in this part of the non-Latin Mediterranean world, then, were essentially political.[3]

Quite different were Catalonian relations with Egypt, which were essentially commercial. These had been established during the third quarter of the thirteenth century, late in the reign of Jaume the Conqueror, and had grown in importance as trade had expanded by way of an Aragonese-dominated Sicily and North African ports.[4] This commerce in some ways even seems to represent a revival of that old Muslim trading area revealed to us so clearly in earlier Geniza documentation.[5] And though Catalan trade with Egypt never matched that which Venice and Genoa maintained with the realm of the Mamluks, it was especially important for Catalan merchants because they had no alternate route which they could use as effectively to tap the trade of the Indian Ocean, like those which the Venetians and Genoese were able to exploit by way of Lesser Armenia and Black Sea ports.[6]

The third area we are considering, North Africa, was one in which Catalans had a major commercial and political stake, as Dufourcq's fine study has recently shown. Here from Ceuta to Tripoli, Catalans and Marjorcans had come to dominate the Mediterranean trade of the Maghreb as well as supplanting the Genoese in Sicily and Sardinia. By the fourteenth century they had also come to exercise considerable political influence, thanks to the Christian militias that they furnished to North African rulers – soldiers on whom the latter relied to maintain internal order. And to all this we should add the large yearly tribute in gold which the Hafsid rulers of Tunisia thought it wise to pay to the Crown of Aragon. Indeed, from the Straits of Gibraltar to Palermo and Sfax, it was Aragonese flotillas which tended to dominate the waters off African and Nasarid Granadan shores, and not the warships of their French and Italian rivals.[7]

Initially, Catalans had some special built-in advantages in dealing with the Byzantine and Islamic worlds. They had never attacked Byzantine territory in Greece as the Venetians had regularly done since the twelfth century – assaults which had culmi-

[3] On Catalans in Athens, see Kenneth M. Setton, *Catalan Domination of Athens, 1311-1388*, rev. ed., Variorum (London 1975) and *idem, The Papacy and the Levant, 1204-1571* 1 (Philadelphia 1976) 441-473. On the Knights of Rhodes, *ibid.* 159-170, 179-214, and 327-346; and Anthony Luttrell, *The Hospitalers in Cyprus, Rhodes, Greece and the West (1291-1440)*, Variorum (London 1978).

[4] For the importance of this trade, see J. N. Hillgarth, *The Problem of a Catalan Mediterranean Empire, 1229-1327*, The English Historical Review suppl. 8 (London 1975). Though Hillgarth is probably correct in doubting the political motivation behind this trade, he may underestimate its economic importance.

[5] On this route during the centuries between A.D. 950 and 1250, see S. D. Goitein, *A Mediterranean Society*, 3 vols. (Berkeley 1967-1971).

[6] On these routes, see Eliyahu Ashtor, "L'exportation des textiles occidentaux dans le Proche Orient musulman au bas Moyen Age," in *Studi in memoria di Federigo Melis* 2 (Naples 1978) 303-377.

[7] Charles E. Dufourcq, *L'Espagne catalane et le Maghrib aux XIII^e et XIV^e siècles* (Paris 1966); and Rachel Arié, *L'Espagne musulmane au temps des Nasrides, 1232-1492* (Paris 1973).

nated in the infamous Fourth Crusade.[8] And they were not as closely identified as the Genoese were with that brutal slave trade which bore so heavily upon the Greek inhabitants of the Black Sea-Aegean litoral.[9] They were thus initially relatively free of the burden of long-standing hatreds and misunderstandings on the part of the Greeks that they ruled.

