Hitler

[IAH]

I'm not so knowledgable on World War Two, but am quite fascinated in the inter-war years. I'll start with a common one...

One debate which has been prominent among historians for decades is that of Hitler's intentions and beliefs, espescially in the crucial late 1930s. Some historians say that Hitler's aims were consistent throughout his adult life until the day of his death: to restore the German empire, specifically through expansion in the east, and to remove the Jews (and others he disliked, including slavs). Others however say that Hitler was naive, and even as late as 1939 he thought he might "get away" with invading Poland. They say that war on such a scale was never his plan, he was forced into it by economic necessity.

What are your views on Hitler's real aims? Did Hitler's policies shape events, or did events shape Hitler's policies?

I have some good books on this subject, but you'll have to give me some time to type out the extracts, unless I can find them on the internet.

[Сержант Уханов]

Hitler

Hitler was all but naive. He declared wars and killed people with one aim - the "Thousand Year Reich" to dominate over all free people in this world. Who opposed him had to die. The NSDAP party, the SS, Gestapo and SD are crime organisations are criminal organisations. He is a war criminal and a enemy of mankind. The SS was to ensure order on the occupied territories and execute the nations like jews, slavs, gipsy etc. They were his Black Guard and The Weapon of Death :roll:

I'm translating a article named "The secret plot of nacism". But i'n almost sure u don't speak bulgarian...

[Гост]

A very interesting aspect is the way Mussolini viewed Hitler until the war began

he once called Hitler a buffon and he criticised Hitler for being "weak" and "frail" compared to him

[Sir Gray]

Just the same said Hitler about Mussolini. Dictator's ego i suppose, one is always 'the strongest", "the best" ect. ect.

[rambler]

One cannot deny Hitler's tremendous willpower, though, and his charisma,as well.

[cyberhunne]

Originally posted by "IAH"

I'm not so knowledgable on World War Two, but am quite fascinated in the inter-war years. I'll start with a common one...

One debate which has been prominent among historians for decades is that of Hitler's intentions and beliefs, espescially in the crucial late 1930s. Some historians say that Hitler's aims were consistent throughout his adult life until the day of his death: to restore the German empire, specifically through expansion in the east, and to remove the Jews (and others he disliked, including slavs). Others however say that Hitler was naive, and even as late as 1939 he thought he might "get away" with invading Poland. They say that war on such a scale was never his plan, he was forced into it by economic necessity.

What are your views on Hitler's real aims? Did Hitler's policies shape events, or did events shape Hitler's policies?

I have some good books on this subject, but you'll have to give me some time to type out the extracts, unless I can find them on the internet.

I read a theory by Sebastian Haffner (a very prominent historian on the 3rd Reich here - he lived through that time, fled form the Nazis to London to publish a newspaper for German refugees and returned to post-war Germany).

He says that with regards to the attack on Poland Hitler didn?t positively plan or intend a world war, he just took a "calculated risk" of war with UK/F. He hoped to get away with it like with Sudetenland/Rump Cz Rep, but didn?t mind war either. So it?s a kind of middle way between the theories you mention, and I think it sounds reasonable.

I don?t think Hitler planned for a massive world war, but once the attack on Poland was on its way and the declarations of war from UK/F were received, there was hardly a turning back. My personal guess is that once Hitler realised that this is a big war (when UK rejected any peace offers after the fall of France) he just went nuts.

I think Hitler?s successes pre-war can?t be denied, in a way he was a good "war drum banging" peace politician, but a horrible war leader. Haffner also asks the bold hypothtical question that if Hitler had died in ?38 or so (C&C red Alert anyone ), he might be remembered as the greatest German politician. Not only he managed to compeltely overturn the Versailles humiliation, he got Germany out of depression, made Germany once more the strongest power in Europe and basically managed to get away with anything in foreign politics.

Of course these achievements vanish in comparison to the terrible barbaric acts of Hitler, but it?s an interesting hypothetical question nonetheless.

