This is an extract from:

Dumbarton Oaks Papers, No. 57

Symposium on Late Byzantine Thessalonike

Editor: Alice-Mary Talbot

Published by
Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection
Washington, D.C.

Issue year 2003

www.doaks.org/etexts.html

Late Byzantine Thessalonike: A Second City's Challenges and Responses

John W. Barker

. . . who has been so pre-eminent a master of words, surpassing all others, that would be capable of making a proper comparison of this city with the greatest of the others? Who could do justice to its surpassingly beautiful and wholesome location, or its yield of produce that excels even Egypt's fertility? So, too, the superlatively lovely and sacred shrines and holy places that are everywhere within it, of such size and such profusion that there is nowhere else their like, neither in magnitude nor in multitude. Likewise its market-place, welcoming people from everywhere on earth, and obliging those who gather there to forget where in the world they might be: so that living there was as good as being everywhere at once. And, while many people have sung the praises of other harbors, yet the one there would truly surpass all others as an example—one and the same place serving the function of both a city and a harbor, and causing the main town to terminate not at the sea but at virtually a second city all its own. So, too, is it girt by walls more grand than the circuit of Babylon. And, as the greatest of all the harbors we know, it provides the greatest security, embracing the city in arms eager to unite with it. Would not the city's total appearance allay anyone's discontent? . . . And would it not persuade any visitor to forget his own home?

. . . as to the city's piety and its devotion to the worship of God . . . no time-limits are fixed there for those who wish to pray: rather, since the churches are open both night and day, it is possible to have one's fill of prayers and to find one's supplications rewarded. As for the other aspects of the city's eager striving and its zeal in such matters—the beauty of its offerings, the multitudes of its donations, the continuity of its vigils, the cantillations of its singers, and, above all, its virtually musical concord and organization—these are best appreciated in their presence and best understood in experiencing their reality. . . . [The citizens'] reward for this piety is certainly not slight: rather it is just what anyone would crave for his near and dear—deliverance from sieges, relief from famines, remedies for epidemic diseases, the annihilation of sovereigns who attack in armed force, and prophecies of the city's unique impregnability and preservation from disaster. . . . [St. Demetrios himself] assists in these matters, since he abides within the city, and he gathers to himself the polarities of faction from all sides, as the city's savior, the citizens' mediator, and the intercessor for their interests before God. Still more, he appoints to the government such gentle sovereigns as relax the city's taxes and tribute offerings, while at the same time he is its commander against external foes, inspiring dread in those who dare raise arms against the city. So might it be said that the city represents a general model of piety.

And where might one find larger or finer ensembles of orators and philosophers? Rather it is in this city that they assemble, constituting a veritable school of general studies, with each of them following his own Muse here. . . . it has now become this school's lot to stand supreme in intellectual activities, though it was founded among people by no

> means previously ignorant. On the contrary, the city has been at all times a veritable Helikon, and the disciplines of the Muses have managed to blossom here through all the ages. . . . Thus, one might compare being here to dwelling in Athens in the company of Demosthenes and Plato.[1]

Slightly compressed and minimally modified, this constitutes the bulk of the glowing description of his native city written by Demetrios Kydones. That native city was, of course, not the Byzantine capital, Constantinople, but Thessalonike. The description is a part of what is called his "Monody on the Fallen in Thessalonike," in which Kydones goes on to deplore the so-called Zealot rising in the city in 1345 that had wrecked and ravaged all that the description celebrated. This "Monody" or "Lament" probably originated as an oration, possibly delivered the following year, perhaps in Constantinople before Thessalonian refugees from that upheaval.[2]

Even beyond standard Byzantine propensities for hyperbole, Kydones creates the most glowing picture possible of his native city the more to dramatize the disasters it suffers, plainly a strategy of rhetorical effect rather than of sober accuracy. Yet one cannot deny that fourteenth-century Thessalonike at its best exhibited many of the features that Kydones praises so fervently. Its location was indeed a blessed one.[3] As the major city of Macedonia and Thessaly, Thessalonike was the focus of a rich agricultural hinterland which not only supplied amply its own needs but made it a conduit for lucrative exports of vegetable and animal products.[4] Situated at a crucial point along the great Via Egnatia, the vital Roman highway that spanned the south Balkans from Dyrrhachium on the Adriatic to Constantinople on the Bosphorus,[5] the city held immense strategic significance that merged with its economic advantages. Its ample harbor guaranteed its prosperity as a port, while its position at the northern apex of the Aegean Sea and at the southern outlet of the Vardar valley made it the logical commercial linchpin of the Balkan peninsula, especially with Basil II's conquest of Bulgaria and the resulting reintegration of the south Balkans under a coherent Byzantine political and economic order.[6] The most familiar tes-

[1] *Demetrii Cydonii occisorum Thessalonicae monodia,* PG 109 (1863): 639–52, at 641B–644B. The translation given is slightly adapted from pp. 292–93 of the rendering of the full text (pp. 291–300) by J. W. Barker, "The 'Monody' of Demetrios Kydones on the Zealot Rising of 1345 in Thessaloniki," in *Essays in Memory of Basil Laourdas* (Thessalonike, 1975), 285–300. Other panegyrical comments on the city by an earlier Byzantine writer, John Kameniates, are cited by A. Laiou at the beginning of her essay, "Thessaloniki and Macedonia in the Byzantine Period," in *Byzantine Macedonia: Identity, Image, and History,* ed. J. Burk and R. Scott, ByzAus 13 (Melbourne, 2000), 1–11. For a comprehensive collection of descriptions of, and writings on, the city through the Byzantine era in general, see H. Hunger, *Laudes Thessalonicenses* (Thessalonike, 1992).

[2] Barker, "Monody," 288–89.

[3] The work of the dedicated Rumanian scholar O. Tafrali, *Topographie de Thessalonique* (Paris, 1913) remains the standard overview, despite its age.

[4] For the agriculture of Thessalonike and its hinterland, there is now A. Laiou, "The Economy of Byzantine Macedonia in the Palaiologan Period," in Burk and Scott, eds., *Byzantine Macedonia* (as in note 1 above), 199–211, esp. 200–203; also her "Η Θεσσαλονίκη, η ενδοχώρα της και ο οικονομικός της Χώρος στην εποχή των Παλαιολόγων," in *Βυζαντινή Μακεδονία 324–1430 μ. Χρ., Διέθνες Συμπόσιον (Θεσσαλονίκη, 29–31 οκτωβρίου 1992*), ed. T. Pentzopoulou-Valala (Thessalonike, 1995), 183–94; and, on rural conditions, her *Peasant Society in the Late Byzantine Empire: A Social and Demographic Study* (Princeton, N.J., 1977).

[5] F. O'Sullivan, *The Egnatian Way* (Newton Abbot–Harrisburg, Pa., 1972); Ch. I. Makaronas, "Via Egnatia and Thessalonike," in *Studies Presented to David Moore Robinson,* vol. 1 (St. Louis, Mo., 1951), 380–88; see also Laiou, "Thessaloniki and Macedonia in the Byzantine Period," 7.

[6] Laiou, "Economy of Byzantine Macedonia," 203; M. Angold, *The Byzantine Empire, 1025–1204: A Political History,* 2d ed. (London–New York, 1997), 283–84; W. Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au moyen âge,* trans. F. Raynaud (Leipzig, 1923), 1: 244–45.

timony to the city's great vitality is, of course, the famous twelfth-century description of Thessalonike's annual October fair, set up along the Vardar valley to the west of the town walls, a robust gathering of merchants and visitors from far and wide who brought profit and prosperity to the city's economy.[7] As for the city's own grand topography, Kydones did not exaggerate in representing Thessalonike veritably as two cities in one, its lower zone around the harbor joined to the upper city on the ascending slopes within, all within the embrace of a magnificently sturdy fortification system.[8]

Nor need we be entirely cynical about our panegyrist's praise of Thessalonike's religious life. We may question how much civic bounty was directly bestowed by the protective patron, St. Demetrios, but the people of the city had over the centuries accepted as fact that he did indeed watch over them. His shrine was an important center of pilgrimage, while the proximity of the city to the great monastic center of Mount Athos connected it closely with principal currents of Orthodox spiritual life. More than a dozen churches survive from the span of the Byzantine centuries to suggest what a profusion of important sanctuaries there must have been.[9] The city's devotional and liturgical life had a vitality and individuality that is only now being appreciated.[10] Likewise genuine, despite Kydones' rodomontade, was Thessalonike's intellectual life, cradle and home to a number of important scholars of the period, of whom Kydones himself was but one distinguished example.[11]

[7] *Timarione,* ed. R. Romano (Naples, 1974), 3–6; trans. B. Baldwin, *Timarion* (Detroit, 1984), 43–45. For discussion of this passage, see S. P. Vryonis Jr., "The *Panegyris* of the Byzantine Saint: A Study of the Nature of a Medieval Institution, Its Origins, and Fate," in *The Byzantine Saint,* ed. S. Hackel (London, 1981), 196–228, at 202–4. On the economic dimension, see Laiou, "Thessaloniki and Macedonia," 7–8.

[8] On the early history of the city's fortifications, see G. M. Velenis, *Τὰ τείχη τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης ἀπὸ τὸν Κάσσανδρο ὡς τὸν Ἡράκλειο* (with Eng. summary) (Thessalonike, 1998); also J.-M. Spieser, "Les remparts de Thessalonique. À propos d'un livre récent," *BSl* 60 (1999): 557–74. There are important short studies by M. Vickers, esp. "The Byzantine Sea Walls of Thessaloniki," *BalkSt* 11 (1970): 261–78, and "Further Observations on the Chronology of the Walls of Thessaloniki," *Μακεδονικά* 11 (1971): 228–33. Not fully reliable is the booklet by G. Gounaris, *Τὰ τείχη τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης* (Thessalonike, 1976), in English as *The Walls of Thessaloniki* (Thessalonike, 1982).

[9] Among comprehensive studies, the pioneering one by C. Diehl, M. Le Tourneau, and H. Saladin, *Les monuments chrétiens de Salonique* (Paris, 1918), is now quite dated; more recent material may be found in R. Janin's *Les églises et les monastères des grands centres byzantins* (Paris, 1976). Good general treatment of the city's churches can be found in such guidebooks as: A. Papagiannopoulos, *Monuments of Thessaloniki* (Thessalonike, n.d.); Chr. Mavropoulou-Tsioumi, *Byzantine and Post-Byzantine Monuments of Thessaloniki* (Thessalonike, 1997); and E. Kourkoutidou-Nikolaidou and A. Tourta, *Wandering in Byzantine Thessaloniki* (Athens, 1997); all with bibliographies, the last of them particularly good. There are too many studies of individual churches to cite here, but mention should be made of J.-M. Spieser, *Thessalonique et ses monuments du IVe au VIe siècle. Contribution à l'étude d'une ville paléochrétienne* (Paris, 1984); and P. Vokotopoulos, "Church Architecture in Thessaloniki in the 14th Century. Remarks on the Typology," in *L'art de Thessalonique et des pays balkaniques et les courants spirituels au XIVe siècle. Recueil des rapports du IVe colloque serbo-grec, Belgrade 1985* (Belgrade, 1987), 107–16.

[10] For a specific example of indigenous Thessalonian liturgy, see O. Strunk, "The Byzantine Office in Hagia Sophia," *DOP* 9–10 (1956): 175–202.

[11] This is the purview of F. Tinnefeld later in this volume. In general, see D. M. Nicol, "Thessalonica as a Cultural Centre in the Fourteenth Century," in *Ἡ Θεσσαλονίκη μεταξὺ Ἀνατολῆς καὶ Δύσεως. Πρακτικὰ Συμποσίου . . . τῆς Ἑταιρείας Μακεδονικῶν Σπουδῶν* (Thessalonike, 1982), 121–31, reprinted as no. X in Nicol, *Studies in Late Byzantine History and Prosopography* (London, 1986); also, E. Fryde, *The Early Palaeologan Renaissance (1261–c. 1360)* (Leiden, 2000), 169–71; and A. E. Vakalopoulos, *A History of Thessaloniki,* trans. T. F. Carney (Thessalonike, 1972), 50–51; or a little more fully in his earlier *Origins of the Greek Nation, 1204–1461,* trans. I. Moles (New Brunswick, N.J., 1970), 46 ff, esp. 49–54; also B. Laourdas, *Ἡ κλασσικὴ φιλολογία εἰς τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην κατὰ τὸν δέκατον τέταρτον αἰῶνα* (Thessalonike, 1960). The place of Thessalonike in Palaiologan cultural life is noted throughout S. Runciman's *The Last Byzantine Renaissance* (Cambridge, 1970); cf. the comments of R. Browning, "Byzantine Thessaloniki: A Unique City?" *Dialogos: Hellenic Studies Review* 2 (1995): 91–104, at 99–101.

