Further reading: Yitzhak Nakash, *The Shi'is of Iraq* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

Shihab family The Shihab family was one of the leading families of Lebanon and in the 18th and 19th centuries its members dominated the office of Emir of the Mountain, the title of the dominant warlord in the Lebanese mountains. The Shihab family was somewhat unusual in a region politically dominated by Druze dynasties, as they were nominally practitioners of Sunni Islam. The descendants of Fakhr al-Din al-Maani, who dominated much of what is today Lebanon in the first part of the 17th century, had held the office for most of the 17th century, despite attempts by the Ottomans to dislodge them. But when the last male descendant in the family line died in 1697, his vassals chose Haydar al-Shihab as emir. Although Haydar was a Sunni, his mother was a Druze from the Maan clan. He spent the next decade trying to win the support of various Druze and Shii clans in southern and central Lebanon. His rivals called in help from the Ottomans in 1711, but before the Ottoman expeditionary force could arrive, Haydar defeated his local rivals at the Battle of Andara and seized the former Maan capital of Dayr al-Qamar. Through intermarriage Haydar then effected an alliance with two powerful Druze groups, the Abu-Lamma family and the Janbulad family. That alliance lasted for most of the 18th century.

When Haydar died in 1732 he was succeeded first by his son Mulhim and then by Mulhim's brothers. Mulhim's son Yusuf gained the title of emir in 1770. Throughout this period, the Lebanese mountains were relatively quiet, although simmering feuds between individual families frequently flared into violence. The status quo was shattered with the Mamluk invasion of Syria in 1770. Yusuf al-Shihab aided the Mamluks and his troops even briefly occupied Damascus. But in the aftermath of the Mamluk withdrawal, Sultan Mustafa III (r. 1757–1774) appointed Cezzar Ahmed Pasha to the governorship of Sidon. From his stronghold in Acre, Cezzar Ahmed steadily acquired territories that had been held by vassals of the Shihab clan. In 1789, when there was an attempted coup against Cezzar Ahmed, he became convinced that Yusuf al-Shihab was behind it. In reprisal, he moved his army into Lebanon where he defeated the Shihabs in a battle in the Bekaa Valley.

In defeat, Yusuf abdicated, and his vassals then chose his cousin Bashir. It is not clear whether or not Yusuf had converted to Christianity as he participated in both Muslim and Christian religious services and visited Druze and Christian shrines, but Bashir openly acknowledged that he was a Christian. That fact marked a transition by which Maronite power began to eclipse that of the Druzes in the Lebanese Mountains. The Abu-Lamma clan, who were close allies of the Shihabs, also became Christians around the same time. Bashir (usually referred to as Bashir II to distinguish him from Haydar's father, who had also been called Bashir) held the post of emir until 1841, making him the longest-reigning emir of the Lebanese mountains and the most powerful figure of the dynasty.

After the death of Cezzar Ahmed in 1804, Bashir II moved to destroy the feudal families his predecessors had relied upon as allies. When Ibrahim Pasha moved his army into Syria in 1831, Bashir II offered his allegiance to the Egyptian forces and was granted extensive authority over much of Lebanon. He used his power to extract extra taxes and to impose military conscription, extremely unpopular measures that led to wide-scale revolts by Druze and Christian peasants. After the withdrawal of the Egyptian army in 1840, Bashir II surrendered to the British fleet anchored off Beirut and went into exile.

With the exile of Bashir II, the fortunes of the Shihab dynasty rapidly declined. The Ottoman sultan appointed Bashir III, Bashir II's distant cousin, as emir in 1841, but it was not a popular choice. Not long after his appointment the new emir called the principal Druze families to Dayr al-Qamar to discuss his tax policies. The families showed up armed and besieged him in his palace in October 1841. The stalemate ended when the sultan withdrew his appointment and Bashir III went into exile. With that, the reign of the Shihab dynasty collapsed. There were attempts to restore Bashir III as Emir of the Mountain after the civil unrest in Lebanon in 1860 but the era of the feudal emirs was over.