[IAH]

Re: Hitler

OK I've found some extracts from some prominant historians (Mason, Overy, Taylor etc) who all have differing views, but imo put them very well. I'll type them up tommorow.

As one of the historians put it (I forget which now), Hitler said many things, and frequently contradicted himself, but we know that some of what he said must have been true. The task is therefore to find a criterion of veracity. Hitler spouted a lot of nonsense in his years, but he must have meant some of it. The key I guess is to analyse to whom he said what, when it was said, and to determine in each circumstance whether he was really speaking his mind. This is a very subjective form of historical discipline, but sadly the only one available. This is probably why historians still can't agree about it to this day.

[IAH]

Haffner also asks the bold hypothtical question that if Hitler had died in ?38 or so (C&C red Alert anyone ), he might be remembered as the greatest German politician. Not only he managed to compeltely overturn the Versailles humiliation, he got Germany out of depression, made Germany once more the strongest power in Europe and basically managed to get away with anything in foreign politics.

Of course these achievements vanish in comparison to the terrible barbaric acts of Hitler, but it?s an interesting hypothetical question nonetheless.

This is true, but even after Versailles Germany was in a pretty strong position that many of these achievements were likely. I believe the problem with Versailles was that it was sufficiently harsh to cause resentment among Germany, and it's enforcement sufficiently weak that Germany as a nation could express this resentment. But to come back to my point, Germany was, even after Versailles, the dominant power in it's area, outmuscling all it's neighbours, and any firm diplomat could have brought down reparations payments. For someone so evil, people expect Hitler to have been an absolute idiot. He did I accept have some economic successes, but Germany was a strong nation who was at her lowest when the Weimar Republic were tasked with rebuilding the country, and by the time Hitler came to power Germany was "on the up" anyway. Furthermore, pro-Hitler historians see fit to compare Hitler's best years with Weimar's worst. Weimar was hit badly by the Wall Street crash, as was the rest of the world, and this was great for Hitler to compare his achievements to, but a very unfair comparison. His achievements might have happened anyway under a different leader because as I say Germany was a powerful nation back "on the up" when he came to power.

[FeldMarshal Kalchev]

Re: Hitler

After Versailles Germany was forbiddan to have an air force. Also the army had limitations which allowed the Reich to have less people organized in the military then the other countries which took part in the Great War. After '33 the ressurection of the Luftwaffe began in secret, and although the restrictions Hitler announced it officialy in '35 ( if I'm not mistakeing ). It wa during this period when the humiliations from the Versailles treaty were forgotten and Germany started to grow more and more - politicaly and militarly (don't know if such word exists ).

I think Hitler's goals were to take over France and the Soviet Union. The only one that didn't behave as he wanted was Great Britain. Probably the main reason for the whole collapse of the Third Reich...

[cyberhunne]

Originally posted by "IAH"

...His achievements might have happened anyway under a different leader because as I say Germany was a powerful nation back "on the up" when he came to power.

I'm not so sure about that, I think Hitler's radicalism and forceful demands aided to get more acceptance especially from Britain, who might have thought "he's an idiot but he does have a point". A more "diplomatic" German leader at that time would probably have been mostly ignored with his demands. Just look at the achievements of Gustav Stresemann (the most famous Weimar Republic foreign minister), with his honest and considerate approach he only got a few treaties done, Hitler OTOH went for the big cake.

[Imperial]

Re: Hitler

glad to see a good discussion going on at last here as well

[Imperial]

And my 2 cents (damn I use this expr. too often..at least they are eurocents )

I haven't read Mein Kampf and what I know about him is mostly from his generals or historians.

He surely wasn't stupid, however he, just as well as his foremost people like Goering and Himmler, went dreaming too far. And that passed over to the German people and the German army and OKH (which is the worst IMO for when this happened, they become much more prone to accept his initially so-so reasonable but later totally mad demands; if he was initially faced by a strong OKH that held their own, I believe many errors could have been spared). I once told Victor that the Germans were the most dreaming nation during WW2 To woke up for the worst nightmare any nation could face, but that is another story.