To be sure, the upheavals of the fourteenth century brought reductions, disruptions, and even displacements to many of the qualities that Kydones praises. But, at least for much of that century, especially the first half, Thessalonike must still have been an extraordinary urban world fully meriting his panegyrical outpourings.

Kydones' hyperbole led him to florid comparisons of Thessalonike with the likes of ancient Babylon and Athens, beyond other cities not specified. Notably, the one city not invoked for comparison's sake is the Byzantine capital city, Constantinople, where Kydones himself had already begun his career as the leading Byzantine intellectual of his era. Kydones certainly understood well the disparities pertaining by then between the two great cities, and could even have made up a scorecard in which Thessalonike could claim considerable points of superiority to Constantinople, or advantage over it. But, the fact remains, Constantinople was the seat of the central government, of the court, and of serious opportunity for anyone seeking status of the first rank in either letters or politics. Kydones appreciated that fact, and he had made his own clear career choice.

Put simply, Demetrios Kydones knew that Constantinople was No. 1, while his beloved native city was inescapably No. 2. Not that he would have admitted such a ranking himself. (Ironically, the evocation of urban dichotomy he does make is in a fanciful distinction within Thessalonike itself, between its harbor and the main town.) He and his family had been expelled from Thessalonike during the Zealot episode, and his subsequent career was pursued in the capital: that he never chose to return "home" does not, however, discredit his appreciation of it.

Analyzing the "Second City"

Through much of the Byzantine Empire's long history, and ever since, Thessalonike has labored under a status of "secondity"—or, if a pun may be forgiven, of "secondicity." Writers now describe it so automatically as Byzantium's "second city" that it is difficult to recall who first coined this usage. The label has become a cliché, and, like most clichés, it invites suspicion or scorn. But, also as with so many clichés, there is a kernel of truth to it that cannot be ignored. Its implications color all analyses of the city's history, especially in the later Byzantine period.

In Byzantium's early centuries, the empire possessed many great cities that could and did challenge Constantinople's status. Alexandria was a prime example, but there were many other great imperial cities. Successive episodes of the dismantling of the empire's western provinces, the termination of the West Roman regime, and the consolidation of the Germanic "successor states" in the fifth and sixth centuries were followed by the Arab conquests of the seventh, processes that recurrently stripped the empire of many former urban centers. The considerable changes in economic and social life by the beginning of the eighth century, meanwhile, further reduced urban life in the territories that remained to the Byzantine Empire in its geographic redefinition. From that time onward, the continued vitality and prosperity of Thessalonike stood out the more clearly, marking it as the most important Byzantine city after the capital itself.

In what follows, the portrait of this "second city" must deal with a complex of themes, each distinct and yet regularly interwoven with each other. One of these themes is, of course, that of Thessalonike's rivalry to Constantinople through one or another kind of

political challenge, attempting to replace secondary with primary or at least alternate status. But often connected to that theme is a parallel one, which is concerned with Thessalonian tendencies of separatism from the capital, and which in turn involves still another theme: the city's repeated detachment as a kind of appanage. In occasional counterpoint to those themes is one of occasional internal dissension within Thessalonike's population. Still another is the recurrent threat of encroachment or attack by foreign forces.

Such themes might well be traced individually, freed from the straitjacket of a chronological narrative. Yet total avoidance of chronology risks losing a sense of coherence, within which the constant interaction of our themes needs to be seen. Accordingly, the discussion that follows will observe some degree of chronological flow, as supported by the appended outline, even as we sort out the topical themes. In doing so, of course, I must pass over still other themes that are left to other papers in this volume—social, intellectual, and artistic aspects of late Thessalonian life that Kydones praised so passionately.

Focus on the final Byzantine centuries inevitably obliges us to leave aside important contributions of earlier centuries to the shaping of the city as we deal with it. In those centuries Thessalonike had its share of glory and of suffering—in episodes of internal unrest and dissension, of tastes of capital-city status, of facing grave attack and devastation that already prefigured the even more dramatic experiences the city was to have in our time period.[12]

It is with the late twelfth century, however, that we begin our scrutiny in earnest. Though Thessalonike had reached a height of prosperity by that time, it was less the city's wealth than its combination of strategic and symbolic importance that attracted the second episode of its foreign violation. The first had been its brutal pillaging by the Saracen corsair Leo of Tripolis in 904. This one was its savage storming and sack in 1185 by the forces of Norman Italy. That horrific event was visited upon Thessalonike as punishment, in a sense, for the sins of Constantinople: the Norman campaign was justified as retaliation for a massacre of Latins in the capital three years before, and the targeting of the city was intended to represent a step on the way to Constantinople. If in different ways, the sack of 1185 conveyed messages parallel to those of the Saracen sack in 904. The earlier disaster provided an urgent spur to resurgent Byzantine command of the seas and to the empire's eventual achievement of military and naval ascendancy in the Mediterranean world. The later event laid bare the full depth of Latin hatred for decaying Byzantium in the age of the Crusades, and adumbrated the horrors to be visited upon Constantinople, in its own turn, in 1204.

Thessalonike as an Appanage: The Montferrats

In the years just before the Norman ravishing of Thessalonike, that city was caught in the first tangles of one of our important themes. This is the concept of treating the city as what would seem to correspond with the French feudal appanage. Understanding the

[12] O. Tafrali, *Thessalonique des origines au XIVe siècle* (Paris, 1919), effectively expanding the very cursory survey previously published in his *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle* (Paris, 1913), 1–13. Though now considerably dated, Tafrali's 1919 book still offers the fullest survey of the city's history up to the last phase of the Byzantine era. For a stimulating reflection on some general trends and circumstances, see Laiou, "Thessaloniki and Macedonia." See also Browning, "Byzantine Thessaloniki: A Unique City?" for a range of interesting observations.

French royal practices of granting patrimonial enclaves to younger sons of the reigning dynast is complicated enough by itself. Simplistic equating of the French principles and practices with Byzantine phenomena is unwise and misleading, if not ultimately incorrect.[13] Setting aside the vain question of Western models, however, we might use the term, cautiously qualified, as one of convenience in explicating an obscure episode, one with important implications for Thessalonike's future.

In early 1180, after a dizzying round of marital negotiations for a suitable Western noble, Emperor Manuel I married his elder daughter Maria to Renier, or Rainier, of Montferrat, a young member of an emerging princely family of northern Italy. Though barely eighteen at the time, and a decade younger than his bride, Renier was given the title of caesar, which normally would make him heir or second-in-line to the throne. Reports circulated that, in token of his status, Renier was given the city of Thessalonike as his possession, and even that he was crowned as its king. Those reports are entirely Western in origin, and there is no evidence on the Byzantine side of Renier's investment with any "Kingdom of Thessalonike." Still, there is precedent for such an act from more than a century earlier: Alexios I Komnenos invested one of his noble allies, Nikephoros Melissenos, with the rank of caesar, at the same time awarding him the administration of Thessalonike. In the case of Renier and Maria, there is at least the possibility that they may have made a brief residence in the city, and the multiplicity of Western statements on the point makes it unwise to rule out completely the possibility that Renier was given something like a *pronoia* grant in Byzantine fashion.[14] Two things do emerge clearly from the murk of this episode, however. One is the identification of the Montferrat family with claims upon Thessalonike; the other is the simple fact that Thessalonike was deemed a choice parcel of property for use in dynastic manipulation.

Whatever his claims to Thessalonike, Renier of Montferrat did not live long enough to enjoy them. Following Manuel I's death in 1180, Renier and his wife were murdered two or three years later after the failure of her ambitious schemes to claim the throne. Renier's honor, if not also his claims, might still have been vindicated, however, through the efforts of two older brothers. One of them, Conrad of Montferrat, had his own entitlements to Manuel's favor and had actually been in Constantinople for a while in 1180, just before the emperor's death. In 1187, after the collapse of the Komnenian dynasty, Conrad was invited to Constantinople in his turn to become an imperial in-law. The new emperor, Isaac II Angelos, gave Conrad his sister Theodora as a bride and awarded him also the title of caesar. Conrad was, however, denied some aspects of that dignity, and nothing seems to have been said about any rights to Thessalonike. The Montferrat baron quickly earned Isaac's gratitude by leading the suppression of a serious military rebellion against the emperor. Nevertheless, court sentiments turned against Conrad, and he decided to cut his losses. Aban-

[13] J. Barker, "The Problem of Appanages in Byzantium," *Byzantina* 3 (1971): 105–22, esp. 116–22.

[14] Niketas Choniates simply reports the marriage: ed. J.-L. van Dieten (Berlin, 1975), 171 and 200; trans. H. J. Magoulias, *O City of Byzantium* (Detroit, 1984), 97, 114. On the date of the marriage, Magoulias, 383 note 478. For Western sources that identify the couple with Thessalonike, see the accounts by R. W. Wolff, "The Fourth Crusade," in *A History of the Crusades,* ed. K. M. Setton, vol. 2, 2d ed. (Madison, Wisc., 1969), 165 and notes 34–36; and by S. Runciman, "Thessalonica and the Montferrat Inheritance," *Γρηγ.Παλ.* 42 (1959): 27–35: 28 note 3. More recently, C. Brand, *Byzantium Confronts the West, 1180–1204* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968), 19, and 319 note 12.

doning his new bride and office, before 1187 was out, he set off for the Holy Land where he was to die as king of Jerusalem.[15]

It was left to yet another Montferrat brother, the marquis Boniface II, to seek full satisfaction. His involvement as leader of the Frankish forces of the Fourth Crusade is well known, and, considering his tangle of connections and motivations, any residual concern over Montferrat interests in Thessalonike can only be guessed at. After the capture of Constantinople in 1204, Boniface's hopes to become its new Latin emperor were dashed, and at least at that point he turned his attentions to Thessalonike. Reasserting his brother's rights, he demanded and eventually secured that city for himself, with the title of king.[16] Boniface's personal regime there lasted barely three years, and, after his death at the hands of besieging Bulgarians in 1207, his widow conducted a feeble government in the name of their son Demetrios. Still in his mid-teens, Demetrios found his weak regime under Greek attack. In 1222 he was obliged to make a trip to western Europe to beg for aid—just as would such later rulers of Constantinople as the Latin emperor Baldwin II and Byzantine emperors John V, Manuel II, and John VIII.

Under Boniface and his son, Thessalonike could take pride in being a capital city of sorts, but the next chapter in the story saw that status given yet further lustre. In truth, though, the Montferrat kingdom of Thessalonike belongs partly to another of our themes, that of opposition to Constantinople. So too does the regime that replaced it, that of Theodore Angelos, representing the forces of the Epirote regime among the several Byzantine successor states that arose in the years after 1204. With the Angelan episode I shall deal shortly. First, however, we must return to the Montferrat connection with Thessalonike, which hardly ended when Theodore Angelos took the city in 1224.

Demetrios and his half-brother, William, made a feeble effort to retake it in 1225, but the expedition foundered and William died in futility. The hapless Demetrios himself perished two years later. Though he bequeathed his Thessalonian title to the Latin emperor of Constantinople, Latin legal intervention awarded it instead to the marquis Boniface III of Montferrat, Demetrios' nephew, son of his half-brother William, and to his descendants.[17]

That devolution extends our appanage theme. Through several generations, the marquises of Montferrat continued to include the style of king of Thessalonike in their formal titles, though there were other Western claimants to the title as well. Such Latin claims on Byzantine rights were taken seriously in the West, and there were cases of Latin titular claimants actually making military attempts on Byzantine territories, so that resolution of such claims was a genuine concern of Byzantine diplomacy. This process reached a climax early in the reign of Andronikos II who, become a widower, sought a new bride from a Latin dynasty, one who would bring the best diplomatic dowry to Byzantium. After pursuing several prospects, Andronikos turned to the marquis William VII of Montferrat. The latter had been an Italian ally of Emperor Michael VIII and felt honored at the idea

[15] On Conrad, see the account of Niketas Choniates, ed. van Dieten, 382–87, 394–95, trans. Magoulias, 210–15, 217 (see also 397 note 1116). For a critical account, see Brand, *Byzantium,* 80–84.