As far as the Muslim world was concerned, they had similar advantages because they maintained a relatively benign rule over the conquered Islamic population of Valencia and the Balearics while allowing Muslim merchants in ports like Palma to play an independent commercial role of their own – something Venetians and Genoese were loath to do. They were equally receptive to the interests of Jewish merchants and financiers whom their rulers employed as officials and who helped them to dominate trade with North African Tlemcen which served as a gateway to the gold of the Sudan.[10]

It should, therefore, come as no surprise to us that it was in Aragonese domains during the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries that we find some imaginative attempts to convert Muslims in the Maghreb to Latin Christianity – one initiated by both Ramon Lull and his Franciscans and by a band of Dominicans who learned Arabic for this purpose.[11] Nor is it surprising that Frankish Greece, where Catalans were so powerful, produced an *Assizes of Romania* and a *Chronicle of the Morea* which reveal considerable Frankish-Byzantine cooperation on the upper-class level and that here Latin-Greek religious hostility was relatively muted.[12] If any group were in a position to serve as a bridge between Latin Europe and the Greek and Islamic worlds during the fourteenth century, then, it was the Catalans. They had the opportunity to prove that acculturation could proceed effectively and fruitfully on a number of levels.

Yet by the time this century had drawn to a close, such hopes had turned out to be stillborn. Let us first look at Frankish Greece. By 1388 the rule of the Catalan Company had ended in central Greece, unlamented by a hostile native population, and the Catalans had been replaced in Thebes and Athens by the Florentine adven-

[8] Donald E. Queller, *The Fourth Crusade* (Philadelphia 1977). For the later Venetian Empire, see F. Thiriet, *La Romanie venitienne au moyen âge* (Paris 1959).

[9] The most recent account of this slave trade is to be found in Charles Verlinden, *L'esclavage dans l'Europe médiévale* 2 (Ghent 1977) 427-541.

[10] See Dufourcq (n. 7 above) 106-259.

[11] On Lull and the whole problem of the conversion of Muslims in Valencia and elsewhere, see Robert I. Burns, *Islam under the Crusaders* (Princeton 1973), esp. 189-199. For North African problems, see Dufourcq (n. 7 above). Out of date but useful is E. Allison Peers, *Fool of Love: The Life of Ramon Lull* (London 1946). Better is J. N. Hillgarth, *Ramon Lull and Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France* (Oxford 1971).

[12] For sources, see *Les Assises de Romanie*, ed. G. Recoura (Paris 1930) and *Chronique de Morée (1204-1305)*, ed. J. Longnon (Paris 1911). For secondary literature, David Jacoby, "Quelques considerations sur les versions de la 'Chronique de Morée,' " *Journal des savants* (1968) and especially *idem, La féodalité en Grèce médiévale* (Paris 1971). Also useful is Antoine Bon, *La Morée franque* (Paris 1969).

turer Nerio Acciajulio,[13] though Catalan pirates continued to operate off Greek shores into the early years of the fifteenth century.[14] There was also a steady growth of anti-Latin sentiment in the nearby Peloponnesus as Byzantine holdings about Mistra grew in size and importance.[15] Soon after 1400 the Morea had become almost completely Byzantine and its Greek despots were expanding northward to take over Athens and Thebes as well.[16] As for the Knights of Rhodes, in whose ranks Catalans played a part, though they were able to hold onto their island, by the early fifteenth century they had proved that they were unable to rally the Greeks and halt Ottoman power on both sides of the Bosporus, as first Smyrna and then Saloniki fell into Turkish hands.[17] Catalan-Byzantine acculturation in this part of the eastern Mediterranean must be rated a failure.

Equally disappointing was the role that the Catalans played in Egypt. Though their merchants continued to maintain close commercial ties with Alexandria throughout the first two-thirds of the century, they were unable to affect the aggressive tendencies of their fellow Latins who, led by Peter of Cyprus, launched a brutal and unrewarding crusade against Alexandria in 1365 and followed it with a decade of assaults on coastal Syria.[18] By the end of the fourteenth century the hostility which these attacks engendered in Cairo and Syria had resulted in the wiping out of the Kingdom of Lesser Armenia and had helped revive a Mamluk fleet which forced the Cypriots to pay tribute.