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Further reading: William Polk, *The Opening of South Lebanon, 1788–1840* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963).

shipbuilding *See* Tersane-i Amire.

sipahi *See* military organization.

slavery The age-old practice of slavery was widespread in the Ottoman Empire. It was a complex institution of many forms, combining elements of pre-Islamic, Islamic Near Eastern, and Mediterranean classical heritages with distinctive Ottoman conventions. Although the most intensive use of slaves occurred at the height of Ottoman power between the mid-15th and the late 17th centuries, slavery remained legal in imperial territories in the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa until the end of the 19th century. When the Ottomans were in a position of military dominance, slaves were acquired through

conquest in Europe, around the Black Sea, and on the Mediterranean. Tens of thousands of men, women, and children might be captured and brought to market in a single military campaign. A further source of captive labor, commercial raiding by professional drovers, was the principal mode used in the enslavement of sub-Saharan Africans, but it was also commonplace in the northern borderlands. In the later centuries commerce rather than warfare accounted for the bulk of slave imports.

The horsemen and merchants of the Crimean Tatars were the principal suppliers and commercial agents for the Black Sea slave trade until around the mid-18th century. The African trade to the Middle East was historically more decentralized. Numerous towns and cities in Upper Egypt, the Sudan, and coastal North Africa had regular markets to accommodate both regional demand and consignments for Mediterranean, Indian Ocean, and Persian Gulf buyers. Istanbul and Cairo, the two largest cities in the empire, operated the most important end-destination markets dealing in slaves, although smaller centers like Tunis, Algiers, and Mecca, among others, were also heavy consumers.

The importance of slavery is reflected in the empire's urban demography. In the 16th century, when Istanbul was the largest city in Europe and West Asia, slaves and former slaves made up about a fifth of its population. During Bursa's heyday as a silk-producing center in the 15th and 16th centuries, as many as half of its inhabitants, including many of its skilled weavers, were slaves and ex-slaves. Although such percentages declined in later centuries, slaves continued to be an important source of labor and a visible presence in major cities and ports. Throughout Ottoman history the ownership of slaves was one of the most consistent markers of high social standing.

Slave ownership was concentrated in the wealthier classes, especially among members of the ruling elites. Most slave owners, and the owners of the largest numbers of slaves, were Muslim and male. Women, overwhelmingly Muslim, also bought, sold, inherited, and bequeathed slaves, but they were a small percentage of all owners and their wealth in slaves did not approach that of male owners. Because of slaveholding's association with social status, non-Muslims were discouraged from slave ownership, the more so if slaves in their possession converted to Islam. Blanket prohibitions, however, were never consistently applied. Christian and Jewish slave owners, both native and foreign, could be found in the empire well into the 19th century.

Ottoman slavery was officially configured along religious and geographic lines. By law no Muslim, regardless of his or her country of origin, could be reduced to slave status. Captives who converted to Islam did not automatically gain their freedom, although many who converted did so hoping to improve their circumstances and hasten manumission. Slaves could be of virtually any origin, race, or ethnicity provided that they were not Ottoman subjects. The one programmatic exception to the geopolitical dictum occurred in the forcible recruitment of native Christians, usually sons of Balkan villagers, as elite imperial servitors, called *gulam, kul, or kapı kulu,* literally "slaves of the Porte." Ordinary war captives were also assigned to the elite ranks, but most *kul*s in the 15th and 16th centuries were products of the devşirme system, the periodic "levy of boys" carried out by the authorities in the Balkan provinces. Although they technically ought not to have been levied, since Christians within the empire were officially recognized as *dhimmi*, or "people of the book," and were thus officially protected from enslavement, Ottoman pragmatism, cloaked in a dubious religio-political rationale, explained away the violation of the protective pact regulating state action with regard to religious minorities.

For most of the history of the empire, "white" captives of various ethnicities were arguably in greater demand than sub-Saharan Africans. In the early centuries, when eastern Europe and the Black Sea steppes lay open to Ottoman armies and their allies, Slavic, Germanic, and tribal Caucasian peoples constituted the majority of captives. The sale of sub-Saharan Africans dominated the market in the later centuries, although the ratio of African to non-African slaves always varied by locale, with a heavier concentration of white slaves in the capital and in the northern provinces generally.

The Ottoman practice of slavery, adhering to Islamic precepts, was also distinguished from many other slave-owning cultures by the imposition of legal restraints on slave owners' rights. Islamic law's recognition of the dual nature of slaves as human beings as well as property denied to owners life-and-death authority over their slaves and put strict limits on corporal punishment. The law, historical tradition, and the prestige value of magnanimity helped to protect Ottoman slaves from the excesses to which slaves were frequently subject in the Americas, and these factors encouraged, although they could not guarantee, an ethic of paternalism in master-slave relations. Thus, slave-owners often attended to their slaves' physical and material well-being as solicitous caretakers. A combination of paternalism and economic self-interest, resulting in more humane treatment in settled regions where community values and the legal system were strong. In areas destabilized by war, banditry, or paramilitary thuggery, protective mechanisms disappeared.