[16] Boniface of Montferrat's role in the Fourth Crusade and its aftermath are well represented in standard accounts: Wolff, "The Fourth Crusade" and Runciman, "Montferrat Inheritance"; D. E. Queller and T. F. Madden, *The Fourth Crusade: The Conquest of Constantinople,* 2d ed. (Philadelphia, 1997). For an older account of the Montferrat regime in the city, see Tafrali, *Thessalonique des origines,* 192–211. But now see T. F. Madden, *Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice* (Baltimore, 2003), 184–90.

[17] D. M. Nicol, *The Last Centuries of Byzantium, 1261–1453,* 2d ed. (Cambridge, 1993), 61–64.

of becoming Emperor Andronikos' father-in-law. He was all-too-happy to accept contributions to his military needs in exchange for yielding up, along with his daughter, the useless family claim to Thessalonike. Thus, when in 1284 Andronikos took as his second wife the young Yolanda of Montferrat—who took the Byzantine name Irene—it seemed as if the Montferrat claims on Thessalonike were laid to rest.[18] In fact, they were not. Indeed, the problem of quasi-appanage partitionings was only to be renewed.

The Montferrat Heritage

Blame for this outcome is often laid, perhaps too easily, at the door of Irene-Yolanda herself. Having borne Andronikos II a series of children, including three sons (John, Theodore, Demetrios), she became resentful about their exclusion from power in favor of Andronikos' son by his first marriage—already his designated heir and co-emperor as Michael IX. In a famous passage,[19] the historian Nikephoros Gregoras describes scornfully how the empress demanded that each of her sons share in the imperial title, along with apportioned territories assigned to them and to their descendants. When this demand was rejected as an impossible innovation, the empress became embittered and troublesome. This impasse occurred apparently in 1303, and in that year the empress responded by reasserting her family's rights to Thessalonike and resettling herself there in what amounted to her independent court. From it she circulated vicious slanders of her husband and pursued various intrigues, mostly seeking prestigious alliances for her sons, if in vain. She continued to agitate unsuccessfully for preferments for her eldest son, John. When her brother Marquis John I died back in Montferrat, leaving her as heiress to the title, she first proposed that John be sent west to become successor in her place. Andronikos and the patriarch blocked this scheme, but eventually the empress arranged to have her second son, Theodore, assume the Montferrat succession.[20] She had already acquiesced in the sacrifice of her hapless little daughter Simonis to the wedding bed of Serbian king Milutin (1299).[21] Building upon this alliance with Milutin, she intrigued to have her youngest son, Demetrios, made Milutin's heir, an opportunity with which Demetrios dabbled before rejecting so barbarous a situation.

Nikephoros Gregoras denounced Irene-Yolanda's ideas as "non-Roman" and "Latin," while modern historians have equated her aims with Western feudal ideas. In point of fact, her proposals diverged from the classic Capetian French concept of the appanage in that it would have apportioned the sovereign title as well as territories, while the French practices never denied the unity of the realm under the sovereign dynast. Her ideas rather recall the much earlier practices of the Merovingian and Carolingian Franks.[22] Moreover,

[18] D. M. Nicol, *The Byzantine Lady: Ten Portraits, 1250–1500* (Cambridge, 1994), 48–49; A. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins: The Foreign Policy of Andronicus II, 1282–1328* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 44–48; Runciman, "Montferrat Inheritance," 30–31.

[19] Nikephoros Gregoras, ed. L. Schopen, vol. 1 (Bonn, 1829), 233–36; key passages trans. Barker, "Appanages," 105–6; cf. Nicol, *Byzantine Lady,* 49 ff; and Tafrali, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle,* 205–6.

[20] A. Laiou, "A Byzantine Prince Latinized: Theodore Palaeologus, Marquis of Montferrat," *Byzantion* 38 (1968): 386–410, and *Constantinople and the Latins,* 173–74; Nicol, *Byzantine Lady,* 52–53; Runciman, "Montferrat Inheritance," 31–32.

[21] Nicol, *Byzantine Lady,* 51–52, 57–58, as well as *Later Centuries,* 119–21; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins,* 95–100.

[22] Barker, "Appanages," 122.

her proposals were hardly unprecedented. The principle of collegial sovereignty was well established in Palaiologan dynastic practice, and was particularly characteristic of that practice. With equal scorn, Gregoras in fact reports a more direct anticipation of Irene-Yolanda's proposals. It seems that Andronikos' own father, Michael VIII, had actually favored his younger son, Constantine the Porphyrogenitos, over Andronikos. Michael, it was said, had planned to detach "the region around Thessalonike and Makedonia" and make it into Constantine's own separate imperial dominion; only Michael's death prevented this from happening, so the story went.[23]

Further, the continuing conduct of Andronikos himself, after his confrontation with his wife, indicates that Irene-Yolanda's thinking was by no means out of step with the Byzantine governmental setting of her day. In 1306 he honored his nephew, John, with the rank of panhypersebastos and designated him as "guardian of Thessalonike and all the other western cities." Moreover, having denied Irene-Yolanda's initial demands on her sons' behalf, and having forced a diplomatically nullifying local marriage on their eldest, John, Andronikos granted that son the title of despot with some kind of status in Thessalonike, where he died in 1307.[24] Through all of this, the empress maintained a court in Thessalonike, conducting her own foreign policy as if an independent sovereign in her little enclave—a situation that lasted until her death in 1317 (in her summer retreat at nearby Drama). Her position and titles were based upon her Montferrat dowry, which was accepted as hers by right. At the same time, her regime covered a period in which others were also appointed in some way or another as governors of Thessalonike: her son the despot John and later the despot Demetrios (returned from his Serbian ordeal). Moreover, from 1310, her uncongenial stepson, Emperor Michael IX, also resided in the city. Accordingly, the empress's actual powers in administering the city itself may have had some limitations, though there is occasional evidence of her involvement.[25]

Though Irene-Yolanda's youngest son, Demetrios, held the post of governor of Thessalonike some years later (in the 1320s), the issue of the Montferrat claims on that city and its supposed "kingdom" died with her. But the issue of Byzantine "appanages" (real or so-called) did not. What we really observe in all this dynastic tangle is, of course, evidence of the decentralization that was becoming ever more characteristic of Byzantine government by the early fourteenth century. Feeble and waning, the old governing bureaucracy was being replaced by the power of regional magnates. The only way the emperor in Constantinople could maintain some control of localities, both rural and urban, was to send out younger members of the reigning family with viceregal powers. If they were younger sons of the emperor, they automatically bore the title of despot. Though there were a few close calls, these appointments never became hereditary patrimonies in the Western sense of an appanage.[26] But it is an irony that Irene-Yolanda's little re-created "Kingdom of Thessalonike," generated out of her personal animosities and seemingly at odds with orderly governmental practice, represented the first really notable case of quasi-appanage practices in late Byzantium.

[23] Gregoras, 1: 186–91.

[24] Gregoras, 1: 241.

[25] Nicol, *Byzantine Lady,* 56–57; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins,* 229–32.

[26] Barker, "Appanages," 120–21. Cf., however, Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins,* 48, suggesting some Western influence.

Such continuing practices also continued to involve Thessalonike itself, if after a certain hiatus. We shall examine subsequently the further examples: John V Palaiologos in Thessalonike and then related territories in the period 1350–54; John V's second son, the despot Manuel, in two phases as governor of Thessalonike (1369–73, 1382–87), in the latter one operating a semi-autonomous regime of his own; John V's grandson, the would-be emperor John VII, grudgingly given by his uncle, Emperor Manuel II, the rule of the city (1403–8) as both "Emperor of all of Thessaly" and "Despot of Thessalonike"; and, upon John VII's death, Manuel's installation of his own third son, the despot Andronikos.

The Emergence of Separatism

What we may call the "appanage theme" of Thessalonike's Palaiologan history must meanwhile be seen in relation to its parallel theme, that of the city's propensity for separatism from the capital—separation from and, at times, outright challenge to Constantinople. In a sense, this thread must also lead us back to Boniface of Montferrat and his creation of the crusader Kingdom of Thessalonike in 1204. The marquis seems to have been welcomed as ruler in the city, at least initially—partly through his politic marriage to a widowed ex-empress, partly also out of possible local disgust with the discredited and overthrown Byzantine regime of Constantinople. Boniface's personal rule was cut short by his death in 1207, by which time he had become very unpopular; but, though we have no hard evidence on the point, the government of his widow and son may have won some sympathy from the populace.

Having been elevated to the status of a Latin regal capital, Thessalonike was soon advanced to becoming a Byzantine imperial capital, if an interim one. The Byzantine splinter regime of Epiros under its Angelan house, fired by the vigorous leadership of its second lord, Theodore Angelos, capped its pressures against the Latin occupiers by forcing the surrender to him of Thessalonike in December 1224. On that basis, the bold Theodore had himself crowned formally, early the following year in the metropolitan cathedral of Thessalonike, with the joint titles of king of Thessalonike and emperor of the Romans. He followed this with the creation of a full panoply of titles, administrative organization, and court trappings. In all this, he was issuing a challenge not only to the weak Latin regime of Constantinople but also to the Laskarid successor-regime of Nicaea, which until then had seemed to hold the preeminent claim of continuing the Byzantine imperial government in exile.[27] In that sense, then, Thessalonike was not being itself proclaimed as the new Byzantine capital, but merely a temporary one—a stepping-stone on the way to Constantinople, not a fully-fledged rival to it.

Upon the defeat, capture, and blinding of Theodore Angelos by the Bulgarian king in 1230, however, the Angelan regime in Thessalonike was suddenly transformed into a precarious holding operation: first by Theodore's brother, Manuel, who ruled under the title of emperor and despot of Thessalonike until 1241; then by Theodore's son John with the same titles (1242–44); and finally by Manuel's son Demetrios (1244–46). From the hapless Demetrios Thessalonike was taken in 1246 by John III Vatatzes, the expansionist Nicaean emperor, to become a component of the Nicaean regime's campaign to restore the Byzantine Empire. The city received as its first Nicaean governor the respected general, An-

[27] D. M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros* (Oxford, 1957), 63–67; also Tafrali, *Thessalonique des origines,* 212–19.

dronikos Palaiologos, father of the future Michael VIII, founder of Byzantium's last ruling dynasty.[28]

There are limits to our knowledge of Thessalonike under Nicaean and subsequent Palaiologan government. It is clear that it was dominated by an urban nobility which had agreed to surrender the city to Vatatzes and was rewarded by a formal chrysobull guaranteeing the rights and freedoms that typified the relative autonomy some Macedonian cities enjoyed in their internal affairs. Thessalonike continued to be the seat of the governors and viceroys who administered much of Nicaea's European territories, a pattern carried over smoothly into the Palaiologan regime, as restored in the old capital of Constantinople from 1261 onward.[29] Just what kind of public sentiments and divisions existed in Thessalonike itself during the latter decades of the thirteenth century cannot be documented precisely, but at least one scholar[30] has speculated that the Montferrat experience may have left, if not a nostalgic legacy, at least a stimulus to Thessalonian pride and even separatism. Irene-Yolanda may or may not have been welcomed in her private regime there out of long-nurtured pro-Montferrat sentiments, though perhaps Andronikos II did hesitate to curb her independence out of uncertainty about the city's loyalty to him. But Thessalonians may well have taken satisfaction in their city being once again a capital of sorts, of a quasi-independent statelet. In that regard, the complex story of Irene-Yolanda on her own in Thessalonike also represents the real beginnings of separatist ideas in the city's Palaiologan role.

In connection with the themes both of appanages and separatism, it is perhaps worth noting here a factor that could well have furthered both mentalities during all of our time period: the factor of the periodic dangers that threatened and isolated Thessalonike, creating recurrent realities of independence, sought or unsought. At regular intervals through the fourteenth century and into the fifteenth, conditions of travel were violently interrupted or suspended by the depredations of raiders or invaders. We know, for instance, that Irene-Yolanda had to be warned not to make a journey from Thessalonike to Constantinople in 1305/6 because the rampages of the Catalan Grand Company in the area rendered the route hazardous if not impassable.[31] Subsequent threats by Serbs and, later, by Turks would likewise have imposed temporary but highly disruptive conditions, suspending normal travel, transportation, and contacts. If they did not by themselves create the needs for quasi-independent subgovernments, or alone generate separatist motivations, such disruptions must have made both rulers and ruled more conditioned to accept regularized forms of local self-reliance.[32]

However early some enhancement of status may have become a motivation for Thessalonians, it was one they were to display repeatedly through the fourteenth century. It could have flickered fleetingly in 1326, amid the debilitating struggles between Andronikos II and his rebellious grandson, Andronikos III. At that point John the Panhy-

[28] Nicol, *Despotate of Epiros,* 146–48, and *Last Centuries,* 20–21; Wolff, "The Latin Empire of Constantinople," in Setton, ed., *A History of the Crusades,* 2: 187–233, at 214–15; Tafrali, *Thessalonique des origines,* 219–31.