You need only to think about it not being compulsury for women to go work in the war factories....though the slave labour indeed can explain this phenomena to some extent, I think Hitler's idea of keeping Germany on peacetime state even in '42 ( IIRC ) was pure madness....

sorry for the lack of coherence but I haven't slept for two days now

[IAH]

OK, for those who don't know, there are two schools of history on this issue, the intentionalist and the structuralist.

Intentionalist v Structuralist:

The 'structuralist' historians believe German foreign policy was determined collectively by a whole range of different factors, some determined by the Nazi party, some not. They reject the idea that German foreign policy was set to follow a rigidly defined course, and instead claim that it was unclear and without specific aims, that Hitler was a man of improvisation and experiment.

The 'intentionalist' historians place great emphasis on Hitler's personal determination to carry though a pre-planned foreign policy programme. They see Hitler as a man of great will-power and vision whose character and drive were the key factors in shaping German foreign policy. Furthermore, they see his policy as based on a clearly defined programme of objectives. Some consider that his aim was to progress towards his ultimate goal on a stage by stage basis, according to a 'stufenplan'.

Much of the focus of historians revolves around the Hossbach memorandum, named after the man who wrote it. Hossbach was present when Hitler gave a speech in November 1937 and the memorandum was his notes on Hitler's speech. The document was used extensively during the Nuremberg trials, but historians have long argued it's worth, and what conclusions can be drawn from it. It is one of the few inside sources we have from that time which may help guage just what Hitler was thinking.

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I present here the first source, a well known structuralist historian...
From AJP Taylor - The Origins of the Second World War:

"Hitler's exposition was in large part day-dreaming, unrelated to what followed in real life. Even if seriously meant, it was not a call to action, at any rate not to the action of a great war; it was a demonstration that a great war would not be necessary. Despite the preliminary talk about 1943-1945,its solid core was the examination of the chances for peaceful triumphs in 1938, when France would be preoccupied elsewhere. Hitler's listeners remained doubtful. The generals insisted that the French army would be superior to the German even if engaged against Italy as well. Neurath doubted whether a Mediterranean conflict between France and Italy were imminent. Hitler waved these doubts aside: 'He was convinced of Britain's non-participation, and therefore he did not believe in the probability of belligerent action by France against Germany.' There is only one safe conclusion to be drawn from this rambling disquisition: Hitler was gambling on some twist of fortune which would present him with success in foreign affairs, just as a miracle had made him Chancellor in 1933. There was here no concrete plan, no directive of German policy in 1937 and 1938. Or if there was a directive, it was to wait upon events.

Why then did Hitler hold this conference? This question was not asked at Nuremberg; it has not been asked by historians. Yet surely it is an elementary part of historical discipline to ask of a document [the Hossbach memorandum] not only what is in it, but why it came into existence. The conference of 5 November 1937 was a curious gathering. Only Goering was a Nazi. The others were old-style Conservatives who had remained in office to keep Hitler under control; all of them except Goering were his opponents; and he did not trust Goering much. Why did he reveal his inmost thoughts to men whom he distrusted and whom he was shortly to discharge? This question has an easy answer: he did not reveal his inmost thoughts. There was no crisis in foreign policy to provoke a broad discussion or sweeping decisions.

...

...none of the men who attended the meeting on 5 November gave it another thought until Goering found the record produced against him at Nuremberg as evidence of his war guilt. From that moment it has haunted the corridoors of historical research. It is the basis for the view that there is nothing to be discovered about the origins of the second World War. Hitler, it is claimed, decided on war, and planned it in detail on 5 November 1937. Yet the Hossbach memorandum contains no plans of the kind, and would never have been supposed to do so, unless it had been displayed at Nuremberg. The memorandum tells us, what we know already, that Hitler (like every other German statesman) intended Germany to become the dominant Power in Europe. It also tells us that he speculated how this might happen. His speculations were mistaken. They bear hardly any relation to the actual outbreak of war in 1939. A racing tipster who only reached Hitler's level of accuracy would not do well for his clients..."
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I will type up others later, and then we can argue whose argument is the most convincing