In terms of formal legal norms, the law empowered slaves to appeal to the courts in the event of egregious physical injury by a master or mistress, wrongful prolongation of servitude after a valid promise of emancipation, or other breach of the law. The surviving records of the

Islamic courts reveal a sprinkling of slaves' complaints regarding forsworn manumission vows and bodily harm. The absence of more such grievances may be attributable to a number of factors. Given the documented cruelties of galley slavery and other hard-labor occupations, slaves' lack of access to the legal system rather than extra-judicial conflict resolution or the mildness of slavery most probably accounts for the relative silence.

By far the most common complaint that reached the courts dealt with false enslavement of one sort or another. Ottoman subjects in remote or unstable rural areas were sometimes snatched and enslaved illegally. Women and children, both Christian and Muslim, were especially vulnerable to this sort of trafficking. The demand for nubile women and tractable children was usually high, and Ottoman Islamic rules of family privacy helped traffickers secrete their victims. Some who had been kidnapped were held for years before being restored to freedom. Others, of unknown number, never saw their homes again. Relatives and fellow villagers were crucial in establishing a victim's identity. Without them, a dealer's sworn denial was apt to outweigh a victim's unsupported protestations.

Male and female slaves served their owners in virtually every capacity—skilled and unskilled, indoors and out, admired and debased, intimate and remote—known to the early modern economy. They functioned as guards, servants, porters, field hands, miners, masons, concubines, weavers, secretaries, entertainers, and galley slaves, among other occupations. One of the distinctive features of Ottoman governance was its grooming of a special class of slaves to fill important military and administrative posts. Taken as boys, usually as part of the devşirme carried out in the Balkan regions, and forcibly converted to Islam, these "slaves of the Porte," including the famed Janissaries, were effectively the sultan's own bond-servants. Their imperial roles imparted a legal and social status superior to that of ordinary slaves (*abd*, *esir, rıkk, köle*). Despite their slave identity as the property of the sultan, as representatives of the sultan's authority, these individuals exercised rights and privileges superior to most free subjects whether serving as simple soldiers or grand viziers. While these elite contingents were a small and unrepresentative minority of the total slave population, the sultan's *kul*s and their remarkable social mobility have been taken to be hallmarks of the Ottoman system; certainly European visitors found their ascent most striking and foreign to the aristocratic governance of their own countries. Despite their elevated status, however, slaves of the Sublime Porte retained, in relation to their sovereign-master, the attributes of enslaved property. They were subjected to harsh discipline without recourse or redress during their apprenticeship. And even as powerful officeholders, many a slave-turned-grandee lost his estate and sometimes his life because of conduct displeasing to his autocratic master.

Most male and female slaves, whether gathered in commercial raids or in war, were employed in urban settings and in the myriad occupations of the domestic household. Most of the tasks performed by slaves for their wealthy owners were no different from those that fell to ordinary free householders. The Ottoman practice of slavery was not as severe a system of labor exploitation as the harsh agricultural slavery associated with plantation capitalism in the Americas and elsewhere. Another feature that distinguishes Ottoman slavery from the harsher conditions faced by most slaves in the Americas is the relative ease with which Ottoman slaves obtained their freedom. Most household slaves were freed by their owners either during the owner's lifetime or in testamentary declarations upon the owner's death. Although the length of bondage varied, in the 19th century it became customary to emancipate slaves after seven or nine years. Slave women who bore their master's child also customarily gained their freedom upon the master's death if not before. Moreover, a master's children born of his slave woman were not only free but became his legitimate heirs, entitled to the same share of his estate as offspring born to a legal wife.

The experience of former slaves as free Ottoman subjects varied as much as that of the freeborn. In general, freed Africans fared less well in terms of employment and opportunity than non-Africans. That is, dark-skinned, broad-featured male and female slaves were more likely than fine-featured, lighter-skinned slaves to remain clustered on the lower rungs of the social ladder. Nonetheless, many former Ottoman slaves of sub-Saharan origin attained wealth and position. Whether light- or dark-skinned, the opportunities for women who had formerly been slaves were quite constricted. Because there were few legal and respectable occupations for women, emancipated females typically continued a life of subordination and domestic service, whether as servant or wife, and there was often little material difference between these roles. Former slaves of every origin established social networks and cooperative ties with their co-nationals and co-ethnics. By law, freed slaves were entitled to the same rights and legal standing as the freeborn, and in general, no stigma attached to ex-slaves or their offspring.