[29] M. Angold, *A Byzantine Government in Exile: Government and Society under the Laskarids of Nicaea, 1204–1261* (Oxford, 1975), 286 ff; Tafrali, *Thessalonique des origines,* 232–42.

[30] Runciman, "Montferrat Inheritance," 34–35.

[31] George Pachymeres, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1835), 2: 586–87; cf. Tafrali, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle,* 206–7.

[32] On this point, cf. Browning, "Byzantine Thessaloniki: A Unique City?" 97.

persebastos, who was then governor of Thessalonike, planned to defy his uncle, the elder Andronikos, and plotted to create an independent regime for himself in Macedonia, a venture that soon fizzled out.[33] It was perhaps in that context, however, that we can place hints of a parallel and very ominous pattern emerging: social tensions finding expression in outbursts of internecine violence.[34]

Separatism and Social Upheaval: The Zealots

Notwithstanding the mounting Serbian threat from the north, the restoration of some stability attending the independent reign of Andronikos III limited further opportunities for separatist activism. But that situation changed with the premature death of Andronikos, with the ensuing regency of dowager empress Anna of Savoy for their son John V Palaiologos, and then with the usurpation of John Kantakouzenos as John VI. The struggle between the supporters of John V and John VI was a profoundly disruptive episode, accelerating the dissipation of reduced Byzantine resources and guaranteeing the empire's further decline into impotence and vulnerability. Among other things, the struggle laid bare the terrible gaps and resentments between social and economic groups, especially in Byzantium's few remaining urban centers. These resentments led to outbreaks of violent conflict in a number of them, such as Adrianople in Thrace, where the notables (aristocratic or otherwise) and powerful (δυνατοί) tended generally (if not totally) to support the aristocrat Kantakouzenos and the populace (the δῆμος) generally supported the legitimate Palaiologan dynast. It was in Thessalonike, however, that the most complicated and potent of these outbreaks occurred.

The scene there had been set in advance. Long-standing social tensions had apparently been behind the first incident in the launching of an earlier civil war, the one in which old Andronikos II was challenged by his grandson, Andronikos III. In 1322, while Andronikos II's son, the despot Constantine, was governor of Thessalonike, a violent popular rising by the *demos* of the city confronted Constantine, obliged him to flee, and compelled the city's surrender to the faction of the younger Andronikos.[35] Five years later, however, sentiments were sufficiently shifted in Thessalonike for a majority to accept its seizure by Andronikos III and his lieutenant, John Kantakouzenos.[36]

It was, significantly, the second phase of succession struggles, that between John V Palaiologos and John VI Kantakouzenos, which ignited a more prolonged upheaval. Kantakouzenos proclaimed himself emperor in October 1341. Excluded from the capital, he

[33] U. V. Bosch, *Andronikos III Palaiologos: Versuch einer Darstellung der byzantinischen Geschichte in den Jahren 1321–1341* (Amsterdam, 1965), 39–41; Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins,* 294–95; Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 119; Tafrali, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle,* 214.

[34] Allusions to these tensions and outbursts in writings by Thomas Magistros are cited by I. Ševčenko in his important study "Nicolas Cabasilas' 'Anti-Zealot' Discourse: A Reinterpretation," *DOP* 11 (1957): 84 and notes 12–13; and by G. Weiss, *Johannes Kantakouzenos—Aristokrat, Staatsmann, Kaiser und Mönch—in der Gesellschaftsentwicklung von Byzanz im 14. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1969), 91–92. Another possible reference, if more generalized, may be found in the letter (Loenertz 77; Cammelli 160) of Demetrios Kydones to Phakrases (1372), ed. R. J. Loenertz, *Démétrius Cydonès, Correspondance,* vol. 1, ST 186 (Vatican City, 1956), 109–10.

[35] Gregoras, 1: 356–57. Cf. Laiou, *Constantinople and the Latins,* 290.

[36] D. M. Nicol, *The Reluctant Emperor: A Biography of John Cantacuzenus, Byzantine Emperor and Monk, c. 1295–1383* (Cambridge, 1996), 26, and idem, *Last Centuries,* 160; also, Tafrali, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle,* 209–13.

quickly attempted to build himself a position in Thrace and Macedonia, with Thessalonike as a much-desired prize. Led by Kantakouzenos' old friend Synadenos, then governor of Thessalonike, elements of the *dynatoi* who dominated the city attempted to deliver it to him in early 1342. But a faction of the *demos*—whose main strength was the organization of sailors and dockworkers in the harbor (the ναυτιόν) and who called themselves by the name "Zealots" (ζηλωταί)—stirred up the populace, which forcibly drove out large elements of the notables. The Zealot leadership then cast in their lot with the ambitious Alexios Apokaukos, the veritable dictator of Constantinople, who had rallied the populace there as his support for championing the claims of John V. After a personal visit to Thessalonike, Apokaukos established his son, the megas primikerios John, as governor there in the name of the dynastic loyalists. In actual fact, John Apokaukos merely shared power with another holder of the same title, the Zealots' own leader, one Michael Palaiologos, who with his well-organized popular faction had created something of an independent dominion only loosely connected with any central government. John Apokaukos and Michael Palaiologos each held the title of *archon* and were backed by a legislative council or βουλή (whose selection is not clear). Imposing a strict suppression of any internal dissidence, this regime held out against a series of Serbian and Turkish menaces brought into play by the civil war.

Through all this, the position of John Apokaukos was a largely fictitious one. But he had ambitions of his own, and he began to cultivate the remnants of upper-class Kantakouzenian sympathies. Once he had consolidated his alternate support, he brought matters to a head by arranging the murder of Michael Palaiologos. This coup left the Zealot faction momentarily leaderless and the younger Apokaukos in full control. His next step was given impetus by the murder of his father, Alexios, in June 1345. Finally left on his own, John Apokaukos confirmed his shift of allegiances and arranged a bargain with the Kantakouzenian leaders by which he was left in his position in Thessalonike as a reward for submission of the city to the usurper. What he did not anticipate was the resurgence of the Zealot faction. Under new leaders—one of them called Andreas Palaiologos, known as leader of the longshoremen (παραθαλάσσιοι)—a riot was organized and the populace joined in what became a bloodbath. Apokaukos and about a hundred of the counterrevolutionary magnates were rounded up and, after brief imprisonment, were delivered to the mob to be torn to pieces in savage retaliation. Heedless of their leaders' admonitions, the blood-crazed mob then went on a rampage through the city, murdering any other Kantakouzenian sympathizers, real or merely accused, and pillaging their homes. When the dust settled, Thessalonike was more firmly than ever under the control of the Zealots and their ruthless commune. Dissent of any kind was prosecuted as "Kantakouzenism."

After John VI's assumption of power in Constantinople, the Zealot regime remained defiant, refusing to accept as their new metropolitan Kantakouzenos' designate, the eminent Gregory Palamas. This denial was apparently made not only on political grounds but because the Zealots opposed the triumphant theological doctrines of hesychasm with which Palamas and his Kantakouzenian supporters were identified. This meant that Zealot Thessalonike was isolated ecclesiastically as well as in other ways. Meanwhile, the Serbian ruler, Stefan Dušan, had renewed his menace to Thessalonike, adding to its strains. Further, this was the epoch of the Black Death's passage through the Mediterranean world: clearly in the path of its devastation, Thessalonike was undoubtedly af-

fected.[37] The actual impact is not adequately recorded or known in detail, but, especially in combination with all the other stresses, it must certainly have contributed to a mounting sense of disillusionment and disaffection amid the prolonged stalemate. Eventually the radical regime found its influence shaken and eroding. In desperation, it went so far as to consider handing the city over to Dušan. That prospect proved to be the last straw for the exhausted Thessalonians. A reaction soon split the regime's leadership. The two co-*archons* were Andreas Palaiologos and the protosebastos and governor, Alexios Laskaris Metochites, son of Andronikos II's famous logothete. Metochites, no Zealot himself, felt strongly about maintaining the city's ties to the central government and opposed any kind of secession therefrom as "apostasy." In the resulting confrontation, Andreas Palaiologos and his faction were defeated; expelled, he fled to Mount Athos, even though he had been made unwelcome on a previous visit there. Metochites then opened negotiations with John VI, and in 1350 it was finally possible for Kantakouzenos to make a triumphal entry into the long-contested city. The remnants of the Zealot leadership were rounded up for punishment in Constantinople, leaving behind only broken and powerless remnants of discontent. Thus did the spectacular separatism of Thessalonike end in renewed subjection to the government in the capital.[38]

The seven or eight years of Zealot rule in Thessalonike were regarded with horrified fascination by the writers of their day and have intrigued scholars of modern times. Byzantine historians such as Nikephoros Gregoras and John Kantakouzenos himself expatiated on the utter novelty and radicalism of the Zealots' regime, considered something unprecedented in Byzantine tradition.[39] This view became the starting point for discussions

[37] See Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 224–25. Studies on the Black Death in Byzantium are as scanty as our sources of information on the subject, and mainly concentrate on analyzing the stylized, classicizing accounts of Gregoras and Kantakouzenos: C. S. Bartsocas, "Two Fourteenth Century Greek Descriptions of the Black Death," *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences* 21 (1966): 394–400; T. S. Miller, "The Plague in John VI Cantacuzenus and Thucydides," *GRBS* 17 (1976): 385–95; H. Hunger, "Thukydides bei Johannes Kantakuzenos. Beobeachtungen zur Mimesis," *JÖB* 25 (1976): 181–93. Beyond passing reference to these two writers (pp. 50–51), there is unfortunately no treatment of the Byzantine scene in M. W. Dols, *The Black Death in the Middle East* (Princeton, N.J., 1977).

[38] The Zealot episode is touched upon in many areas of related literature, but for the best general (and contextual) accounts, see Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 192–95, 199, 202, 227–29, and *Reluctant Emperor,* 58, 62–63, 67–68, 74, 107–9. Still useful, if dated, is P. Charanis, "Internal Strife in Byzantium during the Fourteenth Century," *Byzantion* 15 (1940–41): 208–30, repr. as no. VI in Charanis, *Social, Economic, and Political Life in the Byzantine Empire* (London, 1973); see also idem, "The Monastic Properties and the State in the Byzantine Empire," *DOP* 4 (1948): 51–118, esp. 112–14; likewise, Vakalopoulos, *History,* 56–59; more recently, A. Laiou, "The Byzantine Empire in the Fourteenth Century," chap. 24 in *The New Cambridge Medieval History,* VI: *c. 1300–c. 1415,* ed. M. Jones (Cambridge, 2000), 795–824, esp. 813–17. An outstanding survey of events and of the literature on them may be found in Ševčenko, "Nicholas Cabasilas' 'Anti-Zealot' Discourse," 81 ff; and a subsequent one in D. M. Nicol, *Church and Society in the Last Centuries of Byzantium: The Birkbeck Lectures, 1977* (Cambridge, 1979), 20–28.

[39] Gregoras, 2: 795–96, a portion translated by Ernest Barker in his *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium, From Justinian I to the Last Palaeologus: Passages from Byzantine Writers and Documents, Translated with an Introduction and Notes* (Oxford, 1957), 192–93; Kantakouzenos, ed. L. Schopen, vol. 2 (Bonn, 1831), 233–35, a portion translated by D. J. Geanakoplos in his *Byzantium: Church, Society, and Civilization Seen through Contemporary Eyes* (Chicago, 1984), 271–72. Given the removal of the Kabasilas Discourse from viability as a source for the Zealots, these statements by our two historians are the only contemporaneous suggestions remaining to us of supposedly radical intents and innovation on the part of the dissidents. In view of the stylized and partisan character of their accusations, however, these passages are suspect, and hardly decisive or accurate evidence in themselves. On the political terminology that they and other Byzantine writers used, see G. L. Brătianu's "Empire et 'démocratie' à Byzance," *BZ* 37 (1937): 86–111, and "'Démocratie' dans la lexique byzantine à l'époque des Paléologues," in *Mémorial Louis Petit* (Bucharest, 1948), 32–40.

of the Zealots as "social revolutionaries," supposedly committed to a radical program of drastic socioeconomic reform. Eventually colored by modern ideological agendas, such interpretations have waxed and waned through the course of the twentieth century, and by now have been considerably deflated. Likewise apparently ephemeral has been a corollary effort to link the Zealot rising with patterns of urban unrest and violence extensively manifest in western Europe by the middle of the fourteenth century. These interpretations have produced lively and voluminous scholarly argument.[40]

If reduced in intensity by now, debate about the nature of the Zealot regime remains unresolved, and will probably continue to be so until new sources or evidence can be discovered. But the questions continue to tantalize us. Was it an organized movement of social protest with a serious program of reform? Or was it simply the lashing-out of the bitterly disaffected "have-nots," seeking to turn the tables on the "haves"? What was its connection to the anti-hesychast intellectual circles of the city? Did the regime represent a genuine venture in "democracy," or was it simply a brief assertion of mob rule?