Most important of all, such attacks helped to fuel anti-Christian prejudices throughout the Near East, which reduced contacts between Latin Westerners and Islamic society to a minimum and rendered outside intervention in the area, like Tamerlane's conquests of Syria and Anatolia, of little value to the Latin West – despite efforts to take advantage of them.[19] From this time on, it was only those *Frangis* who were willing to become renegades who were welcomed by the Mamluk military establishment or the Egyptian-Syrian civilian upper class.[20] The chance for a fruitful acculturation had been lost here as it had been in Frankish Greece.

[13] On the loss of Thebes and Athens by the Catalans, which left only one small surviving lordship on the island of Aegina (not extinguished until 1451), see Kenneth M. Setton, *Los Catalanes en Grecia* (Barcelona 1975) 174-198.

[14] *George Phrantzes: Byzantium's Last Decades (1401-1477)* 21.1, ed. and trans. Mario Philippides (Amherst, Mass., forthcoming).

[15] Setton, *Papacy* (n. 3 above) 98-99, 154-159, and 372-381.

[16] George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. J. Hussey (New Brunswick, N.J. 1957) 484-496.

[17] *Ibid.* 497-498.

[18] A. S. Atiya, *The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages* (London 1938) 353-354; and Setton, *Papacy* (n. 3 above) 1.255-284.

[19] For Cyprus and Lesser Armenia, see T. S. R. Boase, *Kingdoms and Strongholds of the Crusaders* (New York 1971) 215-234; and Setton, *Papacy* 274-284. Also of importance is Ira Lapidus, *Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, Mass. 1967) 5-85, for Mamluk retreat from the sea under Latin pressures.

[20] See David Ayalon, *Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom* (London 1956); *A Muslim Manual of War*, ed. and trans. G. Scanlon (Cairo 1961); and D. Ayalon, *Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt, 1250-1517*, Variorum (London 1977).

Equally significant was the failure of Aragonese prospects in North Africa. By the 1330s and 1340s a revival of Muslim strength led to a brief period of North African unity under the Merinids and a last large-scale invasion of southern Spain. It is true that these invading forces were defeated by a joint Portuguese-Castilian army at Salado in 1340 and that shortly thereafter Iberian-Genoese flotillas regained control of the Straits of Gibraltar.[21] But even after these victories and the swift disintegration of the Merinid empire which followed, the previous situation could not be restored. Catalans were unable to regain their former political, economic, and naval dominance along North African shores.

Instead, Christian mercenary troops seem to have been disbanded by the Maghrebi rulers of Tunis, Tlemcen, and Morocco; and the tempo of raids by pirates located in small ports along the coast increased markedly as more and more Spanish Muslims sought refuge in North Africa.[22] Even the Hafsids of Tunisia ceased to pay tribute to the House of Aragon. And when a large French force made an attempt to conquer Mahdia in 1394, an assault which was beaten off with great loss to the attackers, this further lowered Catalan prestige in this part of the Islamic world even though Catalans had not been a part of the expedition and had continued to maintain trade with Tunisia throughout this conflict, by way of Sardinia.[23]

We find a similar failure when we examine ideology. Ever since the abortive attempt of the emperor Michael Paleologus to unite the Greek and Latin churches after the Council of Lyons of 1274, [24] Byzantine emperors had been striving to come to an agreement with Rome. In their attempts in the course of the fourteenth century, they had the support of a group of Greek intellectuals like Barlaam who had close connections with the Dominicans of Pera and who admired Thomistic theology.[25] Despite the efforts of this group and those of an emperor like John VIII who understood the importance of such an agreement to gain Western support, nothing was accomplished.[26] Instead, the majority of the Byzantine religious establishment, and the monks of Mount Athos and the village priests especially, rallied to the mystical vision of Saint George Palamas and his Hesychasts who were bitterly opposed to any accommodation with the Latin church.[27] This opposition continued

[21] A. R. Lewis, "Northern European Sea-Power and the Straits of Gibraltar," in *Order and Innovation in the Middle Ages: Essays in Honor of Joseph R. Strayer*, ed. W. C. Jordan et al. (Princeton 1976) 158-161.