Genuine assimilation depended to a great extent on the religious, ethnic, and linguistic affinities between ex-slaves and the larger community. The prospects for any emancipated slave were greatly enhanced if the former slave-owner continued in the role of patron or patroness. In any case, owners often eased the transition to freedom by supplying their freed men and women with "emancipation dowries" of household goods, clothing, and money. For others, suitable marriage partners were found, either

with other former slaves or with freeborn individuals. Marriage between female slaves and their owners or other family members also sometimes occurred, but was not the norm. In order for marriage to take place between a master and his own slave, the slave had first to be emancipated. The more usual sexual relationship within slaveholding families was that of concubinage, with female slaves in the sexual and procreative employ of their masters. Once a female slave was emancipated, she could no longer legally be anyone's concubine, since by law a free woman could have sexual relations only within marriage.

Even though most female slaves were owned by men, not all were concubines or acquired for sexual purposes. Most functioned as maids, personal attendants, nannies, washerwomen, cooks, or had similar domestic responsibilities. Many female slaves were purchased by men to serve the women of the household. Despite the fact that most female slaves in the Ottoman Empire were domestic workers, however, slave women were particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Their sexuality was both a liability and, within the limits of bondage, an asset, a fact that colors the picture of all slave women's experience. Male slave owners were legally entitled to the sexual use of their female slaves. Although men were prohibited by law from sexual relations with slaves owned by others in the household or elsewhere, transgressions within the household appear to have been common, with penalties rare or inconsequential. Lacking the right of refusal in any case, it is not surprising that many slave women competed to attract the master's favor, a tactic that was a standard but often ruthless feature of life within the sultan's HAREM. Countless slave women gained status or otherwise improved their position within the household by bearing their owner's child, sometimes even becoming legal wives and earning the support and inheritance entitlements that legal marriage conferred.

Young male slaves were known to have been sexually exploited by slave traders and owners, although homosexuality and in particular the sexual exploitation of young males were illegal and widely condemned.

The regular passage of male and female former slaves into the Ottoman family system made for a porous boundary between slave and free. Paradoxically, it also hardened Ottoman attitudes against abolition. In response to European, principally British, efforts to end slavery in the 19th century, Ottoman apologists defended the Ottoman system as a uniquely benign and culturally imbedded practice. The tide was against them, however. The African slave trade was abolished in 1857 and slavery overall was sharply reduced by measures in the 1860s and 1870s, but slavery was still practiced sporadically in the empire until its dissolution.

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See also SEX AND SEXUALITY.

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Sobieski, Jan (John III Sobieski) (b. 1629–d. 1696) (r. 1674–1696) *king of Poland, celebrated military commander in the wars against the Tatars and the Ottomans* Born on August 17, 1629 into a powerful noble Polish family, Jan Sobieski studied politics, languages, and military art in Krakow and Western Europe. In the 17th century the once-powerful Poland was under threat from the Prussians and Swedes on its western borders and from the Russians, Turks, CRIMEAN TATARS, and Ukrainian COSSACKS to the south and east. During the period 1648–1653, Sobieski fought against the Cossack rebels and the Crimean Tatars, and in 1654, he participated in a Polish embassy to Constantinople. During the Swedish invasion of 1655, he initially sided with Charles X Gustav, the Swedish pretender to the Polish throne, reentering the service of King John Casimir in 1656. From 1656 to 1660, he fought successive wars against Sweden, the Transylvanian pretender George II Rákóczi (*see* TRANSYLVANIA), and RUSSIA.

His reconciliation with the royal court in 1656 coincided with his love affair with Marie Casimire d'Arquien, the French maid of honor and protégée of the powerful Polish queen, Marie Louise de Gonzaga. Though initially married to another man, Marie Casimire would become Sobieski's wife in 1665. The romance allowed the Polish court to win Sobieski's support for its plans to prepare a French candidacy for the future royal election and strengthen the monarch's role in POLAND. In the ensuing Polish civil war (the *rokosz* of Jerzy Lubomirski, 1665–66) that thwarted the royal plans, Sobieski fought on the side of the court.

After the abdication of John Casimir (1668), Sobieski headed the pro-French faction against a Habsburg candidacy to the Polish throne and then opposed the newly elected king, Michał Wiśniowiecki (1669–1673). As a commander of the Polish troops (field hetman since 1666, grand hetman since 1668), Sobieski fought against numerous Tatar incursions and yet another Cossack