The terrible gap between rich and poor did not go unrecognized at the time by Byzantines themselves, as a remarkable "Dialogue between the Rich and the Poor" by Alexios Makrembolites bears witness.[41] There is no question that poverty and despair motivated the lower-class participants in violent episodes. It is also interesting that the cradle of Zealot leadership was the labor force of the city's harbor workers (as a guild or otherwise). The Zealots *might* indeed have had radical ideas: they *may* have sought to alter the society and institutions of their age with some degree of drastic, conscious, and radical character. But our sources are simply insufficient to prove such totally conjectural portrayals. Those sources do describe mob actions against the persons and properties of the wealthy, actions characteristic of urban rioting in many an age. But the sources afford no clear or explicit evidence of any systematic program of confiscations or redistributions of wealth.

It had also been suggested early on that the Zealots were influenced in their supposed social philosophy by the anti-hesychast circle created in Thessalonike by the visiting controversialist Barlaam.[42] But no decisive evidence has been advanced for this idea. The only indication of any religious policy by the Zealots is their rejection of Palamas as their prelate—which in the end may have depended more on his identification with Kantakouzenos and the circles of the notables. Kantakouzenos refers to episodes when the raging mob used the symbol of the cross as a banner in their campaigns against the rich.[43] Elsewhere, he reports that on various occasions the drunken or rowdy mobsters made mockeries of the sacraments.[44] We know that the Zealot leader Andreas Palaiologos took the trouble to visit Mount Athos to pay respects to the venerated Sava the Younger, later to be reckoned a saint. In his life of St. Sava, the pro-Kantakouzenian Philotheos, after commenting venomously on the Zealots' damage to the holy man's native city, recounts in-

[40] For an extended survey of the varying interpretations and extensive literature on these issues of the Zealot episode, see Appendix 2.

[41] Published by I. Ševčenko, "Alexios Makrembolites and His 'Dialogue between the Rich and the Poor,'" *ZRVI* 6 (1960): 187–228, and repr. as no. VII in idem, *Society and Intellectual Life in Late Byzantium* (London, 1981). For a sympathetic portrait of Makrembolites (in an otherwise rather negative book), see E. de Vries-van der Velden, *L'élite byzantine devant l'avance turque à l'époque de la guerre civile de 1341 à 1354* (Amsterdam, 1989), 251–67, plus a previously unedited text by this Byzantine author, 269–89.

[42] Tafrali, *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle,* 201–3, 269.

[43] Kantakouzenos, 2: 234.

[44] Ibid., 2: 570–71; cf. Nicol, *Church and Society,* 27 and note 53.

cidents in which Sava pointedly snubbed and then denounced the visitor.[45] All in all, the religious element remains difficult to establish clearly in our understanding of the Zealots, beyond their official opposition to Palamism.[46]

The record *is* clear as to Zealot hostility to the Kantakouzenian cause. But how great was their corresponding loyalty to the Palaiologoi? It is interesting that the two prominent Zealot leaders identified for us both bore that family name: Michael and Andreas Palaiologos. Despite efforts to identify them,[47] however, they do not fit in any way into the known Palaiologan family tree, and we do not even know their relationship to each other: they may, indeed, simply have come from some sort of client family or families who took the dynastic name by extension. But one point does remain unavoidable: the so-called "revolutionaries" did consistently identify themselves with Palaiologan legitimacy. The Zealots presumably hated Kantakouzenos for his identification with and support of the wealthy classes, in a simple reflection of social divisions. But did the Zealots use Palaiologan loyalty as a convenient mask to cover what really was the unique venture in regional secessionism in Byzantine history? Or did the issues of social controversy merely boil down—as they had so often through Byzantine history—to a question of which faction would be placed in control of an imperial throne that no one ever suggested should be abolished?

These and other questions will continue to vex scholars, who must recognize that they are reduced as much to speculation as to facts. But, to be fruitful, any further study should consider the Zealot episode not only by itself but also in relation to several contexts. Certainly the episode has to be seen as part of a spectrum of social upheaval and urban violence to be observed in the fourteenth century. The attempts to find direct connections or influences between the Zealot rising and given episodes elsewhere, however, have not produced a convincing case. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that patterns of violent social dissension were generally current, and what happened in Thessalonike holds some place in those patterns. On the other hand, what happened there was, if a distinctly Byzantine episode, not an isolated one. We do have to recognize how conditions in this city shaped events so that they followed a scenario different from, as well as more complex and prolonged than, what can be observed in the upheavals of other Byzantine cities (e.g., Adrianople) during the Kantakouzenian civil war. Thessalonike had a large and diverse popu-

[45] Philotheos, *Life of St. Sava the Younger,* ed. A. Papadapoulos-Kerameus, *Ἀνάλεκτα ἱεροσολυμιτικῆς σταχυολογίας,* vol. 5 (St. Petersburg, 1888), 190–359, at 327–30. In his denunciation of the Zealots, Philotheos insists that their work is utterly at odds with Thessalonian tradition and is the product of "some foreign barbarians from parts far distant from us" (τινῶν βαρβάρων ἐκ τε τῶν ἡμετέρων ἐσχατιῶν) and of refugees from nearby islands (p. 194, lines 7–8). Blaming troubles in one's society on "outsiders" is a timeless recourse, but would Philotheos' vague charge be any suggestion of foreign influence from, say, Italians? (See Appendix 1.)

[46] But see the discussion of Palamas' involvement with the Zealots by J. Meyendorff, *A Study of Gregory Palamas,* trans. G. Lawrence (London, 1964), 89–93. Meyendorff argues that the Zealots were not initially opposed to Palamite theology but that they came to oppose Palamas himself purely for the political reason of the prelate's ties to Kantakouzenos—in other words, anti-Palamism was really just a subcategory of anti-Kantakouzenism. In passing, Meyendorff gives the following description of the Zealots: they "represented a political force diametrically opposed to centralization, in that they stood out against the 'mighty' who represented imperial power, and defended the local interests of the city of Thessalonica, rather than those of the Empire"—a portrayal that hints, even unconsciously, at an underlying spirit of Thessalonian separatism.

As to Barlaam and his impact on the city's intellectual scene, see G. Schirò's brief study, *Ὁ Βαρλαὰμ καὶ ἡ φιλοσοφία εἰς τὴν Θεσσαλονίκην κατὰ τὸν δέκατον τέταρτον αἰῶνα* (Thessalonike, 1959).

[47] E.g., by A. Th. Papadopulos, *Versuch einer Genealogie der Palaiologen, 1259–1453* (Munich, 1938), 29 and 75; more neutrally in *PLP* 21527, 21425.

lation, including an unusually extensive mercantile middle class which could apparently be persuaded to support the popular factions, at least at times. Above all, Thessalonike had its own privileged traditions and institutions of municipal government (including a senate and a popular assembly), allowing it certain degrees of internal autonomy regardless of the governors sent from the capital, if not at times in spite of them.[48] In that sense, Thessalonike had something comparable to the commune of the Italian cities long before those counterparts did.

As for the specific mechanics of the Zealot government, we do not know very much. Gregoras describes their organization as "some of the more reckless men, gathered together in a self-selected assemblage of absolute authority."[49] A great deal of their control must have depended upon either actual or implied intimidation from organized popular factions. There were sufficient checks to the authority of the executive *archontes* for one of them to challenge the other on policy issues and win, as in the confrontation of Metochites with Andreas Palaiologos. (As despot in Thessalonike, Manuel II Palaiologos was also to run afoul of the local council later in the century, as we shall see.) Moreover, the volatility of civic government was of a piece with the sentiment of Thessalonian separatism that is one of our chief themes. It might well be that the seemingly bizarre episode of the Zealot regime will make sense *only* if we do understand it thus in its fuller Thessalonian context, not as a totally exceptional and isolated event in the city's history but as part of a larger context of recurrent Thessalonian separatism.[50]

Separatism Renewed

Indeed, if not new before 1342, that context hardly ended in 1350. Ironically, the very step intended to terminate Zealot separatism only initiated a renewal of subtler separatist forms. Kantakouzenos had brought the legitimate dynast, John V Palaiologos, to accompany him in the triumphal entry into Thessalonike, to symbolize their supposed reconciliation. When he departed Thessalonike, John VI left the young Palaiologos behind as nominal governor of the city. Kantakouzenos had hoped thereby both to placate the legitimate dynast for his eclipse and, at the same time, to conciliate any sentiments of Zealot legitimism still remaining in the city. Far from bringing stability, the arrangement soon went awry. John V intrigued with Stefan Dušan, which only prompted the Serbian prince to advance on Thessalonike for his own ends. The menace was averted only when John V's mother, the dowager Anna of Savoy, chastised her son and then, in a personal interview, persuaded Dušan to desist. In 1352 John V was drawn into territorial interests eastward, as a function of Kantakouzenos' breakneck acceleration of partitioning Byzantine territories into quasi-appanages.[51]

[48] G. L. Brătianu, in his classic little volume, *Privilèges et franchises municipales dans l'Empire byzantin* (Paris, 1936), argued that there was a resurgence of urban institutions and eagerness to return municipal privileges in the late Byzantine era; he stresses the case of Thessalonike in general and its Zealot movement in particular (pp. 108–9, 115–23); also, as noted, making comparisons to contemporaneous Western events. For Tafrali's analysis of 14th-century civil institutions in the city, see *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle,* 66–84. See also Vakalopoulos, *History,* 52–53.

[49] Gregoras, 2: 796, lines 12–14: θρασύτεροι γάρ τινες, εἰς αὐτοχειροτόνητον αὐθεντίας ἄθροισμα συλλεγέντες.

[50] This point had already been somewhat anticipated by Tafrali himself: *Thessalonique des origines,* 247–49, stressing the strong currents of separatism that had been building up before the Zealot episode.

[51] Nicol, *Reluctant Emperor,* 106–7, 110–11, 115–17, 118 ff; also *Last Centuries,* 230, 237, and *Byzantine Lady,* 92.

John V would finally displace John VI from Constantinople in 1354. But by that time the Thessalonian stage had firmly been claimed for a seeming rerun of the Latin Kingdom of Thessalonike. If John V cared little for that city in compensation for the capital, his mother felt quite the reverse. To be sure, Thessalonike had for some time become a kind of warehouse for ex-empresses or the like, and even an emperor or two. In a prefiguration of Kantakouzenos' installation of the reluctant John V, Andronikos II had in 1310 sent his son, Michael IX, to reside there after the latter's humiliation in several defeats: and there he remained—in uncomfortable proximity with his stepmother Irene-Yolanda up to her death in 1317—until he died, a broken man, in 1320. Michael's widow, the Armenian-born Maria-Rita Palaiologina, mother of Andronikos III, stayed on there as the nun Xene until her death in 1333. Anna Palaiologina, mother of the last Angelan despot of Epiros, was briefly confined on an estate in Thessalonike after ceding her titles and lands to Andronikos III. Other notables meanwhile found it a comfortable alternative to the tension-filled capital.

But Anna of Savoy, with the acquiescence of John VI, took over active rule of the city.[52] Like Irene-Yolanda, Anna was a Latin princess, a Palaiologina only by marriage. However, though she was related to the Montferrat family, Anna lacked her own hereditary claim to the city. Instead, Anna assumed the city's government by her right as an empress (δέσποινα), and she ruled there with full use of that title, from 1351 until her death about fourteen years later. Both Irene-Yolanda's renewed Kingdom of Thessalonike and Anna's quasi-Empire of Thessalonike fell somewhere between an appanage and a separatist government. Irene-Yolanda's regime had been an embarrassment to the government in Constantinople, but Anna's regime reflected the degree to which the empire's fragmentation had become normality.