[22] See Dufourcq (n. 7 above) 130-231; and John Boswell, *The Royal Treasure: Muslim Communities under the Crown of Aragon in the Fourteenth Century* (New Haven 1977).

[23] Setton, *Papacy* (n. 3 above) 1.329-340.

[24] See especially Deno Geanakoplos, *Emperor Michael Palaeologus and the West, 1258-1282* (Hamden, Conn. 1972).

[25] George Schiro, *Barlaam and Philosophy in Thessalonika in the Fourteenth Century* [in Greek] (Thessalonika 1959); and *idem*, ed., *Barlaam Calabro, Epistole greche* (Palermo 1954).

[26] Oscar Halecki, *Un empereur de Byzance à Rome (1355-1378)* (1930; repr. London 1974), is the best account of John VIII's efforts.

[27] Deno Geanakoplos, *Interaction of the "Sibling" Byzantine and Western Cultures in the Middle Ages and Italian Renaissance* (New Haven 1976) 36-54; and J. Meyendorff, *Byzantine Hesychasm*, Variorum (London 1974).

right down to the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and thwarted efforts like those generated by the Council of Ferrara-Florence to achieve a religious union between Latins and Greeks.[28]

Relations between West and East broke down in Egypt and the Mamluk domains as well. From 1365 on, a gulf had come to exist which separated Latin Christians from the native Muslim population and which is reflected in Nuwairi's bitter account of the sack of Alexandria.[29] Muslim rejection soon came to include all Christians, whether native or foreign, who from this time on were discriminated against in a number of ways.

It is North Africa, however, which provides us with an especially clear view of a changed climate of opinion. Not only do we find here special importance accorded Franciscan renegades, some of whom were venerated as Sufi saints, but we can see in the writings of two remarkable Muslim authors, Ibn Battuta and Ibn Khaldun, evidence of hostility toward Latin Christianity. Ibn Battuta, for example, is generally thought of as a great traveler only marginally concerned with ideological or religious conflict. He was, however, a native of Fez just across the straits from Andalusia and was well aware of the tensions which existed between his coreligionists and the Christian Spanish. Even more important is the fact that, when we examine his travels, we find him visiting every part of the Islamic world, and Constantinople as well, as if skirting a hostile Latin West that lay beyond. He thus seems to have devoted his life to assuring himself as to the strength and vigor of Islamic civilization and its contacts with non-Latin Christian peoples who lived in the Sudan, along the coasts of East Asia, in India, in Indonesia, and in China.[30]

Ibn Khaldun's hostility toward the Latin West is even more profound. This great scholar, who was of Spanish Muslim descent, knew Christian Iberia well, for he served for a time as Granadan ambassador to the court of Pedro the Cruel of Castile. Yet his writings reveal him to be hostile and unsympathetic to Christianity in all its forms.[31] With him one senses that the dream of Ramon Lull had collapsed and that a gulf now separated the Moslem intellectuals of North Africa from their Iberian Christian counterparts – one not to be bridged for some centuries, which was to lead to a confrontation represented by the conquest of Ceuta in 1415 and Henry the Navigator's anti-Muslim advances down the coast of West Africa.[32]

[28] Kenneth Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant* 2: *The Fifteenth Century* (Philadelphia 1978) 39-160.

[29] See E. Combe, "Le texte de Nuwairi sur l'attaque d'Alexandrie par Pierre I de Lusignan," *Bulletin of the Faculty of Arts, University of Alexandria* 3 (1946), for the best Islamic account.

[30] Most of Ibn Battuta's travels are available in a new edition, *Ibn Baṭṭūṭa's Travels*, trans. H. A. R. Gibb, 3 vols., Hakluyt Society ser. 2 (Cambridge 1958-1971). The rest are to be found in *Voyages d'Ibn Batoutah*, ed. C. Defrémery and B. R. Sanguinetti, 4 vols. (Paris 1857-1874). For a map of their extent, see Björn Landström, *The Quest for India*, trans. M. Phillips and H. W. Stubbs (New York 1968) 142-143.