Anna's government was apparently welcomed and appreciated by the city's population; her reputation is still commemorated by the gate in the upper city walls that bears her name.[53] In far less blatant terms than that of the Zealot epoch, her regime might have suggested a subtler kind of detachment from Constantinople—one mutually acceptable to both cities in the circumstances. But altered circumstances could evoke a return to more robust separatism. By the latter decades of the fourteenth century, dynastic apportionments were standard Palaiologan procedures. As already mentioned, in 1369 the second son of John V, the despot Manuel Palaiologos, was assigned to govern Thessalonike and its region. In 1373 he was advanced over his rebellious elder brother, Andronikos, and made co-emperor and heir. A new round of family strife, during which the displaced first-born prince seized power as Andronikos IV (1376–79), muddied the picture. In the aftermath of that disruption Manuel was deprived of his rights as heir to the throne. Disgruntled, Manuel set out secretly for Thessalonike in 1382, and there, in defiance of his father, John V, he established his own rival regime, using the full imperial title. For five years, Manuel's Empire of Thessalonike made the city independent of the capital, if not officially, at least de facto. Thus liberated, Manuel threw off the official Constantinopolitan policy of timid

[52] See D. M. Nicol and S. Bendall, "Anna of Savoy and Thessalonica: The Numismatic Evidence," *RN* 19 (1977): 90–102; also Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 237–38, and *Byzantine Lady,* 92–93. On institutional implications, see pp. 91–127 of A. Christophilopoulou, "Ἡ ἀντιβασιλεία εἰς τὸ Βυζάντιον," in *Σύμμεικτα,* vol. 2 (Athens, 1970), 1–144. For further literature on her, see *PLP* 21347.

[53] See J.-M. Spieser, "Les inscriptions byzantines de Thessalonique," *TM* 5 (1973): 175–76.

accommodation to Turkish power and pursued a program of staunch resistance to Ottoman forces, a program augmented by an active and completely independent foreign as well as domestic policy.

If this gave Thessalonians any immediate thrill of independence and honor, the reaction soon set in. Manuel's little empire was no match militarily for the juggernaut of Turkish conquest, and Thessalonike soon found itself constrained by a severe siege. To Manuel's disgust, the civic fathers lost any stomach for continued struggle. In 1387 the Thessalonians compelled him to take flight as a humiliated exile while they surrendered the city to the first of its Turkish occupations.[54]

In his own writings of this period, Manuel deplored the divisions, obstructionism, and squabbling that he had to put up with at the hands of the independent-minded Thessalonians. In pursuit of their own advantage, Manuel claimed, they were willing to cast principles aside and even accept foreign domination as preferable to fighting on in a noble but hopeless cause.[55] From their viewpoint, of course, surrender would allow them to protect their city and their interests from ruin, which made more practical sense. But any civic initiatives mattered less now than the compelling fact that Thessalonike, like all things Byzantine, had become a toy in the hands of circumstances. Nothing illustrates this better than the city's one last experience in juggling independence and domination.

Between Occupation and Appanage

For a period of fifteen years, Thessalonike had its first taste of Turkish domination, which began in 1387. The sources for the period are scanty and confusing. From them arguments have been made that the city might actually have broken free in some way and then been resubjected to Turkish rule about 1394. It has also been suggested, on the other hand, that Thessalonike might initially have been allowed some degree of continuing internal autonomy under general Turkish overlordship, with a more direct and strict rule then imposed in or about 1394, at a time of increased tension between the Byzantines and the Turks. The matter remains cloudy, but the scholarly consensus would seem to be that Thessalonike was effectively held by the Turks, to one extent or another, without interruption until 1403.[56] That point aside, the fifteen years of Ottoman control saw Thessa-

[54] The basic study is G. T. Dennis, *The Reign of Manuel II Palaeologus in Thessalonica, 1382–1387,* OCA 159 (Rome, 1960); more cursorily, J. W. Barker, *Manuel II Palaeologus (1391–1425): A Study in Late Byzantine Statesmanship* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1969), 42–50, 52–60. Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 284–88.

[55] Manuel poured out his bitter feelings in his "Discourse in Epistolary Form to Kabasilas," written in the summer of 1387: ed. R.-J. Loenertz, "Manuel Paléologue, épitre à Cabasilas," *Μακεδονικά* 4 (1956): 38–46; see Dennis, *Reign of Manuel II,* 87–88; Barker, *Manuel II,* 59–60. Manuel had complained earlier about the difficulty of leading the contentious and recalcitrant Thessalonians, in a letter written in 1383 to Demetrios Kydones: *The Letters of Manuel Palaeologus,* ed. and trans. G. T. Dennis (Washington, D.C., 1977), 12–15, letter 4. Manuel's efforts to guide the populace during the Turkish siege survive in a highly inflated adaptation of his speech to a popular assembly held in the autumn of 1383: his "Συμβουλευτικός" or "Discourse of Counsel to the Thessalonians," ed. B. Laourdas, in *Μακεδονικά* 3 (1955): 290–307; for an excellent summary of its contents, see Dennis, *Reign of Manuel II,* 80–84.

[56] The possibility of a Byzantine recovery had been left open in Barker, *Manuel II,* 450–53, but this interpretation was meanwhile rejected by George T. Dennis, "The Second Turkish Capture of Thessalonica, 1391, 1394, or 1430?" *BZ* 57 (1964): 53–61, repr. as no. V in idem, *Byzantium and the Franks, 1350–1420* (London, 1982). His interpretation seems now to prevail: e.g., Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 321. See also A. Vakalopoulos, "Zur Frage der zweiten Einnahme Thessalonikis durch die Türken, 1391–1394," *BZ* 61 (1968): 285–90.

lonike as the first target of the emerging Turkish policy known as the *devşirme,* the obligatory levy of tribute-children exacted from a Christian population. This and other potentially harsh burdens were relaxed, however, through the interventions of the successive archbishops of the city, Isidore and Gabriel, whose personalities won the respect of the Turks and a softening of their impositions upon the occupied metropolis.[57]

The occupation ended with Thessalonike's return to the Byzantines as part of treaty settlements made by local Christian powers with Suleyman, Bayazid I's son and claimant to the Turkish succession after the battle of Ankyra.[58] The city's rule had been earmarked in advance for Manuel II's nephew, John, as a reward for the latter's holding the fort in Constantinople during Manuel's absence in the West, and as compensation for ceasing to contest Manuel's rights to the throne in the latest round of Palaiologan dynastic strife. After some initial misunderstanding and delay upon Manuel's return in 1403, John VII was indeed allowed to reign in Thessalonike with the full imperial title. As with Manuel's own independent regime in 1382–87, Thessalonike was once more, and for the last time, a counter-capital to Constantinople.[59]

We know little of John's regime in Thessalonike or what its people thought of him, but once again the separatist motives of a dynastic dissenter would seem to have corresponded with any remaining separatist ideals of that restless city. On the other hand, we do know that, all through John VII's reign there, Manuel maintained a loyal dependent, one Demetrios Leontaris, as administrator and liaison agent in the city. Whether he was there to conduct the actual government, or to be a helpful advisor, or just to spy on John, is not clear, but his uninterrupted presence in the city indicates that Manuel had not totally ceded control or connection of Thessalonike to Constantinople. There is evidence that John VII had a son, Andronikos V, with whom he hoped to maintain his dynastic claims; but the boy died before his father, ending that dream.[60] When John VII himself died in September 1408, Manuel, who had been visiting the Byzantine Morea at the time, hastened to Thessalonike to forestall any dissidence and to establish his third son, Despot Andronikos, as the official head of government there, again with Leontaris at his side during the boy's minority.[61]

Manuel II was the most successful of the sovereigns who employed this quasi-appanage pattern to control the disparate territories of his small and fragmented state. The secret of his success was his own persistent energy in personally coordinating these connections. But, as age and circumstances got the better of him, neither he nor his deputies could stave off impending disaster. Thessalonike—once the second city, once the sometime challenger of the capital—was to be the first victim of that reality. In 1422 Thessalonike was beset by a Turkish siege. Barely able to save Constantinople from the same

[57] Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 321–22; Vakalopoulos, *History,* 61–62. See also B. Laourdas, "Οἱ δημοσιευμένες ὁμιλίες τοῦ ἀρχιεπισκόπου Θεσσαλονίκης Ἰσιδώρου ὡς ἱστορικὴ πηγὴ γιὰ τὴ γνώση τῆς πρώτης τουρκοκρατίας στὴ Θεσσαλονίκη (1387–1403)," *Μακεδονικά* (1955–60): 20–34; and S. P. Vryonis, "Isidore Glabas and the Turkish 'devshirme'," *Speculum* 31 (1956): 438–42.

[58] On this see G. T. Dennis, "The Byzantine-Turkish Treaty of 1403," *OCP* 33 (1967): 72–88, repr. as no. VI in idem, *Byzantium and the Franks.* Also Barker, *Manuel II,* 222–27; Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 319–20.

[59] See Barker, *Manuel II,* 238–45 and 490–93; Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 320–21.

[60] G. T. Dennis, "An Unknown Byzantine Emperor, Andronicus V Palaeologus (1400–1407?)," *JÖBG* 16 (1967): 175–87, repr. as no. II in idem, *Byzantium and the Franks.*

[61] Barker, *Manuel II,* 278–80; Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 235–36.

menace, Manuel recognized the fact that his young and diseased son Andronikos no longer had the resources to maintain it. In the summer of 1423, Manuel therefore supervised negotiations by which it was transferred to the Venetians. This was not the first time the Byzantines, in desperate straits, had offered an important city to the Venetian Republic, but this was the first (and only) time such an offer was accepted. The brief Venetian occupation of Thessalonike was not a happy time for any of the parties: the population that first welcomed the Venetians came to chafe irritably under their rule. It all ended in the Venetians' own ultimate failure and the Turkish capture of the city in March 1430.[62]

Not since the Norman outrage of 1185 had Thessalonike been taken by storm. Its stout walls had withstood the attacks of Kalojan's Bulgarians in 1207, a siege by the Catalan Grand Company in 1308, and repeated menaces by Stefan Dušan's Serbians in the 1330s and 1340s; suddenly weakened by an earthquake, these walls failed before the Ottoman Turks in 1430. The shattering seizure and sack of Thessalonike by them was also a warning signal to Constantinople itself. The fate of the "second city" in 1430 prefigured vividly what lay in store for the "first city" in 1453.

The Post-Byzantine "Second City"

We should not ignore the epilogue to Thessalonike's late Byzantine history. Restored by its conqueror after the ravages, it became the favored residence of Sultan Murad II and a provisional Turkish capital until his son took Constantinople in hand. After 1453, Thessalonike became part of an empire that was too vast, too rich, and too diverse to allow for any clearly discernible "second city" of the Ottomans. Thessalonike did prosper, however, integrated more fully than ever into its natural Balkan hinterland. Among other attainments, it was to become the home for one of the greatest Jewish populations in the world, as a refuge for the escapees from Christian persecution in the Iberian Peninsula and elsewhere, a status it continued to hold until World War II.[63]

There is a rich irony, however, in the contributions of Turkish "Salonik" (or "Selanik" or "Salona") to the decline of the empire that succeeded Byzantium. The city became the base for the movement of the Young Turks, that cabal of officers who aspired to remake the Turkish state at the beginning of the twentieth century. And from beyond that circle finally came one of Thessalonike's greatest native sons, Mustafa Kemal, who as the remark-

[62] Barker, *Manuel II,* 372–74 and notes 129–32; Nicol, *Last Centuries,* 334–36, 347–50, and idem, *Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations* (Cambridge, 1988), 360–63, 367–71; Vakalopoulos, *History,* 63–73; K. M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571),* vol. 2 (Philadelphia, 1978), 19–30; P. Lemerle, "La domination vénitienne à Thessalonique," in *Miscellanea Giovanni Galbiati* (= *Fontes Ambrosiani* 27, 1951), 219–25; also C. Manfroni, "La marina veneziana alla difesa di Salonicco," *NAVen* n.s. 10 (1910): 20:1, pp. 5–68. On the sources for the siege and fall of the city, see S. P. Vryonis, Jr., "The Ottoman Conquest of Thessaloniki in 1430," in *Continuity and Change in Late Byzantine and Early Ottoman Society,* ed. A. Bryer and H. Lowry (Birmingham–Washington, D.C., 1986), 281–321. Valuable reflections in Greek sources of the attitudes of the city's population toward the Venetians and their regime are being explored by M. Dobre, foreshadowed in her report, "Les Vénitiens dans les sources de Thessalonique du XVe siècle," in *XXe Congrès International des Études Byzantines: Pré-Actes, I: Séances plénières* (Paris, 2001), 271–78.

[63] Vakalopoulos, *History,* 74–98; N. K. Moutsopoulos, *Thessaloniki 1900–1917* (Thessalonike, 1981) [based on annotated Greek edition of 1980], 15–39 (in English), 48–75 (in French); M. Laskaris, *Salonique à la fin du XVIIIe siècle* (Athens, 1939). Specifically on the Jewish population, see I. S. Emmanuel, *Histoire des Israélites de Salonique (*Thonon, 1936); R. Attal, *Les juifs de Grèce, De l'expulsion d'Espagne à nos jours: Bibliographie* (Leiden, 1973). See also the article by Jacoby in this volume, below, 85–131.

able Atatürk was to preside single-handedly over the final liquidation of the Ottoman Empire and over the creation of the Turkish Republic in its place—a process, we might recall, that ended the status of Constantinople as a "first city" and capital.[64] Kemal Atatürk's remarkable accomplishments came after the Turks had, to his sorrow, lost Thessalonike to the Greeks in 1916. But the charming house in which he was born is still lovingly preserved, within the compound of the Turkish consulate.

And there is still more irony. A Greek city today, Thessalonike flaunts as its most familiar visual symbol an Ottoman monument, the famous White Tower, once part of a grim Turkish waterfront fortress. And, as part of a Hellenic state again, Thessalonike is once more a powerful "second city" within such a state, the city's vigorous economic and cultural life seriously challenging the seemingly unassailable political and cultural primacy of Athens.

Thessalonike's status as competitor-city has been too recurrent to be ignored or shrugged off. It was not simply an isolated feature of its late Byzantine context. Has, then, a destiny of "secondicity" been immutably fixed for Thessalonike by relentless combinations of geography and circumstances? If so, such a destiny has truly been both the glory and the curse of this magnificent and fascinating city.

[64] Lord Kinross, *Atatürk: A Biography of Mustafa Kemal, Father of Modern Turkey* (New York, 1965), esp. 11–12, 65–66; H. C. Armstrong, *Grey Wolf: The Life of Kamal Atatürk* (1933), rev. E. Lengyel (New York, 1961), 3–4, 35–36.

Appendix 1

Late Byzantine Thessalonike: Chronological Highlights

1180	Renier of Montferrat is married to Emperor Manuel I's elder daughter Maria, is made caesar, and is supposedly promised the rule of Th.; they are both murdered some two years later amid dynastic succession struggles.
1185	The Normans storm Th. and ravage it viciously during a short occupation before being driven away.
1187	Renier's older brother, Conrad of Montferrat, marries a sister of Isaac II Angelos, is given the title of caesar, and helps put down a military rebellion; but, facing court hostility, he leaves for the Holy Land.
1204	Boniface of Montferrat, brother of Conrad and Renier, is a leader of the Fourth Crusade; after its capture of Constantinople, he establishes himself as king in Th., ruling from it until his death (1207) and leaving it to his son Demetrios.
1224	Theodore Angelos, ruler of Epiros, captures Th. from the Latins and is crowned emperor in his bid to re-create the Byzantine state.
1230	After the defeat and captivity of Theodore Angelos at Klokotinica, and his blinding, his brother Manuel rules in Th. as "emperor and despot" (1230–41), followed by his nephew John (1242–44) and the latter's son Demetrios (1244–46).
1246	Th. is taken from the rapidly enfeebled Angelan regime by John III Vatatzes to become, instead, part of the Nicaean restoration of Byzantium; Andronikos Palaiologos is named governor.
1282 ca.	Michael VIII Palaiologos contemplates giving his younger son an independent dominion of Macedonia to be ruled from Th., but is forestalled in this by his death.
1284	Andronikos II Palaiologos marries Irene-Yolanda of Montferrat, who brings her family's claim to Th. as her dowry.
1303/4	Irene-Yolanda, denied the partitionings of sovereignty and territories she has demanded of Andronikos, removes to Th. where she establishes her own quasi-independent government there by right of her inheritance, remaining there until her death (1317).
1306	Andronikos II appoints his nephew John as "panhypersebastos" and "guardian of Thessalonike and all the other western cities"; about this time, he also names John, his eldest son by Irene-Yolanda, as despot, with some kind of power in Th. which lasts until John's death (1307).
1308	The Catalan Grand Company, ravaging Macedonia, unsuccessfully besieges Th.
1310	Andronikos II sends his son and co-emperor, the discredited Michael IX, to reside in Th.
1320	On the death of Michael IX, his widow, Maria Palaiologina, becomes the nun Xene and resides in Th. until her death in 1333.

1322 Despot Constantine, son of Andronikos II, as governor of Th. makes a lax showing against the rebellious Andronikos III; is driven out of the city by a mob rising, which hands the city over to partisans of Andronikos II.

1326 John the Panhypersebastos, nephew of Andronikos II, as governor of Th., plans to defy his uncle and create an independent Macedonian regime for himself, is bought off, and dies soon after.

1327 A shift in factional politics allows Andronikos III and his lieutenant, John Kantakouzenos, to take control of Th.

1328 The new emperor Andronikos III appoints as governor of Th. the treacherous Syrgiannes, who subsequently intrigues with the dowager empress Maria/Xene.

1334 Forces of Stefan Dušan of Serbia menace Th.

1338 The empress Anna Palaiologina, mother of the last claimant to the Despotate of Epiros, is exiled to an estate in Th. until her escape in 1341.

1341ff Dušan's Serbian forces pose renewed threats to Th.

1342 Elite partisans of the usurper John VI Kantakouzenos attempt to hand Th. over to him, but the faction of Zealots arouses the populace to expel pro-Kantakouzenian notables and establish a quasi-independent regime, supporting the legitimate successor, John V Palaiologos; John Apokaukos, son of the legitimist leader in the capital, Alexios Apokaukos, is sent to share government with Zealot leader Michael Palaiologos; resentful of Zealot high-handedness, John has Michael murdered (1344?).

1345 Upon the murder of Alexios Apokaukos in the capital, his son John pursues an independent policy, seeking to join the Kantakouzenian side in exchange for confirmation of his rule in Th.; but revived Zealot agitation leads to a preemptive riot, as a result of which John and a hundred city notables are brutally murdered; under one Andreas Palaiologos, the Zealot regime becomes more radical and staunchly anti-Kantakouzenian.

1349 With Serbian pressure mounting and the Zealot regime crumbling, Andreas Palaiologos is expelled and his successor, Alexios Metochites, negotiates the city's capitulation; John VI enters Th. in triumph the following year, accompanied by young John V, and the Zealot leadership is broken.

1352 Dissatisfied with his pseudo-independent imperial regime in Th., John V intrigues with Stefan Dušan; his mother, Anna of Savoy, resolves the situation, and, when John moves off to take a partition of Thracian territory, Anna assumes active government of Th. in her own right, as "despoina," until her death ca.1365.

1369 John V names his second son, the despot Manuel, to govern Th., which remains his seat until 1373 when Manuel is named heir to the throne and co-emperor.

1382 Denied the succession after new dynastic turmoil, Manuel assumes rule of Th. with the imperial title, against his father's wishes, and conducts a fully independent anti-Turkish policy from this base.

1387 After a ruinous Turkish siege, the Thessalonians force Manuel to leave and accept some degree of Turkish rule or domination.

1403 By treaty with the Turks, Th. is restored to Byzantine control; after some controversy, Manuel II allows his nephew, John VII, to establish himself there, still with the imperial title.

1408 Upon the death of John VII, Manuel II installs his young third son, the despot Andronikos, as governor in Th.

1423 Besieged by the Turks and hampered by ill health, the desperate despot Andronikos, with his father's approval, negotiates the transfer of Th. to Venice.

1430 After a strained occupation, the Venetians lose Th. when the Turks take it by storm; Sultan Murad II thereafter makes it his favorite residence.

Appendix 2

Interpretations of the Zealots

A. Tafrali, Kabasilas, and the Marxists

The descriptions of the Zealot government by Gregoras and Kantakouzenos, cited above, are the only authenticated contemporaneous statements about the regime's social intents and innovations. In view of the stylized and partisan character of their accusations, however, these passages are suspect, hardly decisive or accurate evidence in themselves. They became, however, the starting point for modern scholarly discussion of the Zealots as "social revolutionaries" who were supposedly committed to a radical program of drastic socioeconomic reform.

That viewpoint was given its first full development by Oreste Tafrali in his classic study *Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle* (Paris, 1913). For this purpose, Tafrali drew heavily on what he regarded as an additional source, and a crucial one. This was a discourse by Nicholas Kabasilas, which purportedly described drastic policies of confiscating monastic properties supposedly pursued by the Zealots.

Attention had first been called to the Kabasilas work by Constantine Sathas, *Μνημεῖα ἑλληνικῆς ἱστορίας*: *Documents inédits relatifs à l'histoire de la Grèce* (Paris, 1882), who published only selections from the text and argued that it revealed the Zealots as freedom-loving patriots rather than as merely nihilistic rabble. On that foundation Tafrali constructed his exposition (pp. 225–72), treating the Zealots with considerable sympathy and seeing their movement as an early example of popular struggle for freedom and social justice—perhaps with echoes of the Paris Commune still reverberating. In the process, Tafrali published passages from the Kabasilas Discourse, arbitrarily selected from the Sathas edition, and not always accurately represented. But Tafrali was fully confident that these passages comprised accurate statements of the Zealots' supposed ideas and program. Until 1957, such presentation of these passages represented the only ready access to the Kabasilas work. During the interval of some forty-four years, Tafrali's projection of the Kabasilas Discourse and his portrayal of the Zealots as social reformers became a working norm among scholars.

Thus, though less sympathetic to the Zealots, Charles Diehl, in his "Les journées révolutionnaires byzantines," *La Revue de Paris* (1 November 1928), accepted Tafrali's basic perspectives. Those perspectives likewise colored the approach of Peter Charanis' "Internal Strife" (1940–41) and "Monastic Properties" (1948). They were the foundation of the section "The Social-Revolutionary Movement of the Zealots of Thessalonica (*circa* 1342–50)," in Ernest Barker's *Social and Political Thought in Byzantium* (Oxford, 1957), 184–93. Both authors included translated passages from Kabasilas as transmitted by Tafrali. Also essentially in this tradition, with hints of Marxist influences, is the article by Robert Browning, "Komounata na zilotit v solun," *Istoričeski Pregled* 6 (1950): 509–25.

Tafrali's perspectives found particular response, however, among Marxist-inspired scholars. The first explicitly Marxist analysis was a product of both the pre– and post–World War II world, by a Greek political writer, Giannis Kordatos, *Κομμούνα τῆς Θεσσαλονίκης (1342–1349)* (Athens, 1928; rev. ed. 1975). After World War II, however, the focus on issues of "class struggle" was intensified by Marxist-inspired scholars of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist bloc. The idea of the Zealots as freedom-fighter revolutionaries and reformers was exemplified by B. T. Gorjanov, "Vozstanie Zilotov v Vizantii (1342–1349)," *IzvIstFil* 3 (1946); and by M. A. Levčenko (in *VizVrem* 2/27 [1949]). No Marxist himself, Alexander P. Kazhdan early identified himself with the argument that the Zealots represented a popular movement aimed at destroying the feudal classes in Byzantine society, in *Agrarnye otnošenija v Vizantij XIII–XV vv.* (Moscow, 1952), 183–97. Kazhdan continued to uphold that viewpoint, while stressing that their Byzantine contemporaries viewed the Zealots and their populist violence as totally out of step with fixed Byzantine presumptions of the unchallengeable permanence of the empire's divinely sanctioned order: thus in his book (co-written with Giles Constable), *People and Power in Byzantium: An Introduction to Modern Byzantine Studies* (Washington, D.C., 1982), 35.

Meanwhile, the presumptions by Sathas, Tafrali, and their epigones about the Kabasilas text were decisively challenged by the belated publication of the full work. Its actual title is "Discourse concerning the Illegal Acts of Officials Daringly Committed against Things Sacred" (Λόγος περὶ τῶν παρανόμως τοῖς ἄρχουσιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἱεροῖς τολμωμένων). Ihor Ševčenko published the complete Greek text, with English synopsis, plus extensive historical and textual discussion, in his "Nicholas Cabasilas' 'Anti-Zealot' Discourse: A Reinterpretation," *DOP* 11 (1957): 79–171—published, it might be noted, in the same year in which appeared Ernest Barker's Tafrali-saturated exposition aforementioned. Ševčenko added textual variants and apparatus to his transcription, plus further discussion, in "The Author's Draft of Nicolas Cabasilas' 'Anti-Zealot' Discourse in *Parisinus Graecus* 1276," *DOP* 14 (1960): 181–201. Finally, he reviewed scholarly reactions and reassessed (but effectively restated) his position in "A Postscript on Nicolas Cabasilas' 'Anti-Zealot' Discourse," *DOP* 16 (1962): 403–8. All three of these publications have now been conveniently reproduced as nos. IV, V, and VI in the collection of his papers, *Society and Intellectual Life in Late Byzantium* (London, 1981), and constitute some of the most important assessments of the Zealot issue yet published.