[31] For Ibn Khaldun, see his *Histoire des Berbères et des dynasties Musulmanes de l'Afrique septentrionale*, rev. ed., 4 vols. (Paris 1925-1956); and *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, 3 vols., ed. 2, trans. F. Rosenthal (Princeton 1967), esp. 1.472-481.

[32] See Peter Russell, *Prince Henry the Navigator* (London 1960); and for the earlier period, Charles Verlinden, *La découverte des archipels de la "Méditerranée Atlantique" (Canaries,*

Why did this all come about? What went wrong? We can only attempt some very tentative answers to such questions. And we must begin by noting that, in general, a hostility between Latin Europe and the Byzantine world was relatively complete by 1300, *except* in Iberia and Catalonia. For example, beyond the Pyrenees, anti-Semitism, which was one facet of an anti-Muslim and anti-Byzantine spirit, had become so strong that Jews had been expelled from France and England, and the Inquisition had effectively begun to still dangerous, heterodox ideas among the elite. What concerns us is an *extension* of this spirit to Spain, and to Catalan areas in particular, a century later.

Perhaps we also need to note that the triumph of mystical Hesychast ideas had its counterpart in a similar development in Islam – the growing Sufi movement. Sufism, with its mystical approach to God and its scorn of reason, like Hesychasm, made any exchange of a rational sort with Latin Westerners in general and Catalans in particular hard to come by.[33]

We find a similar rift when we examine artistic trends and tendencies. Though the art of the Church of Kahrieh Djami in Constantinople and the frescoes of a number of Yugoslav churches have obvious connections with the art of early Renaissance Italy, the growing Hesychast mystical strain found in Mistra's mosaics and deeply influencing Russian icon painting by 1400 had clearly widened the gap between the two worlds from an artistic point of view.[34] Even more distant from the artistic interests of Trecento Italy or the Gothic sensibilities of Europe beyond the Alps are the Mamluk mosques of Cairo, late medieval Marrakesh or the Alhambra in Granada.[35] A wide cultural fissure had opened up during this century.

To explain the failure of acculturation, though, as the result of a triumph of mysticism in Byzantine and Muslim intellectual and artistic life is to tell only part of the story. Three attitudes of the Latin West, which were shared by Catalans, were probably more important in explaining the failure of Latin Christian acculturation in these regions of the Mediterranean world. First of all, there was that attitude which can best be described as naked political domination or imperialism, unconcerned with the needs and interests of the Byzantine and Islamic population. For instance, despite the *Assizes of Romania* and some intermarriage, the Catalans of Greece self-consciously separated themselves from the Greek population, so much so that when they were overthrown in 1388 they disappeared, leaving hardly a trace of their

Madères, Açores) et la navigation astronomique primitive (Coimbra 1978). For a later period, see John H. Parry, *The Age of Reconnaissance* (New York 1960), and Andrew C. Hess, *The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African Frontier* (Chicago 1978) 1-67.

[33] No good overall examination of Islamic Sufism exists. See, however, for North Africa, Émile Dermenghem, *Le culte des saints dans l'Islam Maghrébin*, ed. 6 (Paris 1964).

[34] See André Grabar, *Byzantine Painting*, trans. S. Gilbert (Cleveland 1953) 44-46 and 153; David T. Rice, *Byzantine Frescoes from Yugoslav Churches* (New York 1965); and Otto Demus, *Byzantine Art and the West* (New York 1970) 205-260.

[35] For Granada and the Muslim West, see the inadequate Anwar G. Chejne, *Muslim Spain* (Minneapolis 1974) 359-411. In addition to Cresswell, however, the best survey on North African Muslim art and architecture is Derek Hill and Lucien Golvin, *Islamic Architecture in North Africa* (London 1976).

activities. To a large degree, the same kind of aloofness can be ascribed to the Knights of Rhodes on their island fortress.[36]

In Egypt the senseless and savage massacre of the Muslim population by the Crusaders of 1365, alluded to earlier, seems to have triggered a similar response. Now, as we learn from later pilgrim accounts, the Mamluk authorities seem to have regarded all collaboration with the West as impossible except on a controlled economic basis.[37] And in the Maghreb, Christian bodyguards were so resented by the local population that once they were abolished they were not reconstituted. Instead, what seems to have appeared here and in the Mamluk Empire was a new phenomenon – bodies of *renegados* who had to become converted to Islam to gain acceptance by the Muslim majority, whether these renegades were pirate captains of corsair vessels or *Frangi* like those who Ayalon has shown us were used to man Mamluk artillery.[38] In short, attempts at political domination had caused a reaction which helped to doom the acculturation which had previously taken place.

Equally interesting, though harder to pin down, is evidence of an economic domination or imperialism in thought and practice as far as Catalans are concerned, largely having to do with their economic dealings with North Africa. We have no evidence, for instance, that close ties with Muslim merchants settled in ports like Palma or Valencia continued to be maintained in the fourteenth century as they had been in the past. Instead, it seems that an economic hostility prevailed which is best revealed in a slave trade which Charles Verlinden has depicted so vividly for us.[39] As for Catalonia's share of an important textile export trade to Muslim Mediterranean ports, a recent Ashtor article has shown that their textiles after 1400 generally reached Islamic customers in Venetian bottoms.[40] Equally revealing are privateering ordinances which are found in the Catalonian *Consulate of the Sea* and which date from this period.[41] No wonder economic ties between the Maghreb, Egypt, and Catalonia did so little to improve relations between the Catalans and their Islamic and Byzantine neighbors.

Finally, one sees by the fourteenth century in the Latin West, as in Catalonia in particular, a lack of cultural interest in Islamic thought and civilization. Franciscan and Dominican scholarly interest in Islam as a religion seems to end. It is replaced by activities of religious groups concerned almost wholly with the ransom of Christian

[36] Setton (n. 13 above) 163ff.

[37] See the failure of European efforts to deal with Tamerlain in Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, *Life and Acts of the Great Tamerlane*, trans. C. R. Markham, Hakluyt Society ser. 1, 26 (repr. London 1959). Also worth consulting is Ashtor (n. 6 above) 303-312, 350-376.

[38] On European renegades in Egypt, see H. Prescott, *Once to Sinai* (New York 1955) 13-224; and Ayalon, *Studies* and *Gunpowder* (n. 20 above).

[39] See, for instance, Verlinden (n. 9 above) 338-353; and *idem*, "L'esclavage dans un quartier de Palerme: Aspects quantitatifs," in *Studi Federigo Melis* (n. 6 above) 3.505-526.

[40] See Ashtor (n. 6 above) for the actual figures.

[41] See *The Consulate of the Sea and Related Documents*, trans. S. S. Jados (University, Ala. 1973) 233-262.

captives who had fallen into the hands of Barbary pirates.[42] It is significant that the writings of both Ibn Battuta and Ibn Khaldun remained unknown in Christendom for centuries to come, and that Pedro the Cruel, who claimed to be the King of the Three Religions, according to his coinage, was probably the last late medieval Spanish ruler whose court was receptive to Islamic thought. By the 1390s we are in a new world of popular risings against Jewish communities in Spain which boded ill for the future.[43] Acculturation was no longer viable *at home* as well as abroad. An era had come to an end in Catalonia with momentous consequences for the future.

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[42] James Boardman, "The Origins of the Mercederian Order: A Reassessment," *Studia Monastica* 19 (1977) 18-49.

[43] For an internal explanation of this attitude in Castilian territory, see Julio Valdeón Baruque, *Los conflictos sociales en el reino de Castilla en los siglos XIV y XV* (Madrid 1975), and J. N. Hillgarth, *The Spanish Kingdoms, 1250-1516* (Oxford 1976-1978), esp. vol. 2. Also important is Philippe Wolff, "Le pogrom de 1391 en Espagne: Crise sociale ou non?" in *Regards sur le Midi médiéval* (Toulouse 1978) 511-523.