Ševčenko at first argued compellingly that Kabasilas' Discourse had nothing to do with the Zealot episode: indeed, he posited that the work was written around 1344 and was actually directed against the policies of Alexios Apokaukos in the capital and against such a prelate as the anti-Palamite patriarch John Kalekas. Then ("Postscript") he modified this by proposing a later dating, and that the ecclesiastical appropriations of the despot (and future emperor) Manuel Palaiologos in 1371 might have been the author's target.

Reactions to Ševčenko's bombshell varied, and his third publication in the series surveys many of them. Some scholars tried to find a compromise stance. In his "Observations on the 'Anti-Zealot' Discourse of Cabasilas," *RESEE* 9 (1971): 369–76, Charanis argued that, while the text might not have been directed exclusively against the Zealots, it may have reflected their ideas as some component of the rationale it attacks. George Dennis, in his *The Reign of Manuel II Palaeologus in Thessalonica, 1382–1387* (Rome, 1960), 91 note 30, at first supported Ševčenko's placing of the Discourse in the debate over ecclesiastical appropriations in the 1370s. Subsequently, however, in the introduction to his *The Letters of Manuel Palaeologus* (Washington, D.C., 1977), xxxii–xxxiii, Dennis proposed that Kabasilas intended the treatise as a generalized rhetorical and theoretical exercise, "not directed at any specific individuals," suggesting further that it might have been commissioned by, and addressed to, Manuel II himself, rather than being aimed at him. Dennis has gone on to argue that it does not matter to whom the treatise was addressed; that it was a generalized discussion of a serious issue (unjust seizure of church properties and wealth), and clearly written in the later three

decades of the fourteenth century; this in "Nicholas Cabasilas Chamaëtos and His Discourse on Abuses Committed by Authorities against Sacred Things," *Byzantine Studies/Etudes byzantines* 5 (1978): 80–87, repr. as no. XI in idem, *Byzantium and the Franks*.

Some scholars reacted to Ševčenko's publications either by ignoring them or by pretending they would just go away. The most dogged adherent to Tafrali's presumptions was the Cypriot social historian Constantine Kyrris. Having produced an earlier study, "The Political Organisation of the Byzantine Urban Classes between 1204 and 1341," in *Liber memorialis Antonio Era* (= *Studies Presented to the International Commission for the History of Representative and Parliamentary Institutions, XXVI: Cagliari, 1961*) (Brussels, 1963), 21–31, Kyrris went on to construct an elaborate profile of the Zealot regime in his "Gouvernés et gouvernants à Byzance pendant la révolution des Zélotes (1341–1350)," in *Gouvernés et Gouvernants*, II: *Antiquité et haut moyen âge* (= *Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin pour l'Histoire Comparative des Institutions* 23) (Brussels, 1968), 271–330, in which he adjusted to some of Ševčenko's conclusions while still essentially accepting the Kabasilas-based traditions of Tafrali.

Far more tenacious were socialist-bloc Marxist scholars. In the course of his volume *Pozdnevizantijskij feodalizm* (Moscow, 1962), B. T. Gorjanov rejected (and partially misrepresented) Ševčenko's arguments and reasserted the validity of the Kabasilas Discourse as a source for the Zealots (pp. 310–18, 331–32). Michael J. Sjuzjumov was also a continuing advocate of the socialist viewpoint that the Zealots, joining the "bureaucratic" faction of Apokaukos, were part of the prolonged struggle against the "feudal" elements of Byzantine society (*VizVrem* 28 [1968]: 15–37).

Soviet interpretative tradition was also backed by other scholars of the Eastern bloc. An early polemic by the Rumanian scholar E. Frances, "Răscoala Zeloţilor din Thessalonic în lumina ultimelor cercetări," *Academia Republicii Populare Romîne, Subsecţia de ştiinte Istorice şi Institutui de Istorie din Bucureşti. Studi: Revistă de Istorie* 12 (1959): 257–66, crudely dismissed Ševčenko's work with a raw Marxist reaffirmation of the need to celebrate proletarian mass movements. More articulate expositions of continuing Marxist interpretation have been the East German Ernst Werner and the Czech Vera Hrochová. While persisting in themes of class struggle, however, they have become principal proponents in tracing links between the Zealots and supposed counterparts in contemporaneous Italy: accordingly, their work will be discussed in section B, below.

The most balanced and fully developed post-Ševčenko response from the Marxist tradition, however, can be found in the early work of the East German scholar Klaus-Peter Matschke, *Fortschritt und Reaktion in Byzanz im 14. Jahrhundert. Konstantinopel in der Bürgerkriegsperiode von 1341–1354* (Berlin, 1971). His discussion of the anti-Kantakouzenian upheavals in the capital cast Alexios Apokaukos as a populist "progressive" struggling against feudal "reaction"; but the Zealot regime in Thessalonike is itself peripheral to his Constantinopolitan focus. A different but altogether moderate socialist-sociological approach is that of Günter Weiss, in his *Johannes Kantakouzenos—Aristokrat, Staatsmann, Kaiser und Mönch in der Gesellschaftsentwicklung von Byzanz im 14. Jahrhundert* (Wiesbaden, 1969), which is a detailed attempt at dissecting fourteenth-century Byzantine society. In discussing the Zealot movement within the context of the popular role in the period (pp. 83–102), he is willing to recognize that movement as an important populist reform effort, but he rejects the old ideological portrayal of it, observing that it "lacked the slogans which characterize modern revolutions, [and] lacked any social-revolutionary program" (p. 84).

With the end of the cold war and the dissolution of the Eastern bloc, polemic perceptions of the Zealots as early proletarian heroes have become more muted. But their death knell was sounded early on, in the brief and rather neutral section on the Zealots in Léon-Pierre Raybaud's *Le Gouvernement et l'administration centrale de l'empire byzantin sous les premiers Paléologues (1258–1354)* (Paris, 1968), 143–45. This ends by rejecting as "unacceptable" the Soviet idea of the Zealots as foes of the feudal lords. "It is dangerous to make Thessalonica an archetype of the revolutionary com-

mune, since, if the ties connecting it to the central government were loosened, they were not broken."

As for the Kabasilas Discourse, meanwhile, debate will continue as to its date and purpose. But Ševčenko has removed it once and for all as something to be read as a direct source for the Zealot movement and its ideas.

B. Western Connections

A number of scholars have sought to link the Zealot rising with patterns of urban unrest and violence that manifested themselves extensively in western Europe in the middle of the fourteenth century. The possibilities of such connections or parallels were first pointed to by Tafrali himself (*Thessalonique au quatorzième siècle,* 256–57). They were also invoked by George L. Brătianu, in *Privilèges et franchises municipales dans l'Empire byzantin* (Paris, 1936), 119–22.

Since World War II, the most prominent advocates of such Western connections or parallels have been two scholars of Marxist persuasion, who have perceived influences by, and analogies to, social radicalism in contemporaneous Italian urban risings. Vera Hrochová, first in "Die Problematik der Zelotenbewegung in Thessalonike 1342–1349," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg* 10, *Gesellschafts- und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe* 1 (1961): 1447–50, and then more fully in her article "La révolte des Zélotes à Salonique et les communes italiennes," *BSl* 22 (1961): 1–15, has stressed particular influences of the Genoese revolution of 1339 upon the Zealots. In this she was also followed by Kyrris, in his aforementioned "Gouvernés et gouvernants" (328–30). That perspective had, however, already been undercut by Ševčenko, who had argued emphatically and compellingly that Genoese contacts and influences in Thessalonike must have been negligible in this period, in his own article "The Zealot Revolution and the Supposed Genoese Colony in Thessalonica," in *Προσφορὰ εἰς Στίλπωνα Π. Κυριακίδην ἐπὶ τῇ εἰκοσιπενταετερίδι τῆς καθηγεσίας αὐτοῦ (1926–1951)* (= Ἑλληνικά, Παράρτημα 4: Thessalonike, 1953), 603–17, and reprinted as no. III in his collection *Society and Intellectual Life in Late Byzantium* (London, 1981).

Meanwhile, Ernest Werner, "Volkstümliche Häretiker oder sozial-politische Reformer? Probleme der revolutionären Volksbewegung in Thessalonike, 1342–1349," *Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig, Gesellschafts- und wissenschaftliche Reihe* 1 (1958–59): 45–83, while insisting on analysis based upon class-struggle theory, stressed the supposed parallelism of the Zealot episode with the Ciompi upheaval of 1378 in Florence. He then went on to analyze that episode itself from a Marxist perspective in his "Probleme städtischer Volksbewegungen im 14. Jahrhundert, dargestellt am Beispiel der Ciompi-Erhebung in Florenz," in *Städtische Volksbewegung im 14. Jahrhundert,* ed. E. Englemann (Berlin, 1960), 11–55. See also V. I. Rutenburg, "Ziloti i Ciompi," *VizVrem* 30 (1969): 3–37; as well as Werner's own "Gesellschaft und Kultur im XIV. Jahrhundert: Sozial-ökonomischen Fragen," *Actes du XIVe Congrès International des Études Byzantines,* vol. 1 (Bucharest, 1974), 93–110.

If anything, the comparison of the Zealot and Ciompi episodes would likely *discourage* rather than further the reading of present-day ideologies or mentalities into these events of the past. Thus see the work of Gene Brucker, "The Ciompi Revolution," in *Florentine Studies: Politics and Society in Renaissance Florence,* ed. N. Rubinstein (London, 1968); as well as Brucker's earlier book, *Florentine Politics and Society, 1343–1378* (Princeton, N.J., 1962). Such scholarship has done much to dispel the mythology and rhetoric about the Ciompi movement: redefining it as an event intelligible in terms of contemporaneous Florentine circumstances, rather than being loaded with anachronistic projections of modern "class struggle," "proletarian consciousness," and "social radicalism."

The entire issue now languishes, but it is difficult to see that Italian events and ideas could seriously have had much direct influence on the very different ideas, institutions, and perceptions of

Byzantines, steeped as they were in their own very distinct ways of thinking. The best perspective on the problem is that the Thessalonian phenomena were just vaguely parallel to the Western ones, but were neither identical to nor connected with them. Thus Robert Browning in his essay "Byzantine Thessaloniki: A Unique City?" (*Dialogos* 2 [1995]: 98) who, after pondering similarities only to minimize them, observes: "it would be unwise to postulate any direct connection in the total absence of evidence." The point has been put even more succinctly by Ševčenko: "Conditions prevailing in the [Byzantine] Empire since the beginning of the fourteenth century furnish a sufficient explanation for the Zealot revolution" ("Zealot Revolution/Genoese Colony," 616–17).

What is interesting, however, is that it never seems to have occurred to any Byzantine writers themselves to draw any such parallels between the Zealot episode and any foreign manifestations. This point is clear when we compare the descriptions of the Zealots by Gregoras and Kantakouzenos, already cited, to the comments these two writers make about prior and contemporaneous popular upheavals in Genoa: Gregoras, I, 548, and II, 687–88, on the Genoese revolution of 1339 and its extended aftermath; Kantakouzenos, III, 196–98, on a social upheaval in Genoa in the early 1350s (a year or two *after* the end of the Zealot regime). (For observations on these passages, see Ševčenko, "Zealot Revolution," 611 ff). In his instance, Gregoras does speak of general conditions around the world in which "governments and regimes, whether popular or elite, should be troubled by divisions and factions turned against themselves, thrown into internecine struggles; and there was virtually no place devoid of this, no place that could not have been wrecked by such disaster, if not always in identical fashion, at least to a greater or lesser extent." Yet, even though he is discussing upheavals of the mid-1340s at that point, Gregoras explicitly fails to connect Zealot Thessalonike to such a comparative context. Even more significant, perhaps, is the fact that these two writers expressly avoid using the same terminology for the Genoese events that they employ for the Thessalonian ones.

There *is,* to be sure, the teasing accusation of "foreign" influences made by Philotheos in his *Life of Sava* (cited in note 45).